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 This dissertation investigates the state of North Carolina in the years before 
American intervention in the Great War by focusing on the actions, speeches, and 
writings of House Majority Leader Claude Kitchin. Despite his importance to such a 
pivotal decade in American history, Kitchin is a largely forgotten figure today. He 
worked to prevent the United States from entering the war but ultimately failed in this 
task. Other prominent figures are usually given credit as the loudest and most influential 
voices of opposition, but Kitchin excelled in this role. From his not so humble origins, he 
emerged as a leader of an anti-war preparedness movement at a time when so many 
Americans were pushing the country closer to the war. Kitchin worked around the clock 
to convince his own constituents, as well as Americans from around the country, that the 
United States was already well-prepared to face the challenges of a world at war. 
 President Wilson called for a national campaign of war preparedness years before 
the United States was even at war. And because the Atlantic Ocean proved to be such a 
good barrier between the Old and New Worlds many of Kitchin’s contemporaries argued 
for tremendous increases in naval expenditures. Kitchin took particular issue with these 
demands for a dramatic naval build up and consistently reminded the nation that the 
United States already had the best navy in the world, behind Great Britain’s. “We are 
already prepared,” he often said. 
 When it became clear that Kitchin was on the losing side of the fight, he stuck to 
his convictions and delivered an inspiring speech on the House floor hours before the 
vote for war.  He knew this vote might signal the death knell of his political career but 
could only vote how his conscience allowed. After the declaration, he worked to protect 
the American people from overpaying for the war. He determined that if big businesses 
would profit from it, then they should pay for it. And he followed this policy until the war 
ended. After peace was declared and the Republicans took back Congress, he quietly 
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INRTODUCTION: HISTORIOGRAPHY AND THE GREAT WAR 
 
 
WAR CLOUD COVERS ALL EUROPE AND HUGE FORCES ARE MOVING. 
--Charlotte Daily Observer, July 25, 1914 
 
In 1914, no one in North Carolina could imagine that a confusing assassination 
that happened some five thousand miles away would have such a profound and dramatic 
impact on their own lives. Some would be shocked when news of the assassination of 
Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the ancient Hapsburg throne, reached the Old North State, 
but many more would be indifferent. The complicated Old-World politics of the July 
Crisis and ensuing months that ensured a lengthy and bloody war would take place 
seemed to be run-of-the-mill for Europeans who had a very long, and very recent, history 
of regional conflict. In the first years of the war, few Americans could see any benefit 
from military involvement. Eventually, certain instances, such as the sinking of cargo 
ships with American citizens on board, caused moments of panic. It seems, however, that 
the state of North Carolina had resigned itself to entering the war even before the 
declaration in April 1917. Both governors Locke Craig and Thomas Bickett responded to 
President Woodrow Wilson’s requests for war preparedness measures with some degree 
of enthusiasm.  
Whether or not the United States should enter into the Great War would become a 
hotly debated topic around the country. The war started in a corner of the world that few 
Americans were aware of. Immigrants and the children of immigrants from both sides of 
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the conflict populated the United States, but very few actively advocated on either 
side of the debate, based on their heritage. North Carolina was economically benefitting 
from the war after a worrisome opening outlook. The war enabled the state to bring some 
of its agriculture and industry into the new century. The president implored his citizens to 
remain neutral in their thoughts and actions and many did. However, there was a careful 
balancing act to play to achieve this objective, and true neutrality was difficult to come 
by. 
The stage was set for the great debate of American entry into the World War. One 
Tar Heel emerged as an integral component to lead the debate: Claude Kitchin. He 
remained relatively quiet on the subject in the first years of the war. After all, it was still a 
European war at that point. But when President Wilson began moving the country closer 
to the brink of war during his preparedness campaigns, Kitchin became one of his loudest 
and most influential opponents. Scholars note that North Carolina’s role in the Great War 
saga makes up only a single chapter in the history of the American war experience. 
However, Kitchin’s voice merits its own chapter in the ordeal. “Kitchinism” eventually 
entered the political vocabulary to indicate the antiwar dialect of southern, progressive 
Democrats.1 
The history of American involvement in the Great War before and after the 
official declaration of war came in April of 1917 has come back to popular discussion 
over the last decade, owing in large part to many recent centennial celebrations that 
 
1 Jessica Bandel, North Carolina and the Great War, 1914-1918 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 2017), vi-vii; David Traxel, Crusader Nation: The United States in Peace and the Great War, 1898-
1920 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006), 286. 
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marked the conclusion of the war. North Carolina, in particular, has seen a rise in 
museum exhibits and public interest of the state’s role in the war. The state’s Department 
of Natural and Cultural Resources ran an online blog with a kind of “100 years ago 
today” posting. The state museum had a well-attended exhibition of North Carolina’s role 
in the war. This dissertation joins in these efforts by exploring North Carolina’s role in 
the years leading to American entry to the war. It explores preparations for entering the 
Great War before the United States was officially involved, the key political figures who 
voiced opposition to entry, the national war-preparedness campaign from the point of 
view of Claude Kitchin, and the state’s role after the declaration of war in 1917. Much of 
the viewpoint comes from House Majority Leader Claude Kitchin, a Democrat from the 
second district of North Carolina, who was one of the most influential figures in America 
during one of its most trying international ordeals.  
In this dissertation, I use the terms “Great War” and “World War” more than 
“World War I” or “the First World War,” as this is what contemporaries would have 
called it. Of course, individual nations have different names for the war. The British 
generally referred to the “Great War,” while Germans often used “Weltkrieg” (World 
War). The United States seemed to interchange between “Great War,” probably because 
of the Anglophone influence, and “World War” after initially referring to the “European 
War.” Similarly, Francophones called it “La Grand Guerre” (The Great War), before 
interchanging the term with “World War.” For the sake of breaking up monotony or to 
keep consistent with any sources being cited, I occasionally use the terms “World War I” 
or “the First World War.” 
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 Historians such as C. Vann Woodward have often noted that Tom Watson 
became the voice of southern opposition to American involvement in the Great War. 
While Watson was a significant and remarkably influential voice in the anti-war 
movement, recognition of him as the “loudest” voice does not complete the story. In a 
recent article written for The Journal of Southern History, historian Zachary Smith 
summed it up, “As [Jeanette] Keith, [Anthony] Gaughan, and others have made clear, 
Watson may have been the loudest and most persistent voice of discontent.” Smith 
mentioned that Claude Kitchin was another “popular southern Democratic politician” but 
maintained that Watson had been the major southern opponent of preparedness. The 
problem with this line of thinking, though, is that Watson was in no position of real 
authority to challenge President Wilson in the prewar period. Watson was in the House 
decades earlier and did not enter the Senate until after the war ended. For this reason, and 
many others, it is important to reevaluate this period of American history.2 
Representative Claude Kitchin, on the other hand, was the loudest and most 
influential voice of the anti-preparedness and anti-war groups in the United States 
between 1914 and 1917 from a position of high political power. The Office of the House 
Majority Leader has been described as second in power only to the president. Kitchin 
worked to educate his own constituents as well as Americans around North Carolina and 
nationwide about the dangers of a dramatic and large peace-time army and naval buildup. 
Kitchin argued that this would set a dangerous precedent that would lead to renewed 
 
2 Zachary Smith, “Tom Watson and Resistance to Federal War Policies in Georgia during World War I,” 
The Journal of Southern History 78, no. 2 (2012): 296. 
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industrial militarism in the immediate and distrustful aftermath of the war, as most of 
Europe would look to the United States as an example. When Congress voted to declare 
war on Germany in April 1917, Kitchin shifted his focus to financially supporting the war 
from his position in the House despite his never-ending opposition to a war which he 
called unjust and abominable.  
Kitchin’s correspondence with his fellow politicians, as well as the countless 
letters of support that he received regarding the president’s preparedness program from 
North Carolinians are essential pieces of evidence, which demonstrate the Tar Heel 
state’s reluctance to become involved in the war. Many state residents did not believe that 
it was necessary for the safety or prosperity of the United States to get involved and made 
their support known to Kitchin. The balance tipped in favor of anti-preparedness and anti-
war. Despite his grand accomplishments and grander failures during this pivotal time in 
American history, Kitchin is remarkably unknown today. Though the centennial events of 
the last decade marking the beginning, middle, and end of the Great War, many have 
collectively forgotten, or chosen not to remember, the voices of opposition who loudly 
detested our involvement in “the most destructive war known in the history of mankind.” 
Too often these dissidents are lumped together in a category of conscientious objectors, 
slackers, and cowards. This dissertation argues that Kitchin, and many North Carolinians 
like him who opposed American involvement in the war, were integral to the complete 
story of this period. Kitchin rode a wave of white supremacy to political power and 
became one of the most powerful congressional wartime leaders in American history. 
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This dissertation joins the ranks of thesis-centered biographies that bring 
important, but often forgotten, Americans into the spotlight and highlight their central 
roles in effecting America’s foreign and domestic policy. Countless biographies have 
been written and much ink has been spilled over American war heroes and politicians 
who led the country into the Great War. Similarly, tome-length works on combat, 
strategy, and tactics are innumerable. My work on Kitchin will push historiography in a 
new direction by illuminating the contributions of a figure from the other side, a powerful 
voice that fought against American entry to the World War.3  
Jennifer Keene’s 2016 article in The Historian detailed the historiography of the 
First World War in the United States. She noted that “the number of dedicated World 
War I historians remains quite small within the United States,” and many historians who 
write about the war position their works in subfields, such as African American, military, 
or labor history. In closing, she writes, “World War I does not hold their interest for very 
long.” This article explains that most of the major works on the United States in the Great 
War, beyond the studies from military historians and “buffs” who explain the strategies 
of individual units, are done from a macro perspective. In other words, it seems that 
historians have offered arguments on wide ranging issues concerning this topic, but there 
is very little in the way of investigation at the state or local level, especially from the 
voices of opposition. Even more recent historiography complements this thesis. A recent 
set of essays collected in North Carolina’s Experience during the First World War cover 
 
3 Bruce Dierenfield, Keeper of the Rules: Congressman Howard W. Smith of Virginia (Charlottesville: 
University Press of Virginia, 1987); Douglas B. Craig, Progressives at War: William G. McAdoo and 
Newton D. Baker, 1863-1941 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013). 
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topics from the military, politics, business and labor, memory, and the “home front” but 
they all lack any significant detail or attention to opposition. This extends that narrative 
that we live with today, that the United States would automatically enter the war at some 
point. Nearly every essay in this anthology pays minor service to Americans in 
opposition to the war, including Kitchin, but there are no dedicated entries about the 
voices of opposition.4 
Similarly, North Carolina’s role in the Great War “makes up a single chapter in 
the history of the American war experience,” according to Jessica Bandel in one of the 
most recent books on the World War. “In many ways,” she continued, “that role is no 
different than the overall experience.” The rest of her introduction recounts the standard 
narrative of North Carolina’s role in the war. She asserts that before the war, the populace 
generally supported neutrality, but once war was declared, they changed their views to 
support the United States engaging in Europe, “with few exceptions.” The shift in feeling 
from neutrality to support was not as simple as the story we have been told suggests, but 
it is still accepted by the current historical community. 5 
Other books that concern the Great War and United States are almost always from 
a macro level perspective. Many historians have written about the changing nature of the 
 
4 Jennifer Keene, “Remembering the ‘Forgotten War’: American Historiography on World War I,” The 
Historian 78, no.3 (September 1, 2016): 467; Shepherd W. McKinley and Steven Sabol eds., North 
Carolina’s Experience during the First World War (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2018). 
5 Bandel, North Carolina, vi. This book is more of an introduction-level text for people who may not be 
familiar with the war. As for citations, it has little beyond source suggestions at the end, but it illustrates the 
conventional narrative of North Carolina’s role in the Great War. For the most recent example of this view 
of North Carolina’s role, see James W. Hall, “The Last War of Honor: Manhood, Race, Gender, Class and 




United States on the federal level in direct relation to the war and the increasing demands 
of a country on the brink of entering the war, such as Jennifer Keene’s Doughboys, the 
Great War, and the Remaking of America, Ronald Schaffer’s America in the Great War, 
Ellis Hawley’s The Great War and the Search for a Modern Order, and David M. 
Kennedy’s Over Here. Scholars have also noted how southern state power expanded in 
the years prior to American entry, such as Jeanette Keith in Rich Man’s War, Poor Man’s 
Fight.6  
The motivations behind American entry into the Great War have been the subject 
of much historiographical debate in the last century. One of the earliest schools of 
thought formulated by Charles Seymour in 1921 argued that the war was forced upon 
Wilson and the United States by the German disregard for neutral shipping rights. This 
argument continues to hold merit as many students learn about the sinking of various 
British and American ships under Germany’s policy of unrestricted submarine warfare as 
the leading cause of the United States’ declaration of war.7 
A second school of thought regarding the historiographical debate emerged in the 
1930s and attributed the declaration to economic interests, Allied propaganda, and 
Wilson’s personal bias towards the Allied nations, especially Great Britain. Once the 
 
6 Jennifer Keene, Doughboys, the Great War, and the Remaking of America (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2001); Ronald Schaffer, America in the Great War: The Rise of the War Welfare State 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Ellis W. Hawley, The Great War and the Search for a Modern 
Order: A History of the American People and Their Institutions, 1917-1933 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1992); David M. Kennedy, Over Here: The First World War and American Society (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1980); Jeanette Keith, Rich Man’s War, Poor Man’s Fight: Race, Class, and 
Conscription in the Rural South during the First World War (Chapel Hill: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 2004). 
7 Charles Seymour, Woodrow Wilson and the World War (New Haven: Yale University Press 1921). 
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Second World War began, historians have maintained that Wilson demanded American 
security and for that reason had to go to war. By the 1950s, writers, most especially 
Arthur Link, returned to the unrestricted warfare on the high seas as the major cause but 
also included the economic, political, and idealistic reasons. New Left historians in the 
1960s made note of the American fear of Russian Bolshevism and German imperialism 
as major factors. More recent historiography has combined many of these elements but 
extends the argument that Wilson had the goal of promoting progressive principles 
world-wide through involvement in the peace-making process when the war ended.8 
The current historiography of the Great War, as a whole, is best detailed in The 
Great War in History: Debates and Controversies, 1914 to the Present, written by Jay 
Winter and Antoine Prost. They argue that books and films about WWI can be grouped 
into three distinct generations. The first is what they call the Generation of ’35, who 
understood the war in a nineteenth-century context, meaning top-down history, focused 
on the generals, the battle plans, and general military history. The second generation 
described by Winter and Prost were the witnesses of the Second World War. They 
wanted to understand the First World War through everyday people such as workers, 
civilians, and soldiers because the experience of seeing another world war drove them to 
see the “human face” of war. The third generation Prost and Winter noted turned to 
cultural and micro history. Prost and Winter argued that regardless of the generation, 
 
8 N. Gordon Levin, Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: America’s Response to War and Revolution (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1968), 1-10; Charles Seymour, American Neutrality, 1914-1917 (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1935). 
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there were three big questions about the war for everyone: First, why and how did it 
break out? Second, how was it conducted? And third, what were its consequences?9 
When one seeks micro-histories of the First World War, there are many studies of 
individual American units that served in Europe. In the case of R. Jackson Marshall’s 
Memories of World War I, he summarized North Carolinian doughboys’ contributions in 
Europe. Marshall’s book is the essential history of the North Carolinians who did go fight 
in the Great War, while this dissertation looks more to the North Carolinians who did not 
go to Europe. The battles and battlefield experiences of those who went to war are 
essential to understand and complete the picture in a project like this. For a more 
complete picture of the total American experience on the battlefield, Edward Gutiérrez’ 
Doughboys on the Great War: How American Soldiers Viewed their Military Experience, 
is essential. The author’s immense research details what American soldiers thought of the 
war. Gutiérrez took on an impossible task of diving into the heads of soldiers and created 
a convincing narrative. And, Chad Williams’ Torchbearers of Democracy explores the 
African American experience in the war.10 
The following general reference books proved invaluable to find out more about a 
specific topic concerning American society during the war or about the war itself. 
Edward Coffman’s The Regulars and John Keegan’s The First World War are the 
 
9 Jay Winter and Antoine Prost, The Great War in History: Debates and Controversies, 1914 to the Present 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
10 R. Jackson Marshall, Memories of World War I: North Carolina Doughboys on the Western Front 
(Raleigh: Division of Archives and History, North Carolina Department of Cultural Resources, 1998); 
Edward A. Gutiérrez, Doughboys on the Great War: How American Soldiers Viewed their Military 
Experience (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2014); Chad L. Williams, Torchbearers of Democracy: 
African American Soldiers in the World War I Era (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 
2010). Edward Gutierrez cites Williams frequently in his Doughboys on the Great War. 
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standard texts one would consult about the overarching themes, reasons, and conduct of 
the war, which has been important to my project because I needed to include information 
about what North Carolinian slackers were avoiding, if that was their reason for slacking. 
David Kennedy’s Over Here and Christopher Capozzola’s Uncle Sam Wants You are the 
best available books for finding information on the United States home front during the 
World War.11  
The term, “home front” deserves some attention in a project like this one. Most 
Americans today will readily recognize what a “home front” is in any conflict. 
Interestingly, the Great War gave the English-speaking world the term “home front,” 
which did not exist in the same way before 1917. The earliest reference to a home front 
came from the London Times in April 1917, and the term did not appear in the United 
States until 1918. A newspaper editorial had the first reference in North Carolina: “The 
battle front in Europe is not the only American front. There is a home front, and our 
people at home should be as patriotic as our men in uniform.” Buried in a local 
newspaper, this reference did not immediately enter the vernacular. Then in 1919 with 
the publication of Mr. Punch’s History of the Great War, the term took off. Mr. Punch is 
a famous English puppet (as well-known to the British as Americans might recognize 
King Friday XIII from Mister Rogers’ Neighborhood) who “saw” his fair share of wars 
through the second half of the nineteenth century around the British Empire, and in his 
 
11 Edward M Coffman, The Regulars: The American Army, 1898-1941 (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 2004); John Keegan, The First World War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999); 
Kennedy, Over Here; Christopher Capozzola, Uncle Sam Wants You: World War I and the Making of the 
Modern American Citizen (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008); Neil A. Wynn, From Progressivism 
to Prosperity: World War I and American Society (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1986), introduction. 
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later years, documented the Great War. This book introduced the term to Anglophiles in a 
scene that described the “trials of mistresses on the home front” in Great Britain during 
the war. Afterwards, this term was applied to those citizens quite literally on the home 
front.12 
Regrettably, current scholarship has not yet adequately addressed the voices of 
opposition on the home front to American entry to the Great War, beyond small 
references to figures like Kitchin, La Follette, Bryan, and some others. For this reason, 
many books present their arguments as if there was a foregone conclusion that the United 
States would automatically ride in and save Europe from itself. As a result, current 
scholarship characterizes North Carolina as a passively willing participant in an 
inevitable war. Without a sufficient investigation of those voices of opposition, we 
undervalue the impact of how tight and contentious the debate concerning American 
entry to this war was, which ultimately leads to a one-sided conceptualization of the 
Great War teleologically. North Carolina should make up more than the single chapter 
that Jessica Bandel mentioned. Kitchin and his supporters deserve a place in the story of 
North Carolina, the United States, and the Great War. A national sentiment of coerced 
volunteerism that developed during the president’s preparedness campaigns compelled 
many people to openly profess support for American entry to the war while they held 
private reservations about it. Support for the war effort did eventually come from the 
 
12 Oxford English Dictionary, “home front”; Charles L. Graves, Mr. Punch’s History of the Great War 
(New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1919), 19; Roanoke News, October 10, 1918. 
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state but we must always remember that it came with a great deal of personal reluctance, 
even from Kitchin himself.13 
“North Carolina, Claude Kitchin, and the Great War, 1869-1923” remedies this 
gap by analyzing the loudest opponents of the war. Kitchin was not alone in his 
opposition. Many others, including former state attorney general Theodore Davidson, as 
well as thousands of their constituents around the Old North State joined their voices to 
this movement. Often overlooked, the voices of resistance who refused to support 
Wilson’s war-preparedness campaigns and later, entry to the World War, played an 
integral role in maintaining America’s moral superiority on the international stage. 
This study grew out of an interest surrounding the “excitement,” or lack thereof, 
of the centennial of American entry to the World War. There are more “popular” wars in 
American history that many Americans today know much more about. Conversing with 
undergraduates before a lecture on the Great War will leave a professor or graduate 
teaching assistant wondering how those students are generally aware of the general 
causes and outcomes of World War II, but they have little to no idea that there even was a 
“first” world war. Recent PBS American Experience television shows and editorials from 
various newspapers are hopefully correcting the lack of knowledge concerning the Great 
War and the United States. One of the goals of this dissertation is to add to this growing 
understanding of American involvement in the war by uncovering the experiences of 
 
13 Richard Lowitt, George W. Norris: The Persistence of a Progressive, 1913-1933 (Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press, 1971); Robert James Maddox, William E. Borah and American Foreign Policy (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1970); Marc C. Johnson, Political Hell-Raiser: The Life and 
Times of Senator Burton K. Wheeler of Montana (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2019); Nancy C. 
Unger, “The Righteous Reformer: A Life History of Robert M. LaFollette, Sr., 1855-1925” (Ph.D. Diss., 
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North Carolinians during this pivotal time in the nation’s history. Most historians are 
correct when they explain that the Great War changed the very nature of the United 
States, but they always leave out the importance of opposition to the war. 
There are, of course, many treatments of specific groups of opponents of 
American intervention in the World War. Anti-war protests, movements, and sentiments 
stretch back to the very foundations of the United States. Dr. Benjamin Rush, a literal 
Founding Father, published an article in Benjamin Bannecker’s Almanac calling for a 
Peace Department to be established in the federal cabinet with power equal to the already 
established War Department. Organized anti-war movements in the United States began 
during the War of 1812, led mostly by the Quakers. Religious leaders also took the helm 
in protesting the Mexican American War in the 1840s and argued against both sides in 
the Civil War. Few of those anti-war activists thought of themselves as pacifists, though 
they disagreed with violence and cautioned against imperialism. There were secular 
figures through the nineteenth century who also argued against war, as they viewed it as 
detrimental to capitalism.14  
Usually, opposition to American entry to the Great War is explored through the 
lens of specific groups such as conscientious objectors, pacifists, women’s groups, 
socialists, or others. For example, Frances Early’s A World Without War explored 
resistance through the lens of feminism and pacifism in the United States, from those 
who opposed what they considered the anti-democratic forces of militarism and social 
 
14 Judith Porter Adams, Peacework: Oral Histories of Women Peace Activists (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 
1991), 209; and Charles F. Howlett and Glen Zeiter, The American Peace Movement: History and 
Historiography (Washington D.C.: American Historical Association, 1985), 19; Charles Chatfield, ed., 
Peace Movements in America (New York: Schocken Books, 1973), x.  
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repression in the country. To state it another way, she investigated resistance through the 
lens of female activists mostly in the North. Other, large scale treatments of opposition 
investigate military evasion. Carl Peterson’s Avoidance and Evasion of Military Service 
speaks closely to this idea. His is the most comprehensive work on the topic but lacks 
sufficient detail on this time period. In terms of the Great War, he spent less than ten 
pages on it, and North Carolina is virtually absent from the whole book.15 
Well into the twenty-first century, many primary sources are available digitally. 
That convenience sped up the creation of this dissertation immensely. However, not 
everything is online yet and many papers, posters, and documents are still buried in the 
archives. The primary material that was consulted for this project fall into both 
categories. The North Carolina Digital Heritage Center and the Jackson Library at UNC-
Greensboro have painstakingly digitized millions of newspaper articles from across the 
state which make up much of the primary material in this project. These digital sources 
enrich every chapter in this dissertation. Many federal and state records are also available 
online, including census material and the Congressional Record. Federal census records 
aided with the background and biography information on the Kitchin family.  
UNC Chapel Hill has also collected thousands of documents into an online project 
titled “Documenting the American South,” which provided many of the pamphlets and 
posters that were consulted in the writing. The writings, speeches, and documents from 
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prominent North Carolinians, including Governors Craig and Bickett made up the 
majority of primary sources in the second, fifth, and sixth chapters. It is perhaps lucky 
that most of the writings of the prominent figures on the following pages have been 
collected and edited into volumes available in libraries. 
The Claude Kitchin Papers at the Wilson Library in Chapel Hill are still only 
available in the archives but proved to be invaluable sources in the second and third 
chapters. One of Kitchin’s secretaries, Mr. S. E. High, magnificently kept records of most 
of Kitchin’s correspondence, especially when Kitchin became a more prominent figure in 
Washington. Especially after 1914, the collection swells with letters and telegrams to and 
from Kitchin. Many of the letters sent to his office were mundane and concerned run-of-
the-mill congressional requests. However, after Kitchin delivered a big speech or a key 
event involving the war took place, constituents and other Americans sent their thoughts 
to him. Those are the papers that ordered this project. 
The following pages address five fundamental and related questions about North 
Carolina’s involvement in the Great War: First, how did Claude Kitchin’s background 
and family biography prepare him to become the loudest and most influential voice of 
opposition to America’s entry to the war? Second, how did Kitchin try to keep the United 
States from overspending on military defense during President Wilson’s war-
preparedness campaign, and how did he fight against the large peace-time military 
buildup before 1917? Third, how did Kitchin fight against overspending on the American 
Navy and how did the United States fare in its “test” of preparedness in Mexico? Fourth, 
once the war resolution passed, how did Kitchin and the state of North Carolina support 
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the funding of the war? Finally, how did Kitchin and the state of North Carolina support 
the war effort when troops were being trained to go “over there?” 
This dissertation is divided into six mostly chronological chapters, including this 
introduction. Each chapter addresses one of the fundamental questions about Claude 
Kitchin, North Carolina, and the Great War. The second chapter stretches back into North 
Carolina’s past to bring the Kitchin family to life through the middle of 1915. The third 
chapter is about war preparedness activities between 1915 and 1916. The fourth covers 
the major test of preparedness in Mexico but is especially dedicated to naval 
preparedness and the major reasons that America was drawn into the war between 1916 
and 1917. The fifth chapter explains the multitude of methods that the federal 
government, and Kitchin, used to finance the war from 1917 to 1918. The sixth chapter 
covers the military and anti-military aspects of North Carolina during the war also in 
1917 and 1918. I offer a short conclusion at the end that ties up where Kitchin went after 
the war. 
The second chapter offers a background and biography of Claude Kitchin and a 
heretofore unrecognized political dynasty. Claude Kitchin was not the first, nor the last, 
Kitchin to be involved in national politics. His father, William Hodges Kitchin, served in 
Congress decades before Claude did. His brother, William Walton Kitchin, also played 
an important role in the state and federal government. Claude Kitchin was hardly alone in 
Congress as an opponent to American intervention, so there is additional information 
about some of his progressive allies too. Earlier scholars have written dissertations or 
master’s theses on some aspect of Kitchin’s life in Congress. I owe their works a 
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collective debt as my forerunners. Many of these are not available electronically, and 
every one of them draws on information gathered from previous works, as this 
dissertation does in part. The most recent published and only biography of Kitchin, 
Claude Kitchin and the Wilson War Policies, is quite dated now. It was written by Alex 
Mathews Arnett, Professor of History at the Woman’s College of the University of North 
Carolina (now the University of North Carolina Greensboro), in 1937. Arnett engaged 
with Kitchin’s role as the financial supporter from Congress during the course of the 
war.16 
One major point to note is that Arnett was not himself very far removed from the 
ideologies that the Kitchin family held. Claude Kitchin’s great-great-granddaughter, 
Emily R. Rutter, now an assistant professor of English at Ball State University, recently 
published an article dealing with the family’s past and racism in order to compare past 
troubles with recent events in the South. Rutter described Arnett’s work as an “apologist 
hagiography.” She also noted what I have long suspected about the historian who was so 
close to the man who was his subject: he was a bit of an apologist when it came to the 
Kitchins’ racism. Rutter took particular issue with the language Arnett employed in his 
book concerning the relationship between the Kitchin family and their African American 
neighbors, and later, constituents. She noted “perhaps the most jaw-dropping passage 
(and there are many)” in the book “is one in which Arnett waxes nostalgic about the 
affection that people of African descent supposedly felt for Kitchin.” She took particular 
 




issue with Arnett’s use of the term “love” in describing African American feelings 
towards Kitchin.17  
Other scholars have noted that Claude Kitchin and the Wilson War Policies was 
Arnett’s weakest work as a historian. Jerrold Hirsch claimed that Arnett wrote about the 
“good” Kitchin versus the “evil” Wilson, but noted his analysis was only superficial at 
best. “North Carolina, Claude Kitchin, and the Great War” does not argue that Arnett’s 
book has no merit to a current study. Indeed, almost every book, article, chapter, 
dissertation, and thesis that was investigated in the process of creating this dissertation 
cited Arnett’s book. Among countless examples of this process, Karl E. Campbell, author 
of “The First and Second World War Generations of North Carolina Political 
Leadership,” an article in an edited book, mentioned in a footnote to consult two sources 
for more information about Kitchin. One was, of course, Alex Arnett’s century-old book, 
and the other was a book by William Link. Link cited Arnett in his own references.18 
One cannot escape Arnett’s book, as it is the only full-length published biography 
on Kitchin. This dissertation drew on the research done by Arnett. But care must be taken 
when analyzing a work that is nearly a century old that was written by a person so close 
to the subject. There are many stories and anecdotes in his book that have no reference or 
 
17 Emily Ruth Rutter, “Troubled Inheritance: Confronting Old Hierarchies in the New South,” Southern 
Cultures 25, no. 3, (2019): 156-162. 
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citation, some of which are included in the chapters that follow this introduction, but 
careful notations of such occurrences are made evident. Many other anecdotes in Arnett’s 
book were reported directly to Arnett through family interviews. There is no major reason 
to believe that Arnett fabricated anything. It is, of course, probable that he wanted to 
paint Kitchin in a positive light, so he might have embellished certain stories, or perhaps 
his interviewees embellished their own account of those stories. At least once Arnett got 
information plain wrong. Arnett wrote that Kitchin claimed four-fifths of Democratic 
members of Congress agreed with him on an issue concerning the war-preparedness 
campaign. Actually, Kitchin said the opposite.19 
Arnett was close to the Kitchin family and helped to organize Claude Kitchin’s 
papers to go to the archives in Chapel Hill. In the next few paragraphs, I will note the 
other attempts at biography on Kitchin, but all of them fall short of being called a true 
biography. Obviously, Arnett’s Claude Kitchin and the Wilson War Policies comes the 
closest. The preface and first chapter describe much of Claude’s earlier life before he 
entered Congress. Even the Dictionary of North Carolina Biography cites Arnett for 
information on the rest of the Kitchin family in many cases. But as mentioned above, 
Arnett may have been too close to Kitchin to paint a true portrait of his subject. For 
instance, there is no mention of the Red Shirt Campaign in his book. The Red Shirts were 
basically a terrorist organization that operated in North Carolina and other states to 
intimidate and commit violence in order to prevent black people from voting. We will 
never know exactly why Arnett chose not to mention the role the group played as the 
 
19 Arnett, Claude Kitchin, 58-76; New York Times, November 9, 1915. 
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reason that Kitchin was first elected to the House of Representatives from North 
Carolina’s second district, but Arnett’s omission does help illustrate why a new 
investigation is necessary. 
Indeed, a smaller but no less important purpose in this dissertation is to reevaluate 
Claude Kitchin’s role in American memory. If he is remembered at all, it is due to his 
connection to the war-preparedness movement, vote on the war resolution, and eventual 
engagement in the Great War. At least, that is what the roadside marker outside of his 
former residence states. The Kitchin political dynasty emerged during a time when white 
southerners were ready and willing to do whatever was necessary to regain power from 
recently liberated African Americans. But it is worth noting that the Kitchins cannot be 
separated from their rise to political power as part of the racist southern movement which 
took power, and the vote, away from southern blacks. We should remember Kitchin as 
the loudest and most influential opponent of entry to the war, but we should also 
remember how he attained that position. Intimidation and violence tactics won his own, 
his father’s, and his brother’s, seats in government.  
In the master’s theses that preceded my own study, three attempted to explain 
Kitchin’s opposition to war as a pacifist. The “Pacifism of Claude Kitchin, 1915-1917” is 
a master’s thesis written by Ferdinand Melevage in 1949 and the first attempt post-Arnett 
to bring Kitchin back to the historical discourse. Melevage explained that the purpose of 
his thesis was to trace the evolution of Kitchin’s pacifism in the pre-war years, and he set 
the climax of his narrative at the anti-war speech delivered to the House on April 5, 1917. 
While it is an adequate attempt to explain Kitchin’s reasons for pacifism, this thesis is 
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woefully short and filled with lengthy block quotations and little real analysis. Melevage 
concluded that Kitchin was a pacifist but never fully defined his reasoning for that 
conclusion. “Claude Kitchin, Second District Congressman from North Carolina, 1901-
1923,” a master’s thesis by Florence Dunn Bunting in 1996, explored Kitchin’s 
upbringing and early life to explain his later objections to the violence of the Great War. 
She spent considerable space in an exploration of the living conditions in northeastern 
North Carolina, the area where Kitchin was born, from the weeks just before the Civil 
War broke out through the years of Kitchin’s youth during Reconstruction. Bunting 
concluded that Kitchin’s opposition to war began in his youth, which was mostly 
explained to Claude by his father, a Captain in the Confederate army. In “Claude Kitchin 
and the War Preparedness Controversy, 1915-1917,” a master’s thesis by Elizabeth L. 
Steele from 1985, she examined Kitchin’s background as an agrarian progressive and 
how that shaped his responses to American intervention in Europe.20 
Three more theses attempted to explain Kitchin’s role as a Progressive reformer. 
“Pilgrimage to Reform: A Life of Claude Kitchin,” a dissertation by H. Larry Ingle in 
1967, is the closest to a true successor piece to Arnett. Ingle explained Kitchin’s role as a 
product of the liberal agrarian movement and how in his early time in Congress Kitchin 
implemented and supported legislation to help farmers. Ingle obviously spent plenty of 
time researching and writing this work, but there is still some missing information and he 
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was not critical enough of Arnett’s findings. “Rural Radical Rampant: The Early 
Congressional Career of Claude Kitchin,” a master’s thesis by Anthony R. Strickland in 
1976, detailed Kitchin’s early years in Congress, especially highlighting his role as a 
member of the agrarian left. This thesis followed Kitchin to April 1917 and the 
declaration-of-war vote, but Strickland spent most of his final chapter explaining 
Kitchin’s role as a tax reformer. “Claude Kitchin and the Financing of World War I,” a 
master’s thesis by Scott Corl in 1998, investigated Kitchin as a tax reformer, which was 
one of Kitchin’s long-term goals as a Congressman. Corl concluded that Kitchin used his 
seniority and position, and World War I, as an opportunity to restructure the American 
tax system. Corl suggested that despite Kitchin’s opposition to American involvement in 
the war, it provided the vehicle through which he could achieve progressive tax reform 
goals.21 
While each of these semi-biographical theses of Claude Kitchin are important 
contributions, they all fall short of producing adequate answers to Kitchin’s role in the 
anti-preparedness movement in the United States. Arnett’s book comes the closest to 
achieving this dissertation’s goal, but like several others mentioned above, is more 
concerned with describing Kitchin’s role in financing the war. Most of these theses also 
fall into the trap of relying far too heavily on trusting those that came before them. There 
are many anecdotes, stories, and data that cite previous attempts, which ultimately go 
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back to Alex Arnett. Many of those anecdotes are hearsay, with little or no grounding in 
the Kitchin Papers at Chapel Hill, or elsewhere. 
Who progressives, like Kitchin, were and what they wanted has been the subject 
of much historiographical debate. The early interpretations from scholars such as Charles 
Beard saw a very black-and-white battle between the forces of democracy and the forces 
of privilege. Later, Richard Hofstadter and the consensus school argued that 
progressivism was a union between populist farmers and businessmen who were left 
behind by industrialism. Gabriel Kolko and James Weinstein of the New Left school 
believed that progressivism was actually a conservative movement. Robert Wiebe and 
Samuel Hays of the organization school expanded the discussion to include an 
international element to the progressives. C. Vann Woodward, Dewey Grantham, and 
Jack Kirby wrote about the specifically southern elements of progressivism. Southern 
progressives agreed with the larger goals of the movement, which aimed for better 
government, improved economic opportunities, and moral reform. The issue of race set 
southern progressivism apart from the national movement. It is also important to note that 
most progressives in North Carolina did not fight female suffrage, labor improvements, 
or for African American civil rights.22 
The third chapter of “North Carolina, Claude Kitchin, and the Great War” covers 
the great debates concerning the war-preparedness measures undertaken by the federal 
government and Kitchin’s arguments against the campaign. North Carolinians, and the 
American public at large, were obviously split over the war. Some pundits advocated for 
 
22 David M. Kennedy, “Overview: The Progressive Era,” Historian 37 (May 1, 1978): 453-468. 
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more assistance to the Allies against Germany, while others preferred to keep the United 
States in isolation. Much of public opinion was against intervention into what was still 
(through early 1917) largely considered a European war. President Wilson eventually 
came down on the side of favoring war preparation and Kitchin challenged him head on. 
Many preparedness advocates asserted that the United States was too vulnerable 
to foreign aggression, and even if America would not enter the war, a military buildup 
was necessary for security. Other allies of the movement wanted a seat at the peace table 
when the war ended but assumed that the United States would only be welcomed from a 
position of strength. One of Wilson’s closest advisors, Colonel Edward House, travelled 
to Europe early in the war to attempt a negotiated settlement to bring it to an end. 
However, he quickly realized that Europe was not ready to listen to American counsel, 
largely due to its perceived weaknesses. The military preparedness movement, and its 
naval counterpart, emerged out of the Progressive Era as one more way for the 
government to protect the country. Kitchin consistently maintained that any military 
expenditures beyond its current budget would only benefit men of industry and banking, 
mainly in the northeast, who he called the “jingoes and war traffickers.” American 
intervention in Mexico proved to him, and many others, that with some minor 
improvements, the army and navy were already well prepared for any potential war.  
Claude Kitchin’s role in the preparedness debates has unfortunately been 
understudied. He elicited only brief mentions in other scholarly works on the 
preparedness movement. The obvious sources to look at concerning this topic come from 
Arthur Link, the pre-eminent Wilson biographer. Each volume of Link’s multivolume, 
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albeit unfinished, study offers at least some insight to the preparedness debates. Another 
of the standard texts on American preparedness is John P. Finnegan’s Against the Specter 
of a Dragon. Finnegan and Link explained the preparedness movement from a national 
level. Like so many of the other works concerning the First World War, the procedures 
and campaigns from a federal standpoint have been covered by these scholars.23 
Another one of the major themes that historians have dealt with involving the 
United States’s debates about entry to the Great War is the changing nature of American 
society as a whole. For example, one of the major arguments from scholars concerns the 
expansion of the American surveillance state. Jennifer Keene’s Doughboys, the Great 
War, and the Remaking of America offers insight into the changing nature of the United 
States as a whole due to WWI. This dissertation does not draw any conclusion about the 
changing social nature of the country, but her book helped with the understanding of 
these overall social changes. Looking at the macro-level of American history, Keene 
argued that the World War was one of the pivotal events in changing the nature of the 
federal government in the United States. Others have also written about the theme of the 
expanding surveillance state. For example, Jeanette Keith explained how the state 
expanded power in the South in her Rich Man’s War, Poor Man’s Fight. Theodore 
Kornweibel also wrote about the expansion of the federal surveillance system concerning 
African Americans in Seeing Red: Federal Campaigns against Black Militancy, 1919-
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1925. Keene, Keith, Kornweibel, and other scholars have noted this change, and it is 
evident throughout this dissertation.24 
The fourth chapter moves to the naval buildup associated with the preparedness 
movement. Kitchin fought much harder against naval expenditures than with the regular 
army. He often argued that the American navy was the best in the world, behind Great 
Britain’s. Another prominent North Carolinian happened to be in a position to influence 
federal naval policy. Josephus Daniels of North Carolina rose to the position of Secretary 
of the Navy in Wilson’s administration. Daniels and Kitchin had an amiable relationship 
and tended to agree, at least at first, that the war should have stayed as a European matter. 
Kitchin and Daniels were well enough acquainted that they trusted each other to babysit 
the others’ children.25  
The arguments about America’s lack of preparedness for a war were actually 
tested in this period too. A unique event provided a glimpse of American preparedness in 
Mexico, which was in the midst of a civil war by 1916. The United States found a chance 
to test itself in an international crisis. Intervention in Mexico proved that the American 
army and navy were ready to defend America’s borders, but also revealed that there was 
plenty of work still needed to make the military into a modern fighting force.26 
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The fifth chapter explains why the war started in Europe, what North Carolinians 
were told about it, and how Kitchin and the state funded the American war effort. There 
is an exhaustive amount of literature available on the causes of the Great War. From a 
European perspective, the best source is Christopher Clark’s The Sleepwalkers: How 
Europe Went to War. Clark himself admitted that there were already innumerable books 
and sources to scour for this information, but he satisfactorily whittled the causes down. 
For an American approach, Alan Axelrod’s How America Won World War I adequately 
explained the reasons for American entry. North Carolina was on the verge of an 
agricultural revolution in terms of new machinery and potential increased crop yields 
when the war broke out, so this chapter also clarifies the state’s role as a potential “corn 
basket” for the world, with additional information on food and fuel conservation efforts 
around the state. No discussion of a southern state is complete without an investigation of 
racial roles. Nina Mjagkij’s Loyalty in Time of Trial: The African American Experience 
During World War I proved invaluable as a source to understand the African American 
dimension of North Carolina at this time.27 
In the sixth chapter, this dissertation explores the state of North Carolina’s 
military buildup after the war declaration. There was a great deal of support for the war 
effort but also much resistance to involvement. This chapter explains how North Carolina 
mobilized for entry and how it did not. From the declaration of war, it took nearly a full 
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year before American servicemen saw action against the enemy. The process of getting 
young men ready to fight was mirrored around the country. By population, North 
Carolina was the fourteenth largest state in the country and third largest state in the South 
at the time.  Part of the discussion of the mobilization effort will include an examination 
of those who did not mobilize. Resisters, deserters, and draft evaders, or “slackers,” play 
a key role in this chapter. “Slacker” was a term generally applied to those who refused to 
play a role in the war effort. There were two high profile cases of armed resistance to the 
draft in North Carolina. 
The most thorough book that investigates southern resistance is Jeanette Keith’s 
Rich Man’s War, Poor Man’s Fight, in which she explained class differences and 
reactions among southerners to the draft and the debate among southerners about whether 
to go to war. This treatment is the most in-depth study of southerners during the war to 
date. However, her main interest was on the rural South, which was largely outside of the 
influence of the federal government, and she did not spend much ink on North Carolina at 
all. Gerald Shenk’s “Work or Fight!” investigates another kind of resistance. He uses 
case studies from four states to tell the stories of white men who were able to avoid 
military service in favor of some kind of “essential” civilian service. White men who 
were exempted were often married and owned property, which Shenk interprets as 
meaning that the existing social order stayed in place. Slackers from around North 
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Carolina had many different reasons for their resistance, and a case study of the Tar Heel 
state helps build on this work.28 
One cannot efficiently understand what men had to lose by evading the draft or 
deserting without understanding the driving force behind its popular implementation, so 
this chapter creates a dialogue with works about what “voluntarism” meant in the United 
States in the early twentieth century. Christopher Capozzola questioned whether wartime 
voluntarism was actually voluntary at all. He introduced the term “coercive voluntarism” 
to describe the occurrence of local groups policing their communities to ensure voluntary 
compliance with wartime edicts. He argued that without the willing participation of local 
community leaders, the federal government could never have successfully created the 
culture of obligation that led to the successful mobilization of the United States in the 
1910s. According to David Kennedy, not everything came down to “coercive 
voluntarism” for Americans. He suggested that the United States developed, and even 
had to rely on, conscription because not enough volunteers could be coerced.29 
To understand the real nature of voluntarism in the United States, this chapter also 
looks at American propaganda efforts that led the country in a very short amount of time 
to go from chanting, “he kept us out of war,” to a majority of Americans becoming 
enthusiastic about participation. This idea gets to the heart of North Carolina’s opinion 
during the time period: many did not want to participate. However, due to ideas of 
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coercive volunteerism, many were forced to participate. Much of the voluntarism was 
promoted by federal and state propaganda. Alan Axelrod’s Selling the Great War 
explains how the federal government undertook influential propaganda efforts to sell 
America on the war. Robert Ferrell’s study of Woodrow Wilson also explains the efforts 
on the federal level of getting Americans on board with the war effort.30 
 Many of the books that deal with the idea of coercive volunteerism that emerged 
out of the preparedness campaigns detail similar themes. The preparedness campaigns 
were generally supported by northern elites, professionals, large newspapers, and mostly 
Republicans. On the other hand, farmers, ordinary people, and mostly southern 
Democrats who dominated Congress, obviously with Claude Kitchin at the top, opposed 
the movement. Volunteers do not desert as often as draftees, and drafted men became 
coerced volunteers due in large part to the American preparedness movement; however, 
many simply evaded by never showing up, and many southern legislators opposed 
American militarism and involvement. This chapter explains who the draftees and 
coerced volunteers from North Carolina that ended up deserting training camp, or 
avoided service all together, were; what compelled them to make it as far as they did in 
 
30 Alan Axelrod, Selling the Great War: The Making of American Propaganda (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2009); Robert Ferrell, Woodrow Wilson and World War I, 1917-1921 (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1985). The literature / biographies of Wilson during the war are fairly extensive and most include 
information on the change from neutrality to war preparedness and how Wilson tried to get Americans 
ready for war. These include Jim Powell, Wilson’s War: How Woodrow Wilson Led to Hitler, Stalin, and 
World War II (New York: Crown Forum, 2005), chapter 3; Richard Striner, Woodrow Wilson and World 
War I: A Burden Too Great to Bear (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014) chapters 3 and 4; and, of 
course, the best authority on Wilson, Arthur Link, Woodrow Wilson and a Revolutionary World, 1913-1921 
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1982), introduction and chapter 4. 
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the selective service process before leaving, if applicable; and what local and state 
politicians did in defense or injury of these Tar Heels.31 
One of the best lenses to view North Carolina’s commitment to fighting abroad is 
through the Selective Service system. The debate in the United States about the proper 
military recruitment tool (draft or volunteer) has been going on since its founding. The 
most comprehensive book on the draft throughout the U.S. history is John W. 
Chambers’s To Raise an Army. One of the major themes that Chambers returned to over 
and over again in this book was that of an American contradiction. Americans have 
collectively always loved and valued military service going back to the Revolution, while 
at the same time, they have resisted national compulsion to serve in the military because 
of the value of individual liberty. Today, as in 1917 and 1918, deserters and slackers 
might be called “cowards” or “unpatriotic” for avoiding service. Perhaps a level of 
sympathy for draft evaders of the past can be achieved because, as sociologist Charles 
Moskos puts it, “In a manner of speaking, the vast majority of American youth are now 
[since 1973] draft dodgers.”32 
By the time that war came to America in April 1917, the estimated strength of the 
regular American army and the National Guard was at about two hundred thousand men 
 
31 Finnegan, Against the Specter of a Dragon; Paul Koistinen, Mobilizing for Modern War: The Political 
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combined. Despite the lengthy preparedness campaigns across the state and throughout 
the country, facing a war in which many millions had already died fighting, millions 
more were currently engaged in action, and an entire generation of Europeans was 
involved, the United States was not ready in terms of manpower. An estimate of over 
seven hundred thousand men were deemed necessary to contribute in the war. Most 






THE KITCHIN DYNASTY: BACKGROUND, BIOGRAPHY, AND POLITICS IN 
NORTH CAROLINA, 1869-1914  
 
 
Half the civilized world is now a slaughterhouse for human beings. This Nation is 
the last hope of peace on earth, good will toward men. I am unwilling for my 
country by statutory command to pull up the last anchor of peace in the world and 
extinguish during the long night of a world-wide war the only remaining star of 
hope for Christendom. I am unwilling by my vote to-day for this Nation to throw 
away the only remaining compass to which the world can look for guidance in the 
paths of right and truth, of justice and humanity, and to leave only force and blood 
to chart hereafter the path of mankind to tread. 
--Claude Kitchin, Speech in Opposition to the War Resolution, April 6, 1917 
 
 On April 6, 1917, House Majority Leader Claude Kitchin took to the floor of the 
House shortly after midnight wearing a William Jennings Bryan-inspired string tie, a 
mode of fashion that his hero, Bryan, would have been proud of. Kitchin was about to 
announce to the crowded room that he was going to vote against the war resolution that 
would send the American Republic into the “bloodiest war known in the history of the 
world.” He continued, “Half of the civilized world is now a slaughterhouse for human 
beings. [The United States] is the last hope of peace on earth.” The great orator 
passionately pleaded with the chamber for his allotted ten minutes in vain.1 
Only days before, on April 2, President Woodrow Wilson asked a special joint 
session of Congress for a declaration of war against Imperial Germany. The campaigns of 
 
1 New York Times, April 6, 1917; Michael Kazin, A Godly Hero: The Life of William Jennings Bryan (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006), 254; Congressional Record, 65th Congress, 1st Session, 1917, 332-333. 
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unrestricted submarine warfare by Germany that renewed in early 1917 proved to 
be too much for Wilson to stomach, and he saw no other option than to ask for this 
declaration. Kitchin knew that pleading with the Congress to find another solution and 
avoid war would set the entire American press against him and his potentially unpopular 
opinion. He knew that his stance might also signal the “death knell” to his political 
career. He explained to the filled chamber that after “sleepless nights and endless 
prayers” he knew what he needed to do.1  
The Greensboro Daily News noted on April 7 that Kitchin was the only 
representative from North Carolina to vote against American entry into the Great War. 
The dramatic midnight spectacle on the House floor was the culmination of Kitchin’s 
tireless work over the previous years to prevent the United States from entering a conflict 
to which he saw no real benefit for any American, or North Carolinian. Although 
historians such as Jennifer Keene, Christopher Capozzola, and David Kennedy have 
correctly noted the general enthusiasm for President Wilson’s preparedness program 
around the country, an examination of the speeches, press releases, and correspondence 
of Claude Kitchin suggests that it is important to refine their findings by investigating the 
opposing viewpoint in North Carolina.2 
 
1 “Claude Kitchin Only North Carolinian to Vote in the Negative,” Greensboro Daily News, April 7, 1917. 
The full vote was 373-50 in the House and 82-6 in the Senate. Of those who voted against the war, six in 
the Senate and fifty in the House, thirty-two were Republicans, mostly from the Midwestern states. The 
only Socialist Party member, Meyer London, and a Prohibition Party member from California joined them. 
London was the only Easterner to vote no. Three of the six senators who voted against the war were 
Democrats. 
2 “Claude Kitchin Only North Carolinian to Vote in the Negative,” Greensboro Daily News, April 7, 1917; 
Jennifer Keene, Doughboys, the Great War, and the Remaking of America (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2001), Chapters 1-2; Christopher Capozzola, Uncle Sam Wants You: World War I and the 
Making of the Modern American Citizen (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 3-7; David Kennedy, 
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 The man who captivated the attention of the United States on that chilly, rainy 
April night has largely been forgotten today, despite his importance to a nation on the eve 
of its launch to world power status. Kitchin was well known in the 1910s in North 
Carolina and around the country due to his decades of service to the country. He was well 
respected in many circles and loathed in a few others. Like many figures of national 
renown from the American past, he has a checkered record, which must not be ignored, 
and a new thesis-driven biography of his actions leading up to America’s entry to the 
World War must not be misconstrued as hero worship. He was a white southern man of 
his time who helped disfranchise black voters in North Carolina, but he believed that in 
doing so, he also had an obligation to protect those black Tar Heels out of a sense of 
paternalism, or noblesse oblige. That protection, of course, meant keeping African 
Americans in a second-class status. 
Kitchin’s early years in Congress are not particularly noteworthy. He seemed to 
be set up to just run his course in Congress as another uninteresting representative among 
many who would pass into history. He was reelected biannually with very easy victories. 
Kitchin’s most significant offices came later in his tenure in office as chairman of the 
House Ways and Means Committee and as House Majority Leader for the Sixty-Fourth 
and Sixty-Fifth Congresses between 1915-1919. These two roles were usually held by the 
same person at the time. During his terms in Congress, Kitchin focused on the tariff, 
revenue bills, and eventually, the funding of the United States' efforts in the World War. 
 




He opposed the military preparedness measures of President Woodrow Wilson and was 
one of fifty members of Congress to vote against the declaration of war on Germany in 
April 1917. Kitchin crossed swords with the president on several different occasions, 
although he considered Wilson to be the best president since the conclusion of the Civil 
War. However, after he failed to convince enough congressmen to vote against the 
resolution and war was ultimately declared, he recognized the realities of the vote and 
threw himself into the effort, arguing for an increase in taxes on excess corporate profits 
to fund the military, rather than through the sale of Liberty Bonds, which would place the 
financial burden of the war on future generations. He suffered a stroke in 1920 but 
continued to serve in Congress until his death in 1923.3 
 
 




There are no marble or stone monuments to the Kitchin family around the state 
today, and perhaps there should not be.4 The only tangible indication that Kitchin was 
 
3 Richard L. Watson, Jr., “Kitchin, Claude,” in William S. Powell, ed., Dictionary of North Carolina 
Biography: Volume 3 H-K, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1988), 372-374; Kitchin 
to H. F. Lease, October 27, 1915, Box 4, Claude Kitchin Papers, Southern Historical Collection, Louis 
Round Wilson Special Collections Library, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, hereinafter 
referred to as Kitchin Papers. 
4 In today’s political and social climate surrounding the controversial removal of statues and monuments 
that feature prominent southern racists, any monuments to Claude Kitchin or his family would come under 
harsh scrutiny. The Kitchins were racists. Claude himself was involved with the Red Shirt intimidation 
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here is a roadside marker near his former home in Scotland Neck, Halifax County, North 
Carolina, on US 258 (Main Street). The marker (see Figure 1) reads: “Congressman, 
1901-23. As Democratic majority leader, 1915-1919, opposed war declaration; later 
supported Wilson’s war policies. Lived here.” At least one of his descendants currently 
resides at this home. Without this sign, which motorists most likely ignore, modern 
Americans would have nothing palpable to go on for information about the man who 
played such a pivotal role in America’s emergence as an international world power. 
Claude Kitchin was born into a well-respected Tar Heel family that, in time, 
became a small political dynasty in the state. A family tradition explained that there were 
three Kitchin brothers who immigrated from England to the United States soon after the 
American War for Independence, with one ending up in Edgecombe County, North 
Carolina, where he grew tobacco and cotton, with a few slaves. Claude’s grandfather, 
Boas Kitchin, made the family prosperous and pushed it to the high levels of North 
Carolina society by marrying into the family of one of the largest landowners in the 
county. Like many young southern men, Boas sought land and fortune. He went to 
Alabama to find his, where he and his wife had several of their children before returning 
to North Carolina in the late 1840s. One of the children born in Alabama was Claude’s 
father, William Hodge Kitchin, in 1837. It was not until their return that Boas prospered. 
 
gang. It is not clear if Claude himself was directly involved with violence, but he definitely helped organize 
and support the gang. Many Kitchin descendants today recognize the circumstances under which the 
Kitchins rose to political power, and this author reckons very few of them would support statues or 
monuments built in their honor. In fact, days before the defense of this dissertation, it was brought to the 
attention of this author that many descendants want Claude’s and William Walton’s roadside markers to be 
rewritten to tell more complete stories. The North Carolina Office of Archives and History has responded 
by revising the online essays but no changes to the physical markers have been made as of yet. 
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Boas Kitchin reported owning $1,000 worth of real estate on the official 1850 census. A 
decade later, his assets swelled to $4,800 worth of land, in addition to $12,000 of 
personal property. His father-in-law contributed at least fourteen slaves to Kitchin’s 
growing wealth. In today’s value, Boas owned real estate worth nearly $150,000 and 
$370,000 in personal property. The personal property was almost certainly made up of 
many African American slaves.5 
William Hodge Kitchin had a generally pleasant upbringing. As the son of a well-
to-do southern planter, he rarely wanted for anything. He left school at Emory and Henry, 
a Methodist college in Virginia, when North Carolina reluctantly seceded from the Union 
in 1861, to enlist as a private in Company 1 of the Twelfth North Carolina Volunteer 
Regiment, joining the “Granville Greys” unit, sometimes called the “Halifax Infantry.” 
He served his first year uneventfully before his regiment was sent to harsh fighting in 
places such as Mechanicsville, Sharpsburg, Chancellorsville, and Gettysburg. He fought 
in many of the major battles of the war. He was eventually elected to captain, and his 
regiment fought with the Army of Northern Virginia until he was wounded and captured 
by the Union in 1864. He earned the nickname Captain, or “Cap’n,” Buck during his 
service to the Confederacy, a moniker that followed him for the rest of his days, among 
friend and foe alike.6 
 
5 Third Census of the United States, 1810, North Carolina: Edgecombe County, 752; Seventh Census of the 
United States, 1850, North Carolina: Halifax County, 8; Eighth Census of the United States, 1860, North 
Carolina: Halifax County, 9-10; H. Larry Ingle, “Pilgrimage to Reform, a Life of Claude Kitchin” (Ph.D. 
diss., University of Wisconsin, 1967), 1-2. Calculations of today’s value of the Kitchin’s estates by author 
on officialdata.org. In the 1850 census, William was listed as “Wm” and was indicated to have been born in 
North Carolina. Perhaps that was a mistake as the 1860 census lists “William” as born in Alabama. 
6 Louis H. Manarin, North Carolina Troops, 1861-1865: A Roster, Vol. V: Infantry (Raleigh, North 
Carolina: Division of Archives and History, 1975), 167, 200, and 218; United States War Department, The 
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Cap’n Buck was a diehard, anti-Union southerner and only reluctantly was 
released from captivity after several refusals to profess his oath of loyalty to the Union, 
one of the requirements for release of Confederate officers. In fact, Cap’n Buck was a 
member of the famous “Immortal Six Hundred,” Confederate officers who refused to 
take the oath of allegiance to the United States, and thus, he was one of the last of the 
Confederate prisoners to be released from captivity. Kitchin’s experience in this unit 
probably helped to shape his anti-Union sentiment, although he did work with northern 
lending firms later in his life. He had to endure some unusually cruel conditions as a 
Union prisoner. Many of his fellow detainees never made it back to the Land of Dixie, 
dying due to poor treatment, malnutrition, and disease.7  
Cap’n Buck returned home to Scotland Neck after the war to study politics and 
law. Although he never returned to college, he read law after his release. He was admitted 
to the North Carolina bar in 1869. Despite coming home to a war-ravaged state, he 
maintained the family’s wealth initially by recovering an estate in California, although 
the details of this adventure are unclear. His main occupation postwar was in money 
lending, although he earned income from his significant landholdings. He issued 
 
War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series 
IV, I (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1900), 629; “Death of Capt. W. H. Kitchin,” 
Scotland Neck Commonwealth, Feb. 7, 1901; Thurman D. Kitchin to Alex Arnett, November 25, 1935, Box 
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7 Record of Deeds, Halifax County, Book 48, 81. For a full account of the Immortal Six Hundred, T.H. 
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mortgage loans to many people in Halifax County, at modest interest rates, which helped 
supplement the money gained from his farms. Even African Americans turned to the 
Cap’n for small loans on occasion, which he sometimes agreed to provide.8 
Later, he finally decided to enter politics and was elected to the United States 
House of Representatives from North Carolina, serving one term from 1879 to 1881. His 
incursion into politics was largely driven by racism. He was especially wary of 
Reconstruction-induced “Negro rule” across the South, and as soon as the federal troops 
were out of his home state for good, he began hatching plans to unseat the black 
representative in his district. He called white men who voted for anyone but a Democrat 
“race traitors.” However, the Cap’n considered himself above unscrupulous methods of 
election interference, such as miscounting votes or ballot stuffing, common tactics in the 
South. He preferred galvanizing a united white vote and intimidating black voters, which 
also were common tactics in the South.9 
Despite his preference for more “honorable” methods of winning the 
Congressional seat, his election was tainted by accusations of irregularities, which the 
New York Times labeled “pure Democratic villainy.” He was also aided by a split 
Republican ticket, with two opponents claiming their party’s nomination. The two 
African American Republican contenders spent more time attacking each other in the 
campaign than they did attacking Cap’n Kitchin. And for the first time since the Civil 
 
8 “Death of Capt. W. H. Kitchin,” Scotland Neck Commonwealth, February 7, 1901; Alex Arnett, Claude 
Kitchin and the Wilson War Policies (New York: Russell and Russell, 1937), 18; Ingle, “Pilgrimage to 
Reform,” 6. 
9 Josephus Daniels, Editor in Politics (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1941), 341. 
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War began, a Democrat took the Second District in North Carolina. When he ran for 
reelection, he faced a single opponent. This time, a white, northern-born, Republican 
“carpetbagger” easily defeated him despite more charges of Democratic fraud.10  
The district that Cap’n Buck, and later his son, Claude, represented was known as 
the “Black Second.” The racial connotations of this district are quite evident in the 
nickname. The Wilmington Post noted that “THE SECOND CONGRESSIONAL 
DISTRICT is a masterpiece. It takes in Craven then wanders clean to the Virginia line, 
and turns a sharp corner around Nash and grasps Warren.” The district was deliberately 
drawn to keep as many black voters out of the surrounding districts as possible in an 
expert example of gerrymandering. Originally, the Democrats in the state knew they 
could not hold the Second, but by sacrificing this one district, they would neutralize 
thousands of Republican, black votes. Eight out of the ten counties in the district had 
sizeable black majorities, and even the white majority counties were almost 50 percent 
black. It took a split-Republican ticket, and later, the disfranchising of nearly all black 
votes in 1900, to elect a Democrat here again.11 
After his term in Congress, Cap’n Buck remained a significant political figure in 
North Carolina until his death, despite holding no additional elected office. He made 
political speeches around the state regularly, and he kept his opinions in the public view 
as the editor of Scotland Neck Democrat. The Cap’n was almost always a well-liked 
 
10 Eric Anderson, Race and Politics in North Carolina, 1872-1901: The Black Second (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1981), 70-73; New York Times, December 26, 1878. 
11 “The Colored Nomination in the Second Judicial District,” Wilmington Post, July 7, 1878; Anderson, 
Race and Politics, 3-4. 
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figure in his hometown, becoming one of the most prominent citizens well before he 
served in Congress. He helped to build the town railroad, schools, churches, and 
factories. He later joined the Farmers’ Alliance, which began in North Carolina in 
Robeson County in 1887. As the Alliance spread around the state, Buck became a leader 
in the organization.12 
The elder Kitchin also had some detestable qualities. His quick and harsh temper 
might be excused, as he was described as a man who was always in a hurry, but 
inexcusably, he was very much a racist, commenting in 1888, “When you talk negro 
equality, negro supremacy, negro domination to our people, every man’s blood rises to 
boiling heat at once.” Even more bluntly, he told a group of Virginia Democrats, “The 
Almighty had made [the negro] not a little lower than the angels, but a little lower than 
the white man.” Of course, most southern whites spoke with similar language. Such 
attitudes did not begin with Cap’n Buck and did not die with him, but they helped shape 
his children’s attitudes later.13 
Democratic President Grover Cleveland even lost Buck Kitchin’s support partly 
because of Cleveland’s stance on racial issues. At one point, Kitchin declared that “I 
would prefer the Devil himself for President to Cleveland.” In 1894, Cap’n Kitchin 
joined the Populist Party after years of loyalty to the Democrats, and during the election 
that year, he produced more speeches for the Populists than even the leading Populist in 
North Carolina, Marion Butler. However, Kitchin left the Democrats only for a brief 
 
12 Arnett, Kitchin, 11-12. 
13 “The Leading Issues in the Coming Campaign,” Raleigh State Chronicle, May 4, 1888; “Hon. W. H. 
Kitchin in Richmond,” Scotland Neck Democrat, November 07, 1889. 
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period, largely because of his distrust of Cleveland, as the president was a northerner, and 
he rejoined the Democratic Party in 1897, largely due to his fears on racial issues. He 
believed that the only thing that could prevent “Negro rule” was a Democrat. He died in 
1901 before he could see the full fruit that two of his eight sons would bear as they 
succeeded him in politics. He was reported to have said in his last days that he was 
“proud of his sons.”14 
Cap’n Buck had a brood of children with his wife, Maria Figures Kitchin, née 
Arrington. There are two contradictory versions of Cap’n Buck and Maria’s first meeting. 
The first comes from Alex Arnett and is most likely dramatized and inaccurate. He 
claimed that Kitchin met Maria during the Civil War under unhappy circumstances. His 
company’s flag bearer was a man, or teenager more accurately, who became a close 
friend to him during the war, John W. Arrington. John showed Cap’n Buck a small 
picture of his sister, Maria, during one of the long periods of boredom associated with 
being a soldier. Kitchin was so impressed with her beauty that he began writing her 
letters and planned to accompany John to his home on an upcoming furlough. Tragically, 
in May of 1864, at the Battle of Spotsylvania Court House, John was shot. While he was 
dying on the battlefield in Buck’s arms, he asked Kitchin to return his personal 
belongings to his home, which Kitchin did on the scheduled furlough that was meant to 
introduce him to John’s attractive sister. Kitchin did what John asked but he also took the 
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opportunity to woo Maria, who was impressed enough to marry him the next time they 
met. That is the way that Alex Arnett relayed their first encounter. The other, and 
accurate, version of their first meeting explained that Kitchin and Maria were introduced 
by her brother, John, but that they were married on January 5, 1864, five months before 
John Arrington died. In either case, Cap’n Buck and Maria undoubtedly met due to 
Kitchin’s military service with Arrington.15 
Both sides of Claude’s family had deep roots in the United States. Maria 
Arrington came from old money, and the family was a bit higher on the southern social 
hierarchy than the Kitchin family had been. She could trace her ancestry in Virginia to 
about 1700 and in North Carolina to about 1769, and the family could trace its heritage 
back possibly as far as thirteenth-century England. The family name was also as a 
surname of local landowners in England. Maria Arrington’s brothers all fought for North 
Carolina in the Civil War. The Arrington family probably also fought in the American 
War for Independence. Maria lived in Halifax County at the time of her marriage to 
Kitchin. The Cap’n and Maria had eleven children in total, including Claude, many of 
whom had large broods of their own.16  
 
15 Thurmond Kitchin to Alex Arnett, November 25, 1935, Box 45, Kitchin Papers; Ingle, “Pilgrimage,” 3-4; 
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before John Arrington died. Maria Figures Arrington’s name has been the subject of dispute. She has been 
reported as “Maria Figgus” on occasion. A Kitchin descendent explained in a telephone interview to the 
author that “Figgus” emerged as a mispronunciation. A southern drawl will make “Figures” sound like 
“Figgus” to outsiders, thus the confusion in secondary sources. 
16 John Bennett Boddie, Southside Virginia Families: Volume II (California: Clearfield Company Inc., 
1956), 1-11; List from Arnett, Wilson War Policies, 9. Cap’n Kitchin’s sons and daughters, in order of their 
ages were: Samuel Boaz, planter; William Walton, lawyer, Congressman, governor; Claude, lawyer, 
Congressman; John Arrington, planter; Paul, lawyer, state senator; Gertrude (Mrs. A. McDowell): Richard 
Vann, various; Annie Maria (Mrs. Charles L. McDowell); Thurman Delna, physician, President of Wake 
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Some of Cap’n Buck Kitchin’s decisions in politics and life ended up being poor 
ones but he was always willing to take the unpopular or difficult course when he believed 
it was the right thing to do. Claude, and most of the Kitchin children, must have inherited 
this quality. One of Claude’s trademarks as an adult was to follow his conscience, despite 
the popularity of his opinions, inevitably culminating in April of 1917 with an unpopular 
speech against entering the Great War. Of the Kitchin children, three entered politics, 
including Claude, William Walton, and Alvin Paul. Alvin served in the North Carolina 
State House and State Senate but with no real notable acts or speeches.  
Claude’s older brother, William Walton Kitchin, was the other politically 
significant Kitchin. William was the second son of Cap’n Buck and his namesake. He 
graduated from Wake Forest College in 1884 at eighteen and taught briefly before 
moving on to become the editor of the Scotland Neck Democrat, as his father had done. 
He later studied law at the University of North Carolina and passed the bar in 1887. He 
began his law practice in Roxboro, North Carolina, where he also began his political 
career as chairman of the Democratic executive committee of Person County. He served 
as United States Representative from North Carolina’s Fifth District from 1896 to 1908, 
holding that office at one point during the same time Claude was a member of the House. 
The brothers collaborated on certain acts, but neither was in a position of any dramatic 
importance after Claude’s election and before William left the House to take up residence 
in the North Carolina governor’s mansion. One of William’s best-known speeches from 
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his time in Congress was one in defense of the woman’s suffrage amendment, but for the 
most part, his other years in Congress were lackluster.17 
William’s tenure as governor was a little more exciting. After sixty-one rounds of 
balloting, he received his party’s nomination and was elected governor of North Carolina, 
taking office in 1909. He oversaw increases in education expenditures by the state as well 
as increases to public health services for the so-called feebleminded. Railroads expanded, 
the state’s banking institutions were improved, and the conservation of swampland 
increased. Little of what William accomplished, however, was revolutionary or 
particularly notable, as the two governors preceding him and the fifteen governors 
succeeding him had many of the same goals and policies. All of them were Democrats. 
After a failed campaign to be elected to the U.S. Senate, William returned to his law 
practice until a stroke forced him to retire in 1919.18  
Claude was born on March 24, 1869, in Halifax County, North Carolina, near 
Scotland Neck. He spent his formative years in an economically depressed South that 
struggled to adjust to the changes that came to the United States after the Civil War. The 
whole country sustained heavy losses, but the South found recovery particularly difficult 
to achieve. Of course, all of the capital that southerners invested in owning other humans 
was wiped away with emancipation. Slave-based agriculture was the economic basis of 
the region, one that developed over centuries, and with that system now abolished, 
enormous adjustments were needed. Southern citizens took on massive debt from the 
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government of the Confederate States of America, which would never be repaid, in 
addition to the massive material losses during the Union campaigns through the South. 
That destruction and unpaid debt turned into widespread poverty after the war.  
One planter who had owned over a thousand slaves and eight plantations just 
outside of Scotland Neck, Thomas Devereux, experienced this economic transformation 
firsthand. The war cost him all of his slaves, several of his plantations, all of his useful 
livestock, and thousands of dollars of debt certificates from the Confederate government. 
Wage labor suffered simultaneously. Domestic help fetched five dollars a month in 1867 
but dropped to about four dollars a month by 1872. Farm hands were paid similarly, 
especially after the Panic of 1873. Those losses and low wages were typical of the war-
torn North Carolina that Claude grew up in.19 
But the war took a less serious toll on the Kitchin family than many others in the 
state, as the patriarch, Cap’n Buck, survived and emerged in a sound financial situation, 
partly due to his California land speculation dealings. Claude was able to attend Vine Hill 
Academy as a youngster, as nearly all of his siblings did. Vine Hill was mainly a 
preparatory school for upper-class boys and girls, with a tuition of forty dollars and 
additional fees per subject. The school was not for run-of-the-mill children. Vine Hill 
took out advertisements in North Carolina newspapers: “A thorough course will be 
pursued. . . Boys will be prepared for College, or business.” Claude proved himself to be 
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a great student at the academy, where he also began to learn how to be a great public 
speaker. The school placed much emphasis on rhetoric, and he won medals for oratory 
against boys older than he was.20 
Claude entered Wake Forest College in 1883, where he studied law. He followed 
his older brother there, who was a senior by the time of his arrival. It was quite a small 
institution when Claude arrived, with a total population just in excess of 160 students. 
Cap’n Kitchin attended Claude’s graduation with delight in 1888, at which Claude 
delivered a well-received salutatory address. In total, seven of the Kitchin children 
studied at Wake Forest. One brother, Thurman Delna Kitchin, later became president of 
the college. Like his father and siblings, Claude was a Baptist by birth, so it was a natural 
fit for the Kitchin children to attend Wake Forest.21 
It was during his time in college that Kitchin met and courted Kate Mills, whose 
father was a well-respected senior faculty member at Wake Forest. The young woman 
was highly sought after by many of his classmates. She was by all accounts attractive, 
pleasant, and from a family of means. Much like Kitchin’s mother was from a more 
prominent family than his father, so too was Kate higher in social standing than Claude. 
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Like many fathers, Professor Luther Mills was reluctant to allow his daughter to date, but 
in such a small setting, it seemed inevitable that she would be smitten by the handsome 
and eloquent young Claude. There is no doubt that many young men attending Wake 
Forest pitched their woo to Kate, as she was often seen out and about with her family in 
the town. Claude never had the opportunity to speak with Kate one-on-one until they 
shared their first date. Kate invited Claude to go on a school picnic together. They fished 
on the river that day and Claude became determined to marry her. At that point in his life, 
Claude was still unproven, and her father was reluctant to allow a marriage. The elder 
Cap’n Kitchin stepped in to negotiate with Professor Mills on Claude’s behalf, assuring 
him that he would take care of the lovebirds until Claude was sound financially, since he 
was only nineteen at the time. The professor relented and the couple married on 
November 12, 1888. Claude and Kate had nine children through the course of their 
marriage.22 
In addition to finding the love of his life, Claude’s time at the college prepared 
him for the coming career he would take. He graduated with several future state leaders 
and made life-long connections with the other young men of prominence at Wake Forest. 
His course training seemed standard, though maybe more thorough than one might expect 
from a college in postbellum North Carolina. Similar to the excellence Claude 
demonstrated in public speaking at Vine Hill, he became an accomplished orator at Wake 
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Forest. The classics, politics, and rhetoric became old hat to him. He became what he was 
expected to be, a minor southern aristocrat with a well-rounded education.23 
Kitchin spent his first years out of college honing his public speaking skills. The 
minimum age to pass the bar in North Carolina was twenty-one, and since he was 
nineteen at the time of graduation, he still had time to grow. He was the son of the most 
prominent man in Scotland Neck, after all. To polish his speaking skills in these years, he 
delivered several commencement addresses, including at Vine Hill Academy and 
participated in local civic activities in his hometown. The events he attended and the 
addresses he delivered helped him become better known as his own man in the 
community, which he may have believed would in turn help him gain clients as a young 
lawyer when the time came for that. He also read law for two years until he was admitted 
to the North Carolina bar at age twenty-one in 1890.24 
The young lawyer found that building a successful new practice was not easy. His 
first cases were small ones and generally uneventful. He often struggled to earn enough 
money for his own small but growing family, and occasionally, sought loans from his 
father. Alex Arnett reported that on one of these desperate trips to his father’s house, 
Claude, by chance, was stopped by a black man in trouble and in need of a lawyer. Rather 
than beg for Cap’n Buck’s money, he asked the man if he had five dollars to pay for his 
service, which the man had, and they were off to the magistrate’s office. Kitchin cleared 
the man and gave the money to his wife. In time, more white and black clients came, and 
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Kitchin’s reputation grew as a lawyer. This story may well be complete fiction. Arnett 
listed no names for this encounter, but court records indicate that the facts of the case are 
accurate and he did indeed represent an African American. Kitchin took cases where he 
could find them, even from African American clients.25 
Early in his life, Kitchin had shown little substantial interest in entering politics, 
but after his practice was becoming more successful, he was finally ready to enter what 
became his life’s work. He decided that the past was the best indicator for the future and 
drew inspiration from his state’s recent history to set up his personal political platform. 
Much as his older brother had, Claude entered politics slowly and locally. His reputation 
as a charismatic lawyer and compelling orator quickly spread and created a demand for 
his service as a speaker. In a commencement address delivered in June of 1890, Kitchin 
advised graduates to be wary of new theories and hold on to the old established truths of 
the world. His oratory was so impressive that by 1898 he was well known to local 
political officials, and they appointed him to the North Carolina Democratic Executive 
Committee for that year’s state election to help organize the white supremacy campaign 
that returned much of the state legislature to Democratic control. The white supremacy 
campaign, called the “Red Shirt Movement,” centered around intimidation and corruption 
at the polls; although not directly involved in its violence, Kitchin helped to mobilize the 
Red Shirt gang in his district, and he spoke in front of thousands who showed up to Red 
Shirt meetings in North Carolina.26 
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Members of this colorfully named movement traveled on red, horse-drawn 
buggies, with red draping on those horses. They also wore red shirts, hats, and trousers. 
Agreeing with their racist agenda, Kitchin publicly professed his interest in “eliminating 
the negro in politics and office holding.” He made speeches and wrote editorials often, 
leading up to the elections of 1898 and 1900 explaining the superiority of the white man 
over black people. He claimed that he hoped to accomplish these outcomes through 
peaceful methods, but he must have known that violence would happen in some capacity 
to prevent the “Negro vote.”27  
Kitchin and his father, among other prominent white men of Halifax County, were 
accused in 1898 of threatening to kill a “Negro registrar” in Roseneath township if the 
registrar did not resign his position. In the end, nothing ever came of the accusation. 
Registrar B. B. Steptoe charged that the men broke down his door and held him at pistol-
point until he signed his resignation. Cap’n Buck was allegedly the ringleader of this 
incident. Warrants were issued for his and the others’ arrests, and Cap’n Buck vigorously 
denied the allegation. Word circulated that someone connected to the white supremacy 
movement had broken into Steptoe’s home and the Kitchin family’s well-known 
connection to the Red Shirt Movement made them top suspects. Cap’n Buck took a train 
to Raleigh to answer the charges, which nearly caused a riot outside of the courthouse. 
The judge who issued the warrants dismissed the charges “as soon as the evidence was 
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completed.” This incident had no immediate connection to the Red Shirts. We may never 
know the full story of what happened in Mr. Steptoe’s home that evening.28 
However, the Red Shirts had a major impact on the outcome of the state elections 
of 1898 and 1900. These gangs of armed men, attired in red tunics, essentially acted as 
the intimidation wing of the Democratic Party. They carried guns and wore masks, 
although they were not necessarily members of the better-known Ku Klux Klan. The Red 
Shirts made death threats, indicated they would inflict economic harm on anti-
Democratic forces, and resorted to direct violence, including beatings and even some 
murders. They succeeded in their goal of suppressing the African American vote in 1898. 
Many prominent North Carolinians, including Charles Aycock, Josephus Daniels, and the 
Kitchin family, were involved in the disfranchisement effort and justified the Red Shirt 
tactics as a “necessary evil” to prevent black political participation. Kitchin was well 
aware of the violent tactics. However, never publicly advocated for them.29 
In 1900, the Kitchin family strongly supported the gubernatorial campaign of 
Charles B. Aycock. Broadly, Aycock was interested in an educational renaissance in 
North Carolina, along with a general broadening of the social functions the government 
should provide. Besides racism, Aycock is best remembered today as the state’s 
education governor. He committed his campaign for governor to the disfranchisement of 
most black voters on the grounds of illiteracy, provided that the old southern principle of 
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noblesse oblige, or paternalism, was carried out. If blacks were to be disfranchised, it 
would become obligatory of white leaders to make provisions for them, he reasoned. 
Their schools and other public institutions would have to be improved alongside white 
public spaces. Most members of the white elite were ready to assist African Americans 
who were willing to relent to white interests. Some state politicians balked at the 
suggestion but relented when Aycock threatened them politically. However, the true 
motives of noblesse oblige were racist, and black institutions rarely received the same 
resources as their white counterparts.30  
The Kitchin family was well aware of the extra-legal means needed to secure 
Aycock’s 1900 victory. Claude obviously supported Aycock’s goals, and the elder 
Kitchin may also have supported Aycock but was too ill at the time to actively participate 
in Aycock’s campaign. However, Cap’n Kitchin was able to help with Claude’s 
campaign in the same year, as he did not have to travel much to support his son. The 
elder Kitchin’s sympathies concerning paternalism were already well noted in local 
newspapers. He remarked as far back as 1889, “Do all you can for [the Negro] without 
injuring yourselves. Take care of him; for he has not sense enough to take care of 
himself.”31  
The intimidation tactics and violence, employed with ruthless success by the Red 
Shirts in 1898 and 1900, helped send Claude to the United States House of 
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Representatives in 1901 as representative of the “Black Second,” the same district that his 
father served, and the seat that he remained in literally for the rest of his life. His 1900 
platform called for a return of white control to this district and all of eastern North 
Carolina and even the repeal of the Fifteenth Amendment. His father, brother, and others, 
all impressive orators, stumped for him around the Second District, echoing those 
demands for white domination.32  
Later generations might describe Claude Kitchin’s election as “shady” and 
certainly dishonest. Ballot boxes in his district had false bottoms, which Kitchin most 
likely knew about but had no direct part in setting up. Kitchin’s life-long reputation for 
honesty and integrity were not called into question, as these tactics were “justified” by 
the result of returning the Second District to white Democratic control. For his first 
election, Kitchin defeated a Republican, Joseph J. Martin, by the healthy margin of 
10,380 votes. From then on, he became unbeatable in his seat and never needed to resort 
to this dishonest kind of campaign again. However, restrictions on African American 
voters in his district endured. Nevertheless, he became so popular with his white 
constituents that historians have noted he was “probably as undefeatable as any 
Congressman in the country,” and despite his outward modesty, he knew it. Secure 
politically, he could afford to be independent-minded and oppose otherwise popular 
decisions. Perhaps as an omen of things to come, Kitchin’s first vote in the House was on 
the losing side. Even so, his popularity and unbeatability were obvious, even from his 
first reelection. In 1904, Kitchin won an astounding landslide against an little-known 
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opponent, 12,064 to 1,919. By 1916, one North Carolina man liked him so much that he 
suggested that Kitchin should run for the office of president: “Throw your hat in the ring 
as candidate for President of the United States; you are the one man who can lead your 
party to victory in November.” Towards the end of his career, Kitchin often ran 
unopposed for his congressional seat.33 
The methods used by Kitchin to win the 1900 did no lasting damage to his 
reputation. In the South, using violence to disfranchise blacks was a way of life. To the 
rest of the country, the use of violence in the region was tolerated because that was just 
how the southern states operated. Northerners rarely lost any sleep over black 
disfranchisement. After disfranchising African American voters in the “Black Second,” 
Kitchin did not spend much ink or breath on white supremacy, but that ideology truly 
dominated his first campaign. Throughout his career, despite his racism and activities 
organizing racist groups, he at least presented the façade that he would stick to the 
noblesse oblige ideal set forth by Governor Aycock. And Kitchin’s legacy in the ensuing 
century became far more linked with the American role in the Great War than with 
disfranchising black voters.34 
Kitchin’s views on race relations were very much in step with the rest of the white 
South, and indeed, whites throughout the country. President Theodore Roosevelt stirred 
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national controversy when he invited black men to receptions at the White House on 
more than one occasion, with Booker T. Washington the most famous invitee. Kitchin 
was never invited to attend the same functions but indicated that he would most likely not 
attend the same event as a black man. When a Republican colleague challenged his racist 
attitudes on the floor of Congress, Kitchin got the Kansas Representative to agree that he 
would not accept the same invitation either.35 
Kitchin’s personal feelings about African Americans were well known to all of 
his colleagues. He fought hard before his election to Congress to prevent black North 
Carolinians from enjoying the same rights as their white counterparts. Those actions were 
not lost on the Congressman that Kitchin replaced, Republican George White. An African 
American, White used one of his last speeches in the House to plead with his colleagues 
to protect “colored” rights in the face of a man who fought so hard to strip them away. In 
fact, one of Kitchin’s first speeches in the campaign to unseat White was a two-hour 
exhortation to a white supremacist audience to halt black hopes of domination over white 
people.36  
When it came to more serious racial matters than dinner invitations or voting 
rights, Kitchin struggled to show a human side, as his mixed messaging on lynching 
revealed. With the South under increasing pressure to condemn lynching, Kitchin 
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responded that everyone should deplore violent vigilante tactics. Pressed on whether he 
considered lynching an appropriate response to rape, Kitchin could neither condemn nor 
defend the practice in cases of alleged rape, while conceding that the cries of a lynched 
man’s family made him uneasy. Only a month later in Congress, before a national 
audience, Kitchin was more willing to explain, “I do not defend, nor do we in the South 
defend, lynching for any crime . . . except the unspeakable crime against womanhood.” 
His vacillation continued, however, as he declined to condemn lynching, while agreeing 
that “we [should not] advocate or encourage lynching even [in cases involving alleged 
rape].” That speech did not translate into much action on his part to combat lynching in 
North Carolina. Admittedly, Kitchin’s motive for this line may have had more to do with 
embarrassing President Roosevelt, who had advocated for vigilante justice for lesser 
crimes, than in explaining his own personal feelings.37 
Kitchin’s unwillingness to speak up on the subject of lynching, specifically in 
instances of rape, highlighted the typical southern attitude toward race relations. Most 
white southerners agreed that whites and blacks should be kept in separate spheres, with 
whites obviously above the blacks in terms of social standing. All of the evidence 
indicates that Kitchin was fine with this arrangement. It seemed that he just preferred to 
turn a blind eye to lynching rather than to make any major changes to prevent the practice 
from continuing. About 9 lynchings took place in Kitchin’s district, with 26 statewide, 
 




during his terms in office. The state total from post-Reconstruction to 1968 was probably 
101 people lynched in North Carolina.38 
During his first few years in Congress, Kitchin made no major speeches despite 
the promise he had shown around North Carolina as a master orator earlier in his life. 
There was little notice of him nationally except as the younger brother of William W. 
Kitchin, if that was even worth noticing. His early committee assignments in Congress 
were minor. He was put on the Claims and Expenditures and the State Department 
committees in his first session. Remarkably, he gained a reputation of being shy and 
quiet, despite being well-known in his home state as a charismatic speechmaker. His 
quiet demeanor and perceived shyness in Congress were chalked up to laziness by some 
of his colleagues, but it later came to light that Claude was quietly doing the little things 
which would in time become the standard of his work ethic: routine committee work, 
studying, observing, and thinking. There are anecdotes that support his being a generally 
shy person early in his national career. That is, while he proved his worth as a public 
orator, he was not usually keen on conversations. He avoided large gatherings in 
Washington D.C. When he had to make an official appearance in some Washington 
event, he would walk his wife, Maria, to the door and then retreat back to the street or sit 
on his car while she completed the chore of the receiving line. He did put his excellent 
 
38 White, The Republic for Which It Stands, 740-746; LeeAnn Whites, “Love, Hate, Rape, Lynching: 
Rebecca Latimer Felton and the Gender Politics of Racial Violence,” in Timothy Tyson and David 
Cecelski, eds., Democracy Betrayed: The Wilmington Race Riot of 1898 and Its Legacy (Chapel Hill: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 131-146; Martha Quillin, “How Many African Americans were 
lynched in North Carolina,” Raleigh News and Observer, January 29, 2019. 
61 
 
oration skills to use in small group settings when possible, earning the reputation as an 
incomparable cloak room debater.39 
Kitchin finally delivered his first major House speech in 1904. It was a criticism 
of Republican hypocrisy concerning President Theodore Roosevelt. The speech 
addressed two goals. First, Kitchin wanted to respond to recent challenges he faced on the 
subject of race relations in his home region. And second, he wanted to point out how 
unqualified he believed Roosevelt was to hold the office of president, and further, to 
illustrate how embarrassing Roosevelt was as McKinley’s vice-president. To address the 
issue of southern race relations, Kitchin noted that President Roosevelt publicly opposed 
lynching across the South as a punishment, but in one of the president’s books, he 
advocated lynching as a punishment for the low crime of pony theft in western states. 
Kitchin was not necessarily defending lynching in this speech; rather, he seemed to assert 
that the punishment must fit the crime. For Kitchin, the only acceptable reason for a 
lynching was as a punishment for the rape of a white woman. To the other point, Kitchin 
noted that Roosevelt had criticized many previous presidents in his writings and was only 
picked as McKinley’s vice-president to get him out of New York politics.  Kitchin 
claimed “that Roosevelt would be a distasteful running mate for any American 
statesman.” This speech, pointing out the Republican President’s hypocrisy, was a huge 
hit in North Carolina and around the South.40 
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Figure 2. Claude Kitchin Official Portrait. 
 
 
After finding his national voice, Kitchin came to the first national matter that 
would make him well-known around the country: tariffs. As far as Kitchin was 
concerned, tariffs meant that special interests got rich at the expense of the everyday man 
from North Carolina, a common concern across the South. Southern congressmen often 
railed against high tariffs as unfair to the region. Kitchin wanted American manufacturers 
to move into foreign markets, and tariffs made that difficult. He argued that exporting 
American goods was key to growing the economy and first demonstrated his irritation by 
attacking the Payne-Aldrich Tariff in 1909. He specifically tackled a provision 
concerning lumber in the tariff, as North Carolina was a large producer of lumber that 
needed to be sent to foreign markets. His speech against the Payne-Aldrich Bill of 1909 
was well received by many of his colleagues and secured him a spot on the Ways and 
Means Committee. There was some political wrangling necessary for Kitchin to become 
 




a member of this committee, but that was achieved, and by early 1911, he was picked to 
serve.42 
Opposing high tariffs, as well as speaking out against policies of the now Taft-led 
Republican Administration, carried Kitchin through more elections in which he was 
unanimously picked by his party for the Second District seat. Leading up to the 1910 
mid-terms, Kitchin toured his district and the state. He told his constituents that the Taft 
Administration was corrupt, but his key issue consistently remained the tariff. Kitchin 
won this reelection by a huge margin again. Now, securely in his seat in the House and as 
a member of one of the most important House committees, Kitchin began to exert more 
influence in the government.43 
In the election of 1912, Kitchin’s old nemesis Theodore Roosevelt helped split the 
Republican ticket and made Wilson a feasible candidate for president. Claude and 
William Kitchin came out in favor of Wilson. The Kitchins shared many common goals 
with Wilson, as they were all progressive Democrats. The Kitchin brothers instructed the 
North Carolina delegation to vote for Wilson at the primary convention. Claude was 
overjoyed when Wilson was nominated by the Democrats and then sworn in as president. 
Indeed, Kitchin was in favor of the new president’s “New Freedom” domestic agenda. 
The major issues that Wilson wanted action on –banking reform and tariff reform– 
represented policies that the Kitchins had long supported. It was only on international 
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affairs that Kitchin and Wilson disagreed. There was never a dramatic public falling out 
between Kitchin and Wilson. The two only began drifting apart when the United States 
came closer and closer to entering the Great War.44 
By 1915, House Majority Leader Oscar Underwood, from Alabama, was ready to 
step down from that position in order to enter the Senate. Due to House seniority rules, 
the now-experienced Kitchin stood next in line for the role. In late December, it took 116 
votes to elect him to that position, when at least 196 Democrats indicated that they were 
strongly in favor of Kitchin. He was unanimously honored by the Democratic Party by 
being chosen chairman of the Ways and Means Committee that year, and with that 
position came the title of Majority Leader. Democrats chose Kitchin for a few reasons. 
First, obviously, seniority dictated his selection. Second, he impressed everyone with his 
oratory and was eloquently ready to field any question at any time from his Republican 
opponents. And finally, he never lost his head and was always ready to debate a matter in 
a calm manner.45 
The Majority Leader is not usually the same person as the Speaker, although there 
are many cases where a person served in both offices, but never at the same time. The 
person that filled the roles of Speaker and Majority Leader have changed back and forth 
several times. For example, when Champ Clark became the Speaker of the House in the 
62nd Congress, Oscar Underwood served as Majority Leader. Then, in 1915, Kitchin 
succeeded Underwood, who won election to the Senate, while Clark continued on as 
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Speaker. Clark and Kitchin flipped the party leader position twice more in the succeeding 
Congresses. The title “Majority Leader” only applies when the party is the majority in 
Congress. When the Republicans regained the majority in the 67th Congress, Kitchin 
became the minority leader. 
Kitchin stepped into leadership of the Committee on Ways and Means as the 
youngest person to hold the position in over two decades. The Democratic caucus 
officially nominated him on February 4, 1915. Few Democrats had any doubt that 
Kitchin could handle the task though. He was already a “veteran legislator,” an “astute 
parliamentarian,” and a “rough and tumble debater.” Much of North Carolina was 
obviously ecstatic at the idea. The Polk County News called him North Carolina’s 
greatest congressman. The Greensboro Daily News said no one was nearly as qualified as 
Kitchin was to succeed Underwood.46  
At some points, there seemed to be some doubt if President Wilson would support 
the Democratic Party’s election of Kitchin to the office of Majority Leader. Kitchin was 
not always on the same page with the Wilson administration, and the question was raised, 
largely by the hostile northern press, about whether his Democratic colleagues should 
support him for a post often described as second in power only to the presidency. It was 
mainly northeastern newspapers that questioned Kitchin’s abilities, his relationship with 
Wilson, and various rumors about his stance as leader of the House. Kitchin was always 
quick to reassure his constituents that it was all “pure newspaper ‘fake-ism.’ There is 
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absolutely nothing to it.” Kitchin had a running feud with many of the newspapers that 
posted sensational stories, which he considered false information. He responded to a 
letter written to him regarding a newspaper report on his views of the war-preparedness 
question, “I say this in the kindest spirit, but a busy man like you has not the time to read 
anything except the newspapers, and your letter is based on such information, which are 
not the facts.”47 
Despite any real or perceived reservations that the president might have held 
about Kitchin’s election to the position, he quickly earned the respect of his fellow 
officeholders, even those who had publicly held reservations about him taking on the 
post. Representative Augustus P. Gardner of Massachusetts told Kitchin that many 
Republicans doubted if he could handle the job early on because they regarded him as “a 
wit, not an intellectual,” but he had changed their minds, and they now viewed him as 
one of the best majority leaders produced by either party in recent memory. In part, these 
changed attitudes were due to Kitchin demonstrating the mature qualities necessary in the 
office, especially patience and the willingness to listen to his colleagues.48  
It is quite true that Kitchin butted heads with Wilson on foreign affairs issues. 
Although it is often difficult to figure out the exact motives of a person’s actions, there is 
a parallel one might draw between Kitchin and one of his predecessors. Kitchin followed 
in the footsteps, as a major congressional leader, of House Speaker Thomas Brackett 
Reed of Maine. Speaker Reed was a Republican who directly and passionately opposed 
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his own party’s president in his decision to enter a war against Spain in 1898. Reed did 
everything in his power to stop congressional resolutions that would recognize Cuban 
independence before the Spanish-American War was declared. Reed, like Kitchin after 
him, commanded so much respect in his own party that President McKinley would not 
dare openly advocate for a replacement. When Reed opposed American support of Cuban 
independence, he knew that both the U.S. Congress and the American people wanted a 
war. He was attacked in the papers and resented in the House for that stance. Kitchin 
truly mirrored Reed some two decades later under similar circumstances. This time it was 
a Democratic leader disagreeing with a president from his own party, rather than a 
Republican disagreeing with another Republican, and the circumstances of war were, of 
course, different.49 
Following in the footsteps of Reed, the outbreak of the Great War in August 1914 
put Claude Kitchin and other Democrats, including a prominent group of populist-
progressives that included Secretary of State William J. Bryan and Senator James K. 
Vardaman, on a collision course with President Wilson. Other anti-war Congressmen 
from around the country included Senator George Norris of Nebraska. Norris asked his 
fellow senators to “consider the terrible consequences of the step we are about to take” 
when considering the declaration of war. This type of sympathy fell on deaf ears when 
two days later the Senate voted 82-6 and the House voted 373-50 in favor of the 
declaration. There were other high-ranking government officials in North Carolina that 
supported Kitchin and, in general, opposed American entry to the World War. One 
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amongst them was former state Attorney General and Mayor of Asheville, Theodore 
Davidson, who wrote a lengthy opinion piece questioning how ambiguous American 
neutrality actually had been, as well as many other state Democrats who came to office as 
Progressives.50 
There was a small group of Progressive Democrats who merit mention and 
comparison with Kitchin. As progressives, these men largely shared Kitchin’s goals of 
reform from their various positions. When the Great War began and the United States 
began debating its role in world affairs, they also tried to prevent American involvement. 
Senator James Vardaman of Mississippi and Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan 
were both close allies of Claude Kitchin, especially during the preparedness period before 
1917. Former Representative and future Senator Tom Watson of Georgia could also be 
included in this group of southerners in opposition to American entry. Most historians 
agree that Watson was one of the “loudest and most persistent voice[s] of discontent” 
other than Kitchin through the preparedness period, and Watson surely approved of 
Kitchin’s opposition. Most southern congressmen were shocked by the suddenness of the 
World War, but only a select few took such a strong stance against America’s 
involvement in it.51 
Historians have surmised that in the early twentieth century, most southern white 
Democrats fell into three different categories: the conservatives, the agrarians, and the 
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progressives. Most progressives came from small towns and cities, while the 
conservatives and agrarians represented very different rural interests. Kitchin rose to 
office as a Progressive and was profoundly influenced by an extraordinary situation that 
faced the South from Reconstruction through the 1890s. A host of economic factors led 
southern, agricultural areas into despair and resentment. Farmers in the region recognized 
the need to organize in order to protect their own interests, and many joined the Farmers’ 
Alliance. The Alliance began as a cooperative organization but quickly learned its 
potential political power. When it became clear that the Alliance was not strong enough, 
many turned to the Populist Party. Others, especially after the Panic of 1893, joined the 
Populist-Republican fusion party, which sputtered out after the Fusionists were ousted by 
a new crop of Democrats with populist ideas, Kitchin among them. Much of the 
disgruntlement among these farmers and fusionists came from racism. Southern 
progressivism seemed like it might be the answer to these different factions. By 1900, the 
Democratic Party in North Carolina found a man with progressive policies who was also 
eager to disfranchise black voters, Charles Aycock. Aycock’s election signaled the end to 
opposition parties in the state.52 
The Progressive Era in the United States is usually remembered in terms of its 
domestic successes and failures. America’s preparation for, and eventual involvement in, 
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the Great War can be examined from progressivism’s internationalist element. 
Progressives were split over the methods that they should use to fulfill their mission 
beyond American shores. President Wilson eventually came to believe that American 
participation in the war would grant him a seat at the peacemaking table. In his view, he 
could shape the peace with progressive ideals employed on a worldwide basis. Other 
progressives believed that forcing their ideals would not work and preferred a gradual 
reform to the world order, as a byproduct of America’s example, rather than an 
enforcement. One of the tactics used by progressive opponents of preparedness had been 
to raise the income tax on the rich to pay for increased military costs. They assumed that 
the enthusiasm of industrialists would lessen if they were forced to pay higher taxes for 
the coming war.53   
Kitchin and William J. Bryan became acquainted before the World War, as they 
were both products of the progressive agrarian movement and formed a lifelong 
friendship. Kitchin looked up to Bryan even though they were relatively close in age. 
Indeed, when Kitchin took the House floor in April 1917, he wore a Bryan-style bolo tie. 
Bryan represented much of what Kitchin held close to his heart and he could usually look 
to Bryan for an example, if he ever needed one. The two kept in close touch throughout 
the 1910s, but Bryan refrained from giving Kitchin any strategic advice on how to deal 
with the preparedness movement, especially after Bryan’s resignation as secretary of 
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state. There was a mutual give and take between the pair. Kitchin usually benefitted the 
most from these exchanges, but he was always sure to trust his own judgement. Bryan 
often commended his stance on important questions. They did not agree on every issue, 
of course. Prohibition and the anti-evolution crusade did not concern Kitchin very much 
at all, for example. But Bryan’s advice on any topic was always welcome.54 
Kitchin also had much in common with Senator James K. Vardaman, a white 
supremacist from Mississippi who generally supported Wilson’s domestic agenda. Like 
Kitchin, Vardaman and Wilson disagreed over foreign policy. Unlike Kitchin, 
Vardaman’s opposition to Wilson and the war policies eventually derailed his political 
career. He was a very outspoken proponent of neutrality. He learned from his own 
experiences with the Spanish-American War that while many people may have had 
humanitarian reasons for advocating American intervention, bankers and businessmen 
turned the conflict into an imperialistic conquest. And Vardaman did not want to see 
military interventions for financial gain become a trend in the United States. He reasoned 
that humanitarianism should drive American forces to Europe, not profit. Vardaman and 
Kitchin corresponded frequently and often heaped praise on one another for their shared 
views against war preparedness.55 
Another parallel can be drawn with the experience of Tom Watson of Georgia, 
another advocate of white supremacy who has been described by historians as “the most 
trusted Populist in Georgia.” Like Kitchin, Watson was born and raised in a small, rural 
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southern region, where he also spent most of his life. Watson’s father also served in the 
Confederate Army. Unlike the Kitchin family, the Watsons lost several close family 
members, and their family suffered complete financial ruin. One important trait shared by 
both Kitchin and Watson was a gift for oratory. As war was raging in Europe, Watson 
employed his gift to object to the increasing militarism in America and to Wilson’s 
actions as president that promoted war preparedness.56 
Much of Watson’s rhetoric against the United States joining in the Great War was 
reminiscent of Kitchin’s own. They both spoke in similar language while trying to 
prevent American entry, decrying the “jingoes and war traffickers.” In the 1910s though, 
Watson was only a civilian and did not have the same political power as Kitchin, Bryan, 
and Vardaman did. However, in the late teens, Watson ran a nationally known and 
popular newspaper, so his voice was still felt around the country.57 
Kitchin was neither pro-German nor pro-British. Many different motives were 
attributed to Kitchin’s anti-war policies before April 1917.  Alex Arnett asserted that, 
“The charge that [Kitchin] was a pro-German [should] be dismissed as absurd.” Kitchin’s 
heritage, as well as that of most of his constituents, was almost wholly of British stock, 
and he had no connections to German or pro-German groups in America. On the other 
hand, Kitchin, like much of the South, detested the British domination of shipping and 
trade, as it had a detrimental effect on cotton and tobacco growers and timber producers, 
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especially in North Carolina. When Britain threatened to blockade American cotton from 
going to Germany, a huge cry rang out among southern cotton growers against British 
imperialism. Kitchin, like most of his contemporaries, had reason to disapprove of both 
sides, and any possible accusation that he had some secret, or nefarious, motive to 
support either Imperial Germany or Great Britain should be dismissed immediately. The 
answer is simpler; in short, he wanted to join neither side of this war, and he and many of 
his constituents saw no benefit from the United States entering the Great War.58 
As both President Wilson and Kitchin were Democrats, it did come as a small 
shock to the nation when Kitchin resisted the President’s intention of a declaration of 
war. To that point, there were disagreements between the two on the handling of the 
preparedness issue. Indeed, the Majority Leader resisted Wilson on nearly every issue 
that involved expanding America’s role in world affairs, despite their agreement on 
nearly every domestic issue. There were rumors that Kitchin detested the Wilson 
administration on a personal level, but these were groundless. There is no evidence that 
would suggest a personal feud. If their relationship was strained, it was a result of their 
opposing views on preparedness, rather than the cause of any tension between the two 
politicians.59 
Claude Kitchin dazzled through the prewar period. His birth and upbringing were 
far from humble, and he emerged on the national stage prepared for the roles he later 
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assumed. When he came to the United States House of Representatives, there was no way 
he, or anyone, could know the great challenge that would come to the country with the 
Great War. His name became associated around the country as one of the leading anti-
preparedness champions. Perhaps the Great Man Theory comes into play with Kitchin, to 
some extent. There was a role to fill, someone needed to be the “anti-war” voice in 
government to challenge Wilson’s growing fondness for militarism, and Kitchin filled 
that role. He continued his fight against war preparedness by speaking out against 
increases in naval and army spending throughout 1916 and into 1917.  
Newly elected governor Locke Craig announced that a new era was beginning for 
North Carolina when he delivered his inaugural address in 1913. Craig instituted and 
supported progressive policies, authorized the building of new infrastructure including 
modern roads and railroads, and continued the education reforms of his predecessor, 
Governor Charles Aycock. Despite the European War hindering American economics, 
Craig described his first two years in office as an era of substantial progress for the state. 
Agriculture and industry improved in those years because farmers and manufacturers 
realized the need to diversify their crops and goods produced. For white North 
Carolinians, the outlook for the coming years was good. They had no notion that the 
world would soon be at war, and eventually eighty-six thousand Tar Heels would be off 
to fight in it.60
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CONFRONTING A WORLD AT WAR: CLAUDE KITCHIN, NORTH 
CAROLINA, AND AMERICA, 1914-1915 
 
 
Please permit me to thank you for your letter of the 7th, endorsing my position 
with respect to the so-called preparedness program proposed by the 
Administration. As you say, it is all craze. I am confident that if the people knew 
the real facts and situation, an overwhelming majority of them would oppose it as 
earnestly as I do. 
--Claude Kitchin to Earl P. Tatham 
 
When Claude Kitchin took office as North Carolina’s Second District 
Congressman on March 4, 1901, he assumed the seat his father lost almost twenty years 
earlier, beginning with the 57th Congress. Like his father, Kitchin entered the position 
while the United States was at relative peace, as the Philippine-American War began to 
draw to a close shortly after his swearing in. The country was coming to terms with its 
global power, following victory over a much-weakened Spain. Theodore Roosevelt’s Big 
Stick Diplomacy and the Great White Fleet announced to the world that the United States 
had finally joined the international community as a great power, but the United States 
maintained that it would only use its power if threatened. The domestic economy was 
thriving after the Depression of 1893 ended, and the country was beginning to see social, 
economic, and environmental change due to the progressive movement.  
In 1914, Europe had been on the verge of military conflict for at least a decade 
when the Great War finally broke out. There were numerous incidents, such as the two 
Moroccan Crises of 1905 and 1911, the Fashoda Incident, and the series of German naval 
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bills that panicked Great Britain from 1898-1912, that could have easily been the 
spark that finally set off the continent.  The European alliance system, which was 
intended to keep the continent at peace after the Congress of Vienna early in the previous 
century, created rivalries and laid the foundations for a gargantuan conflict. Nationalism 
encouraged by compulsory education systems was a relatively new idea by the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but it guaranteed a magnitude of available 
young men ready to die for their countries. Economic imperialism existed for centuries 
across Europe, but the relative newcomer on the world power stage, Germany, challenged 
the status quo and guaranteed a truly global conflict overseas with Great Britain. 
Industrialized militarism led to the creation of millions of new guns and other weapons of 
death, which were put to terribly effective uses in the succeeding years.  
These are the generally accepted underlying causes of the Great War for the major 
European powers involved, and they did not all happen at the snap of a finger. It took the 
assassination of the heir to a centuries-old throne to ignite this war, but as mentioned, it 
could have been any number of sparks in the decade prior to 1914 that finally drew the 
continent into the fight. In short, Europe had been slowly preparing for the World War 
ever since the last continental maelstrom ended. Historians and scholars from every 
nation that participated in the war produced multi-volume tomes to explain how and why 
they believed the war started. Most of these volumes contradict one another, each 
blaming another country. Some suggested that a war was inevitable, while others simply 
lay the blame on the hands of their adversaries. In recent historiography, some scholars 
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have argued that the war was more “improbable” than “inevitable.” In either case, Europe 
was ready for it and had been for decades.1 
The United States, on the other hand, was not preparing for a European war, let 
alone a World War in 1914. Aside from the Spanish-American War two decades prior 
and the Mexican American War over a half century earlier, the United States seemed to 
have little interest in large-scale conflicts abroad. And indeed, those two wars against 
different Spanish-speaking nations were undertaken by the United States with the full 
thought and confidence that America would achieve easy and quick victories in each.2  
When President Woodrow Wilson finally dragged the United States into the Great 
War in mid-1917, America was hardly equipped or prepared to fight, despite a few years 
of preparedness campaigns undertaken by the federal government, and at its urging, state 
governments after the European war erupted. The United States took nearly a full year to 
actively engage with the enemy on the battlefields of France and Belgium after the 
declaration of war finally came in April of 1917. By the time of American entry, the 
French and British were in desperate need of fresh young men to throw at the Germans 
after Russia surrendered during its own revolution, but the Allies would have to wait a 
little longer than expected for the Doughboys.3 
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The Balkan Peninsula meant little to North Carolinians in 1914. Few people in the 
Tar Heel State claimed birth in or heritage from the lands of either the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire or the Balkan region. Local newspapers mentioned the region only occasionally 
through the first decade of the twentieth century. During heated conflicts on the peninsula 
known as the Balkan Wars, in which several Balkan nations battled the Ottoman Empire, 
North Carolina took note of a war “threatened in the Balkans” and what the Mebane 
Leader called “the Flurry in the Balkans,” buried in page three of a weekly reader. 
Neither paper went into any great detail about the background of why this potential war 
was coming, but like much of the rest of North Carolina, they simply noted that war was 
coming, and when it arrived, they noted the combatants. These two headlines, neither 
from the front page, represented all of the information that the average North Carolinian 
would have about a relatively small conflict in a region that was an ocean away and on 
the other side of Europe.4 
Marking the conclusion of the Second Balkan War on July 18, 1913, the Marshall 
News-Record included an image of the kings of Greece, Bulgaria, Servia (as Serbia was 
then usually called) and their troops and noted in a column that the war was ending. An 
article explained that “as long as the Balkan states did nothing to upset the decisions 
already agreed to among the powers [at war]. . . it was hoped that no power would find it 
necessary to take any action” likely to raise more difficulty in the region. With such 
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limited information, how could North Carolinians possibly know that merely a year later 
events would launch themselves into action which would ultimately send Tar Heel 
soldiers to fight in a war an ocean away?5 
In the spring of 1914, there were rumors in the Balkans that the heir to the Austro-
Hungarian throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, intended to visit Sarajevo to review his 
subjects in the city. Eventually, the Austrian leadership settled on June 28. That date was 
a deliberate choice intended to help solidify Austrian rule of the distinctly non-Austrian 
region. The date was a Serbian holiday called Vidovdan, which celebrated a great 
military victory from centuries ago. A Serbian nationalist organization, the Black Hand, 
hatched a plan to assassinate the heir on his trip through the city on this special day. 
Seven youths were recruited, given guns and small bombs, and placed strategically on the 
parade route to carry out the assassination. One of the recruits, Gavrilo Princip, had little 
reason to be nervous as he was sixth in position of assassins and had good reason to 
believe that the Archduke would be dead well before he was expected to reach Princip’s 
spot on the route. The heir’s motorcade set out on the city tour under the assumption that 
it would be safe in its own empire.6  
The first would-be assassin got cold feet and was unable to throw his bomb. The 
second acted but missed and injured several officers accompanying the Archduke but did 
not touch the heir himself. The motorcade picked up speed and stunned the remaining 
assassins into inaction. Defeated, they trailed into the city, Princip stopped at a café-
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delicatessen called the Moritz Schiller for a failed post assassination-attempt coffee.  
Meanwhile, the Archduke’s driver began a new route to the hospital so that the heir could 
check on the condition of his injured officers. This route went right past the Moritz 
Schiller where a caffeinated Princip sat. Large crowds were gathered to see Archduke 
Ferdinand, which brought the car to a standstill, mere feet from Princip. The teenager 
drew his pistol and shot both the heir and his wife Sophie. Both died quickly.7 
Most North Carolinians could probably not say exactly where Sarajevo was on a 
map. Perhaps even the 281 recent immigrants and children of immigrants from Austria or 
Hungary, who resided in the Tar Heel State, would struggle to find the city. Details about 
the assassination in an obscure part of the world would have confused them even more. 
The European system itself, with the strange alliances, secret deals, and numerous 
monarchs, probably confused most Americans who preferred their politics the same as 
their wars, black-and-white. They preferred to think that George Washington won the 
American War for Independence and King George III lost it, or that the Union won the 
Civil War and the Confederacy lost it. Wars were supposed to be cut and dry, as far as 
Americans were concerned. There should be two sides with clear motives, actions, and 
outcomes. But in Europe, unknown people fought for unknown reasons on a continent 
that Americans believed sensible people left long ago. Most Americans based their views 
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of Europe, if they had any, on “the double principle of abstention from European politics 
and the exclusion of European interference from American affairs.”8  
By early July, Tar Heel newspapers were documenting news of the assassination 
as just another incident of violence from a world away, much the same as they reported 
on the Balkan Wars in the previous years. The Charlotte Daily Observer noted that a 
“war cloud covers all Europe and huge forces are moving” but quickly moved on to 
matters that would be more pressing to an American audience. To reinforce the obscurity 
of the incident, the names of neither assassin nor assassinated were spelled consistently 
across the state. One local paper even included a list of “assassinations of [exalted] 
personages,” as if it had to emphasize the seriousness of this one. The list included 
presidents, sultans, czars, kings, princes, and others to explain that the assassination of 
the Archduke was important and not just another common murder. North Carolinians 
obviously did not understand European politics and did not care about those foreign 
assassinations.9 
However, no one in or out of Europe could see the magnitude of what would 
follow the Archduke’s death. For example, the Kaiser of Germany spent most of July 
sailing on his yacht around the Baltic Sea. Beneath the surface of this tranquility was a 
series of frantic messages and telegrams between Berlin, Vienna, Belgrade (Serbia’s 
 
8 Axelrod, How America Won World War I, xiv; Charles Seymour, American Diplomacy During the World 
War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1934), 1-4. 
9 Sarah M. Lemmon, North Carolina’s Role in the First World War (Raleigh: Division of Archive and 
History, 1975), 1; “Assassinations of [Exalted] Personages in All Countries in the Last Fifty Years,” 
Mebane Leader, July 9, 1914. For inconsistent spellings, see “Heir to Throne Killed,” Roanoke Beacon, 
July 3, 1914, in which the Archduke’s name is turned to “Francis Ferdinand,” and “Franz Joseph, of 
Austria,” Roanoke News, July 2, 1914, in which he is referred to as “Franz Ferdinand.”  
82 
 
capital), and Moscow. One of these messages included the now infamous “blank 
cheque,” in which Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg promised Germany’s “faithful 
support” to Vienna in whatever measure it took against Serbia. The culmination of these 
communiques was Austria’s Ultimatum to Serbia on July 23, which Vienna knew 
Belgrade would not accept. Serbia delivered its reply to Austria on July 28, which was 
rebuffed with a declaration of war. Austria then moved its army to commence the 
artillery shelling of Belgrade and the war began.10 
Over the course of the ensuing days and weeks every major country in Europe 
would be involved in the war. Russia mobilized every man who had been through his 
required military training and came to Serbia’s aid against Austria due to a defensive 
treaty based on a shared Slavic heritage. Germany then was obligated to respond against 
Russia based on its own treaty with Austria. In order to subvert the much larger Russian 
army, Germany moved quickly and declared war on Russia. France was required then to 
intervene against Germany based on its own defensive treaty with Russia. Russia was a 
backward country with antiquated railroads and communications, and Germany knew 
that France was stronger and would be more difficult to deal with than Russia. Therefore, 
Germany had to go on the offensive against France, which required passage through 
Belgium. Germany had been prepared for this exact possibility for about a decade and 
developed a secret strategy called the Schlieffen Plan to deal with a two-front war. 
However, Belgium had an agreement for protection against German aggression from 
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Great Britain, and when Germans crossed the Belgian border, the British were forced to 
intervene. Italy and the Ottoman Turks would take a few extra months to get involved, 
but they both eventually did. The sides were set for the ensuing war, but they were very 
confusing to the Americans who had no conceptions of European alliances.11 
In late June 1914, in a corner of Europe that most North Carolinians would 
struggle to find on a map then and now, the Great War started, and the national debate 
about America’s role in world affairs began to heat up to a boiling point. The United 
States enjoyed its role as a world power without any real responsibilities through the 
aughts, but it was clear by Christmas 1914 that the European conflict was not going to 
end anytime soon. Indeed, several North Carolinian newspapers offered a yearly timeline 
of events at the start of a new year concerning the war in Europe. Nationwide, Americans 
wondered if or when the United States would have to send her boys “over there.” The 
great debate about America’s war-preparedness had begun.12  
In Kitchin’s first week as Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee and 
Majority Leader, Germany declared the territorial waters of Ireland and Great Britain, 
including the whole of the English Channel, to be a war zone. While the World War had 
been raging in Europe and parts of Asia, Africa, and the Middle East for many months, 
there was still hope in the Old World that it would come to a quick conclusion. The 
fantastical “home by Christmas of 1914” idea had passed, but there was no real signal in 
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early 1915 that the war would continue for several more years. As such, in the early 
months of the war, the United States debated with itself about its own state of war 
preparedness, but the idea of America needing to enter the conflict was still far off. 
Germany’s declaration of the war zone around Great Britain and Ireland would be the 
catalyst that ramped up the conversation. American ships were not immediately lost after 
the statement, but American lives would soon be in jeopardy as passengers through these 
waters.13 
After assuming the role as Chairman of Ways and Means, Kitchin was even more 
well known around the country and prepared himself to face the challenges of the 
national spotlight. In a speech to the Virginia Bankers Association during the 
preparedness controversy, Oswald Villard said of Kitchin, “He has given us an example 
of courage and outspokenness of which the South and the Nation may well be proud. He 
refused to swallow his convictions at the party behest, he refused to yield to the 
blandishments and exaltations of the compromising politician in the White House. He 
was deaf to threats that he would lose his House leadership; deaf to threats to defeat him 
in his own district, which has triumphantly sustained him as did his party associates. His 
prestige has waxed as Mr. Wilson’s has steadily waned.” Among allies like Villard, 
Kitchin was obviously well respected and liked. His opponents who disagreed with him 
also appreciated the sincerity of his convictions.14  
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The earliest drumbeats for war in the United States were sounding at the same 
time that the now famous Christmas Truce was underway in Europe. Congressional war 
hawks pressured President Wilson to begin preparations in the United States for war 
almost immediately after the July Crisis. The president ignored these calls for preparation 
until German submarine attacks on Allied merchant ships ramped up in 1915. By autumn, 
Wilson finally gave in to the advocates of American preparedness, including his advisor, 
Colonel Edward House, and began listening to their advice on the matter. Many of the 
earliest preparedness advocates were eastern Republicans and men in industry and 
banking who stood to profit from American involvement in the war. There were many 
other organizations that formed around the country to meet the needs of an international 
crisis.15 
One of the most prominent pro-preparedness organizations that emerged was the 
National Security League (NSL). At its zenith, the NSL boasted more than one hundred 
thousand members, many of whom privately admitted that they were more sympathetic to 
the Allied cause than to the German one. The base of this League was industrialists, 
bankers, and Republicans in the manufacturing regions of the United States, but they also 
drew in Democrats and progressives. These Americans had a considerable stake in an 
Allied victory the longer the war dragged on, due to increased loans and sales of weapons 
and ammunition to the Allies. In the early years of the European war, the NSL did not 
advocate for immediate American intervention. However, the organization pushed for 
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measures that were designed to militarize American society. It advocated for a bigger 
army, an expanded navy, and a system of universal military training.16 
There were numerous groups on the other side of the preparedness question in the 
United States. Pacifists, socialists, radicals, isolationists, German and Irish Americans, 
and many ordinary citizens in the Midwest and South all counseled against entering the 
European war. “I Didn’t Raise My Boy to Be a Soldier” was among the most popular 
songs in the United States in 1915. Critics claimed that the song only emphasized how 
unprepared the nation was for war. The song’s author, Alfred Bryan, explained that he 
wrote it in good faith to highlight American civility against European barbarism. The 
song led to many pro-preparedness parody versions in response, most of which criticized 
its perceived pacifist message. Nevertheless, it reached the top of the charts for two 
months, emphasizing to the world that the United States certainly was divided over the 
war.17 
While the so-called great powers of Europe were creating huge armies and 
building millions of weapons for war, American peace advocates and anti-war 
organizations employed every argument they could muster against the militarization of 
the United States in the early twentieth century. When the Great War began, peace 
advocates shifted their focus to oppose the American preparedness movement. After 
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some time, in a dramatic shift of policy, many of those American peace organizations 
existed on paper only. Many of their official stances on the World War stated that the 
only way to achieve a lasting world peace in the midst of the destruction wrought by the 
Great War was for the United States to get involved, as the last hope to save the Old 
World from itself.  
By 1917, the American Peace Society had moved dramatically far from name and 
proclaimed, “We must help in the bayoneting of a normally decent German soldier in 
order to free him from a tyranny which he at present accepts . . . We must lend our help 
in widowing a good-hearted and kindly German woman in order to save her and her 
children. . . we must aid in the starvation and emaciation of a German baby” to protect 
future German babies. This sensationalized suggestion of starving German babies did not 
sit well with all peace advocates in the United States. A Prussian-born, naturalized 
American, railroad tycoon, who was later arrested for disloyalty in Louisiana, wrote to 
Kitchin begging the Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee to pressure the Allies 
to allow milk products to be sent to Germany and Austria so that the seven million babies 
therein would not starve to death.18  
There were many other peace and pacifist groups, composed mainly of middle-
class feminists and pacifists, who continued to oppose growing American involvement in 
the war and steps toward militarizing the United States. Kitchin sympathized with these 
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groups. He, and many saner voices than those of the American Peace Society, continued 
to advocate for American neutrality through 1917. To many peace advocates, the 
European war remained Europe’s problem. While it is true that American interests were 
threatened, Kitchin and these others were convinced that the United States was still not 
under any substantial threat. The real core of the anti-preparedness forces in the United 
States were southern and western Democrats. Historians tend to agree that Kitchin led 
this group.19 
On the surface, the United States had no reason to enter a war with any of the 
belligerents in Europe. President Wilson quickly announced that “a state of war 
unhappily exists” but warned Americans that they should remain neutral in action and 
thought. When the war was drawing closer to America, Georgian Tom Watson asked his 
fellow Americans what many people around North Carolina and the southern United 
States were asking themselves, “Do you want your son killed in Europe in a quarrel you 
have nothing to do with?” Since 1815, America’s relationships with most European 
powers had been stable. President George Washington warned the nation to avoid 
entangling foreign alliances in his farewell address. For over a century, succeeding 
presidents heeded his warning. Aside from the war against Spain in 1898, the United 
States only looked to Europe for trading partners for the better part of a century. 
Historical and social links to Great Britain made the British America’s biggest trading 
partner, but France, Russia, Germany, and others all proved to be worthy destinations for 
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nineteenth-century American exports. In addition to ordinary imports such as finished 
goods and products, the major European import in the nineteenth century was 
immigrants.20 
Great waves of immigrants from all of the countries in Europe crossed the 
Atlantic in the nineteenth century and continued to come through the early twentieth 
century. English and French immigrants were well represented in the early years. German 
and Irish immigrants came through the mid-century. Southern and eastern Europeans 
populated the last great wave of immigration. By 1914, America was composed of 
persons who could claim heritage in of all the belligerent powers. Some groups, 
especially the more recent immigrants, took time to assimilate, but most could claim they 
were Americans first by the outbreak of war.21  
The issues of loyalty and national identity may have caused some Americans to 
wonder how some of the more recent immigrants to the United States felt about their 
“homelands” fighting in the war. While America was still far away from entering the war, 
these topics were at the front of a national conversation as war broke out in Europe in the 
early twentieth century. Outside of the South, most cities boasted substantial immigrant 
populations. In huge northern cities such as New York City, Philadelphia, or Boston, one 
might expect a high degree of influence on the local government from recent immigrants, 
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or second-generation Americans, based on loyalties to their motherland. In the later years 
of the war, for example, many Irish American newspapers were banned from the mail by 
the United States Post Office on the grounds of national security concerns and potential 
trouble from recent Irish immigrants. However, these issues did not come up very much 
in North Carolina.22 
The presence of large numbers of immigrants complicated America’s response to 
the war. Experts estimated that about thirty-three million Americans were themselves 
foreign born or of foreign parentage in 1917, with twenty-eight million of them from 
countries engaged in the war. The numbers were not as dramatic in North Carolina 
however. There was a small number of foreign born and first-generation immigrants 
living in the state. As of 1910, there were 2,206,287 people residing in the Old North 
State. About 1.5 million were white and a little under 700,000 were black. Only 14,793 of 
the white population were foreign born or of foreign parentage. If these recent 
immigrants’ loyalty still rested with their nation of origin, their sympathies, with either 
side of the belligerent nations at war, would have been split. About 7,000 foreign born or 
first-generation North Carolinians originated in Allied or Allied-leaning countries, and 
5,000 originated in Central Power or Central-leaning countries. Of course, every person 
is unique and many of these new Tar Heels would likely have embraced America ahead 
of any other country, for any number of reasons, the same as many recent immigrants in 
the large northern cities did.23 
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Concerns about divided loyalties no doubt prompted The Literary Digest study of 
American attitudes about the war. Issued in November 1914, the survey examined 
whether Americans were pro-Allied, neutral, or pro-German. Several hundred newspaper 
editors were asked about their own attitudes and what they believed were the dominant 
attitudes of their readership might be. There were nearly four hundred replies to the 
request. The South overwhelmingly favored the Allied or neutral side of the question, 
with five southern editors indicating that they were pro-German. The only section of the 
country that came close to a strong pro-German stance was from the Midwest, where 
many German immigrants had settled in the previous century. Of course, this survey was 
taken only months after the war began but before the United States had seen any tangible 
result in terms of lives or material lost.24 
On the surface, North Carolinians of German descent had little reason to fear for 
their safety. Governor Thomas Bickett noted that North Carolinians of German heritage 
helped to build the state but understood why they might have sympathized with Germany 
before the United States was technically involved. He was certain, though, that after 
America declared war, they would fly the American flag first and foremost and assured 
that public that “99 99/100 percent” of the populace were loyal, although “cranks and 
lunatics will doubtless appear.” The governor also warned against violence against 
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German citizens living in North Carolina and asserted that they would be safer in the 
state than they would have been in Berlin.25 
Of course, the reality was different than the rhetoric. Former state Attorney 
General and mayor of Asheville Theodore Davidson wrote a full-length article in the 
Greensboro Daily News decrying America’s potential involvement in the war. He took 
particular issue with the ambiguity of the nation’s supposed neutrality. It seemed to him 
and many others that the United States had already picked a side before entering the war. 
Many Tar Heels penned responses to denounce Davidson as an Anglophobe or worse: 
“He [Davidson] is simply stupid, that’s all,” wrote one man, though many others offered 
their support of Davidson’s position. Davidson’s editorial was motivated in part by 
growing feelings against German Americans in the state.26 
In May of 1917, the League for National Unity was organized in Asheville. The 
primary objective of the League was to encourage the loyalty of foreign-born citizens to 
the land of their adoption. Another goal was to ensure fair treatment of those foreign-born 
people who lived in North Carolina, especially German Americans, so long as they 
remained loyal. Theodore Davidson spoke at the first meeting to denounce the 
mistreatment of these North Carolinians. It was reported that Davidson said that “while 
we were denouncing Germany for militarism we were inaugurating a policy that would 
make German militarism look like a Sunday school picnic.” As much as many politicians 
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around the United States may have been okay with certain discriminatory measures taken 
against foreign-born Americans, naturalized or not, there were still those, such as 
Davidson, who were disgusted by those actions and sought to oppose them.27 
Dual loyalties have always been a controversial topic in a nation of immigrants 
such as the United States. Almost every time America enters into a conflict, questions 
arise about the supposed allegiances of her recent or second-generation immigrants, 
which had happened most recently during the Mexican American War with people of 
Mexican heritage living in Texas. It is sometimes called hyphenism but always invokes 
feelings of distrust. Some Americans, including former president Theodore Roosevelt, 
insisted that dual loyalties could not work in the United States during wartime. And 
indeed, there was a great deal of anti-German sentiment felt around the country, both 
before and after the United States entered the war. Changing the names of foreign-
sounding words might seem comical today but such tactics of anti-German expression 
existed around the country during the Great War. Sauerkraut became liberty cabbage, 
dachshund dogs became liberty puppies, hamburgers became liberty sandwiches, and 
most famously frankfurters, became hot dogs. Oddly, many American schools stopped 
the teaching of German language classes. These issues were worse in northern cities with 
larger German-stock populations, but they also occurred in North Carolina. One 
newspaper notice in North Carolina read, “Lovers of the succulent cabbage properly 
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fermented can now indulge their appetites without suspicion of disloyalty. There is no 
longer any kraut. Liberty Cabbage takes its place.”28 
There may well be some comedy in changing the names of foods and dogs, but 
the anti-German feelings became prevalent enough that there were some instances of 
people who had to explain themselves to the public. A newspaper editorial made special 
mention that a man called Felix Frankfurter was “German in name but [a] good 
American.” Frankfurter hoped to save his business from a boycott because of his 
Teutonic surname. In addition to family names, many companies changed their names to 
more American-sounding ones. Many made changes to reinforce their loyalty to the 
United States during the war, while many others like Felix Frankfurter felt compelled to 
take action because they feared a boycott of their products by a distrustful public. 
Thankfully, there were only a few incidents of anti-German violence in the United States, 
including the death of one man killed by a mob in Illinois. Most North Carolinians, but 
not all, recognized that by the 1910s, German Americans were loyal Americans.29 
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Recent scholarship has argued that dual loyalties may well have been possible, 
although not quite in the way one might automatically think. Most North Carolinians of 
German origin were “industrially compliant and sustained mobilization in both body and 
purse,” meaning that they were participating in economic activities in support of 
preparedness efforts. However, a culturally based resistance against complete 
assimilation took place in North Carolina, especially after the declaration of war. 
Governor Bickett’s special mention of loyal Germanic North Carolinians came in direct 
response to discontent from the group in the western part of the state. Many ethnic 
Germanic people only opposed the same mobilization efforts as many other Tar Heels 
did, such as through anti-draft petitions, which came from all sectors of North Carolina. 
There were tensions like these all over the state, but no real sabotage or remarkable riots 
ever materialized.30 
The biggest fear concerning the issues of loyalty did not come from recent 
immigrants but from black citizens. Longstanding white oppression of African 
Americans, along with rising black expectations – expressed later on – about a global war 
for democracy, raised the prospect of disappointment, frustration, and protest from the 
country’s most visible minority group. Of course, race relations defined the United States 
ever since the Civil War ended. Even before the United States entered the war, rhetoric 
from the federal and state governments made it clear that America was interested in 
protecting democracy at home and abroad. But that idea contradicted the lack of self-
 
30 Gary R. Freeze, “There May Be a Few Obstructionists About: Mobilization and Resistance in the 
Germanic Counties of Piedmont North Carolina, 1917-1918” in Shepherd W. McKinley and Steven Sabol, 




determination for African Americans who were recently stripped of their rights to vote 
and participate in American democracy. Many scoffed at what sounded like smug 
hypocrisy from the president. Southern state lawmakers had steadily been chipping away 
at black rights since the turn of the century, with several dramatic examples in North 
Carolina. By 1914, African Americans were barred from purchasing homes on any street 
that was majority white in Greensboro, North Carolina. Year-by-year until the end of the 
war, black rights were stripped, so that by 1920 blacks could no longer work alongside 
whites in offices or factories or live in the same neighborhoods as whites. So, the 
question of black loyalty was very real to white North Carolinians.31 
North Carolina before, during, and for decades after the war was part of the solid 
Democratic South, where almost all whites adhered to the tenets of white supremacy. The 
reform movements of the progressive period were exclusively for white people. Black 
Americans were excluded from political life but also segregated from American life in 
general. A select few “elite” African Americans, including Booker T. Washington and W. 
E. B. DuBois, advocated for various strategies to achieve some degree of equality in 
American society, but all of these efforts fell short. In the days of slavery nothing scared 
whites more than the potential for slave rebellions, and in the early twentieth century, 
nothing scared whites more than the idea of an equal black person.32  
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Many agencies were set up in the United States by the federal government to 
work as counterespionage and counter propaganda networks leading up to the Great War. 
These agencies would have monitored suspected anti-American activities from groups 
such as any German Americans or other “alien” groups, pacifists, socialists, any group 
deemed “radical,” and especially African Americans who dared to speak out. In events 
very similar to what one might expect later in Soviet Russia, individual citizens eagerly 
supplied tips to the Bureau of Investigation, precursor to the FBI, against African 
American suspects. Most tips were baseless but arose from widespread suspicion that 
German agents were actively subverting the loyalty of black Americans.33 
On the eve of the Great War, the economic, social, political, and legal conditions 
of black Americans was not very different from those during slavery. President Wilson 
quickly gained notoriety for supporting a white supremacist agenda, leaving black 
Americans bitterly disappointed. For the most part, their daily lives were characterized by 
economic exploitation, intimidation, and violence, as it had been for some time. For some 
African Americans, including W. E. B. DuBois, American involvement in the World War 
provided a tangible opportunity to prove their loyalty and worth as citizens to white 
America in the hope that their experience as citizens might improve when the war came 
to an end.34 
White southerners would not be convinced by the actions of black America. 
Southerners saw any move in the direction of equality, or simply any gathering of 
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African Americans in an unusual setting, as evidence that German agents were working 
to influence blacks against the status quo. In one dramatic example, a concerned Franklin 
County, North Carolina, court official reported that a group of African Americans were 
reading subversive material. As it turned out, the group was reading a newspaper editorial 
written by Nick Chiles, who had previously been investigated by the Bureau of 
Investigation. The editorial criticized blacks who were eager to enlist in the military of a 
country that offered them no rights. The implication was that “outside interests” were 
influencing black Americans. The supposed outside influence, Chiles, was an African 
American citizen from Kansas.35 
The most frequent allegations of sedition were that churches and schools with 
German-speaking populations promoted the subversion. In a bizarre accusation, an 
allegation arose that German agents working through Catholic and Lutheran schools in 
North Carolina spread the idea that once Germany occupied the American South, black 
Americans would be granted absolute equality. Obviously, this allegation was ludicrous, 
but the fear tactics employed were strong. After all, nothing scared white southerners 
more than black equality. One possible way to enforce integration would have been a 
foreign occupation, not unlike the white southern memory of Reconstruction.36 
Although German subversion or black integration never materialized in a tangible 
way, war and apprehension about war sowed many doubts. Time and again leading up to 
American entry to the war, certain imaginary scenarios were speculated upon around the 
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country, based largely on fear of the possibilities. It was, after all, possible that Germany 
could invade the United States through Mexico and possibly win the war. Ordinary North 
Carolinians who did not have much contact with the outside world beyond the local 
newspapers could imagine such scenarios. The actual “German invasion” of North 
Carolina was far less terrifying. Beginning in the eighteenth century, thousands of people 
immigrated to North Carolina from elsewhere in America, particularly the Pennsylvania 
Dutch, as well as from Germany itself. Many of the newcomers came in the great waves 
of immigrants during the nineteenth century, but virtually none of them ever posed a real 
threat to American sovereignty. Instead, they prospered as farmers and eventually 
became ordinary Tar Heels.37 
Though most of 1915 the preparedness issue was mentioned almost always in 
conjunction with the controversial idea that America was actually defenseless. Former 
president Theodore Roosevelt was the chief blowhorn of this opinion. Other Republicans, 
such as Senator Henry Cabot Lodge and Representative Augustus Gardiner, both of 
Massachusetts, and the former Army Chief of Staff Major General Leonard Wood helped 
lead the push for preparedness and claimed that America’s defenselessness would 
weaken its ability to help mediate an end to the war, let alone enter it. One of Wilson’s 
closest advisors, Colonel Edward House, explained to the president that the country 
needed to be prepared to fight in the War to End All Wars as a means to prevent that 
from becoming necessary. Neither the president, nor representatives from the state of 
 
37 Jacqueline B. Painter and Jonathan W. Hortman, The German Invasion of Western North Carolina: A 
Pictorial History (Johnson City, TN: Overmountain Press, 1997); William S. Powell, North Carolina 
Through Four Centuries (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 41, 109-111, 125. 
100 
 
North Carolina, ignored the thought of eventual American involvement. Until May 1915, 
most signs from federal and state leaders indicated that the United States was obviously 
well aware of potential danger but had no immediate or even long-term intentions of 
entering the conflict. Wilson assured Congress in his first State of the Union address after 
the war began that there was no real cause for alarm and the United States was not 
undefended. This address would have led many North Carolinians to believe that 
America did not need to enact a drastic or large-scale campaign of preparing for war. And 
the country remained divided over the question.38  
Originally, Colonel House wanted the president to be in a position to mediate an 
end to the war in Europe. For his part, Wilson sent a personal message to the heads of 
government in Russia, Britain, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and France. The president felt 
it was his privilege and duty as the head of one of the signatory states of the Hague 
Convention “to say to you in a spirit of most earnest friendship that I should welcome an 
opportunity to act in the interest of European peace, either now or at any other time that 
might be more suitable.” While many Americans enjoyed the idea that the United States 
could play peacemaker, the reality was quite different. Most Europeans were not 
interested in America interfering in this way. And it seemed that until the United States 
could project its own power, it would have no chance of forcing any peace talks.39 
One way that the United States might be able to force talks would be to project 
enough strength to threaten American intervention against Germany. Another was to 
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convince the Allies to come to the negotiating table. To that end, House travelled to 
Europe in early 1915 and attempted to negotiate with both the Allies and the Central 
Powers but found that the United States was not ready to play the role of world arbitrator. 
House reasoned that this shortcoming was largely due to America’s ill-prepared military. 
The newspaper headlines declared that there was “no peace in sight” upon his return. 
House also speculated that it would be problematic if an armistice was achieved before 
the United States was in a position to settle the peace. After his attempted negotiations in 
Europe, Colonel House knew that he needed to try harder than ever to convince the 
president that the United States could only create a lasting peace from a position of 
power. And power in this case meant a strong military. Later, certain events in the 
summer of 1916 caused some civilian leaders in Berlin to wonder if Wilson’s potential as 
a mediator should be explored further. But these concerns fell flat in Germany, as the 
Kaiser was far more influenced by his military than civilian advisors.40  
Despite the pleas from men like Colonel House, there was no real sense of 
urgency to act on the idea of American defenselessness, as the United States was not 
involved yet. The European nations at war left America alone, for the most part. Since the 
end of the Napoleonic Wars, Americans had little to fear from potential European 
belligerents. As much as the English Channel shielded Great Britain from invasion 
through most of its history, the Atlantic Ocean proved a fine barrier to prevent any 
amphibious invasion of the United States. Yet, the progress of technology began to 
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challenge America’s perceived oceanic-induced invincibility. Senator Lodge warned that 
the aquatic barrier that help to defend America in 1776 and 1812 was destroyed by steam 
and electricity in the latter half of the nineteenth century. The Senator went on to suggest 
that the United States was “unarmed, unready, undefended” and “stands an invitation to 
aggression and attack.” Arguments such as this one bolstered the pro-preparedness 
argument.41  
These types of hawkish feelings were prevalent amongst Republicans, and their 
feelings were a cause for concern throughout the early years of the Great War. The idea 
of some kind of amphibious invasion on the East Coast of the United States by Germany, 
Austria-Hungary, or even Italy or the Ottoman Turks seems laughable today. It may have 
been laughable through the early years of the twentieth century too. But the major fear 
that German ships or submarines could challenge American invulnerability was very real. 
There are a few well-known examples of German submarines peaking their periscopes 
out of the briny deep up and down the coastal regions of the United States in the early 
years of the war.42  
Much of the American public needed to “be sold” on preparedness. Secretary of 
the Navy, Josephus Daniels, launched a campaign in 1915 to undertake this endeavor. 
The mere threat of submarines in the Atlantic would not justify massive expenditures in 
the army and navy to the public, but the threat was certainly played as one of the most 
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significant threats that the United States ever faced. Daniels, in fact, might be considered 
a pioneer in public relations techniques that he developed that year. He promoted a plan 
to improve American naval technology at the same time as he popularized the idea of 
expanding the navy to the American people.43 
North Carolina had cause for concern. Military installations up and down the 
Atlantic coastline would play a vital role in protecting the United States from the German 
submarine menace. Some of these installations were considered forts, but not all of them. 
They did have the collective goal of defending America’s coast. Two such installations 
were in North Carolina: Camp Glenn outside of Morehead City and Fort Caswell on Oak 
Island. In the end, neither of these forts saw enemy action; they served mostly as 
refueling stations for ships and airplanes.44 
Although only seven U-Boats that came into American waters during the whole 
course of the Great War and just three German submarines into those of North Carolina, 
the Old North State’s oceanfront sits at an important shipping route in the Atlantic. The 
overall role of German submarines was to create an atmosphere of terror, in addition to 
sinking enemy ships and material. The United States government did try to shut down 
any talk of them off of America’s coastline. The German submarines managed to sink at 
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least ten vessels off of North Carolina’s coast alone, so the early fears of those 
Republicans did exist in at least some form.45  
Some Americans on the East Coast were so afraid of German U-Boats that they 
actually blamed the Germans for stirring up shark attacks in coastal waters, such as the 
famous incidents on New Jersey’s coast in the summer of 1916. In an anonymous letter to 
the editor of the New York Times, one American suggested that “the arrival [in American 
waters] of the German supersubmarine” coincided with the onset of man-eating sharks on 
Atlantic coastlines, which the author proposed could have meant the shark, or sharks, was 
originally from European waters. “These sharks may have devoured human bodies” in 
the German warzone and followed the submarines, “expecting the usual toll of drowning 
men, women, and children,” the author suggested. As silly as this suggestion may seem to 
modern Americans, the fear of German submarines roaming American waters became 
very real at various stages of the Great War, even in fantastical situations. Actual German 
seamen were mere miles off of the American coast! When Senators or Congressmen 
called for a more active preparedness campaign, they could look to those submarine 
incidents.46  
The catalyst for greater preparedness was Germany’s sinking of the RMS 
Lusitania on May 7, 1915. On February 9, 1915, the German government announced that 
unrestricted submarine warfare would resume against armed merchant ships of 
belligerent nations. That same day, Secretary of State Robert Lansing announced, with 
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Wilson’s approval, that the United States did not condemn the German plan as unlawful, 
but it would be a matter of serious concern if Americans ended up at the bottom of the 
Atlantic. At that point, the American government refrained from issuing travel 
restrictions and reserved its own interpretation of whether any ship sinking was lawful. 
The German threat, illustrated by the sinking of the Lusitania and other ships, made 
several high-ranking government officials believe that war with Germany was only a 
month away.47 
Nevertheless, President Wilson assured the American people that there was no 
major reason for them to fear for their safety at home and reinforced his policy of 
remaining neutral. He assured the world that the United States would not retaliate against 
Germany to avenge the lives lost on the Lusitania. Instead, the President sent a series of 
communications to Germany requesting that they cease the destruction of non-belligerent 
ships. The letters were viewed by some, such as William Jennings Bryan, as fairly 
aggressive. In fact, Bryan resigned his position as Secretary of State due to the aggression 
he perceived in the communiques. But these messages did not end up leading to 
American entry to the war.48  
By reaffirming American neutrality, the President was able to run his reelection 
campaign the following year on the platform of having kept the United States out of war. 
Indeed, the famous slogan from his campaign in 1916 read, “He kept us out of war.” 
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Several anti-war Democrats in the Congress, including Majority Leader Kitchin, insisted 
that the slogan should have read, “We kept him out of war.” Kitchin and his colleagues 
communicated regularly with the Wilson Administration to maintain peace. Regardless, 
Wilson reaffirmed American neutrality while simultaneously continuing to endorse 
preparedness.49 
Although Majority Leader Kitchin argued that the United States was already 
prepared to show its strength, Americans remained divided over the war in 1915. Some 
believed that direct military intervention was the best method to save Europe from itself. 
Others reckoned the war was just another European conflict, which needed to be figured 
out in Europe. Whatever the national feeling, Wilson eventually came down on the side 
of active national preparedness, and a campaign was launched to achieve that goal, which 
became the major source of disagreement between Kitchin and Wilson. The national 
stage was set for a lengthy debate on how to prepare the United States for entering the 
Great War, whether America was already prepared, or if the United States should even 
consider that possibility. It was obvious to parties on both sides of the debate that the war 
would touch America in some way and possibly even draw her into conflict. Men like 
Colonel House believed that the United States could only avoid war by exuding strength 
and preparing the army and navy for such a possibility. Men such as the Majority Leader 
believed that the United States was already prepared to show its strength.  
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The preparedness movement that Kitchin would oppose so strongly originated 
from the reform spirit of the Progressive Era as another attempt at reformation. 
Specifically, government officials wanted to “prepare” the American military for the 
challenges of the twentieth century. Before the World War, however, there was limited 
success in achieving this goal. A small group of military officers and government 
officials sympathetic to the military cause saw America’s obsolete army and tried to drag 
it into the modern world. The questions of preparedness, which began earlier in the 
century, finally captured the attention of prominent non-military officials after June 
1914.50  
The United States had no tradition of a large, standing army or navy prior to the 
twentieth century. Twenty-first century America spends more money per year on its 
military than the next twelve countries combined. However, this spending is only a result 
of Cold War realities, illuminated in the Powell Doctrine under which the United States 
should be prepared to fight in two wars anywhere in the world at the same time. The 
Powell Doctrine was put to the test and proven to be possible in the first two decades of 
the twenty-first century, with massive commitments of soldiers and money in both Iraq 
and Afghanistan. Furthermore, the United States has technically never lost a declared war 
in its history, with only five wars declared by Congress, not including police actions or 
similar military engagements undertaken by a president with or without congressional 
approval. Therefore, confusion today about how the United States was ever not prepared 
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for a war is abundant. The tradition of the Minute Men looms large in America’s military 
lore.51   
The reality of the American military before World War II was that it was quite 
small compared to European, and other industrialized, contemporaries. One of the major 
underlying causes of the Great War among European powers was industrialized 
militarism, which never reached the United States in the same way during the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. For a time in the nineteenth century, the 
American military services went into “a period of relative isolation in America as the 
nation became absorbed in industrialization, the threat of war receded, and the army and 
navy became intensely involved in professionalizing their functions,” according to 
historian Paul Koistinen. Of course, there were exceptions, such as the gigantic army 
build up during the Civil War or President Roosevelt’s Great White Fleet. So, while the 
United States might have impressed, or annoyed, its Latin American neighbors with a big 
naval show (but a navy still lighter than Great Britain’s), America still remained behind 
most Europeans in military manpower, arms, equipment, vehicles, and vessels.52 
However, the United States did not necessarily need a large standing army or 
navy prior to the twentieth century. Virtually all nineteenth century American presidents 
took President Washington’s warning against becoming involved in entangling foreign 
alliances quite seriously and remained as a spectator to European conflicts of the 
nineteenth century. Except for the greatest American crisis of the nineteenth century, the 
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Civil War, the United States avoided having a large military force. Even the Mexican 
American and Spanish American Wars did not create a very large or long-lasting 
American army. The former produced a force of about seventy-eight thousand strong, 
while the latter was described as a “splendid little war” with much emphasis on the 
“little,” and a similar seventy-two thousand Americans served overseas against Spain. 
Those forces were only the high points of military strength. Upon the conclusion of both 
of those wars, the American military shrank considerably.53  
One of the most intense debates throughout the preparedness campaign was over 
what a remodeled army would look like for the United States. One of the first formal 
announcements to North Carolinians declared the “formation of an organization of first 
reserves, to be known as the American Legion, which will better insure the nation’s 
preparedness in case of war,” which appeared in several local newspapers in early March 
of 1915. A reserve force of up to “300,000 former Army and Navy militiamen [available] 
for instant call in case of emergency” were included in this preparation. This 
arrangement, of course, did not require any Tar Heels to volunteer their service for any 
organized unit, but it represented the very real possibility that the United States could 
well be on its way to war.54 
Secretary of War Lindley Garrison suggested to the president that there should be 
a reorganization of the army into a so-called “continental force,” which would have taken 
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the place of the National Guard as the nation’s first line of defense against foreign 
aggression. This Continental Army would be a four-hundred thousand-man guard under 
the control of the federal government, rather than the state governments, as was the case 
with the National Guard. In Garrison’s proposal, there would be compulsory military 
training for all American men, not necessarily to serve as an active force, but rather, in 
reserve. Many high-ranking military and civilian leaders, such as General Hugh Scott, 
later the Army’s Chief of Staff, and former president Theodore Roosevelt advocated for 
the Continental Army. Other advocates of this or a similar force of men wanted to 
improve American military effectiveness but also seemed to desire a system of universal 
military training to help prepare Americans for any war, not just the ongoing world war.55 
The Continental Army idea not only served the role of preparing the country to 
defend itself, but it was suggested that it could also act as a homogenizing method to 
“yank the hyphen” out of recent American immigrants, especially those recent 
immigrants from Germany. Of course, in North Carolina, there was no real threat of 
German saboteurs or agents riling up German American Tar Heels, but the fear among 
other Americans about that very possibility remained very real throughout the war period. 
Republican Representative George E. Foss of Illinois made a speech on the House floor 
noting that the “surest and the most democratic way to preparedness is by compulsory 
military training,” which would also serve as a “melting pot” for the nation.56  
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President Wilson at first resisted that idea of creating such a Continental Army. 
Only after Secretary Garrison resigned did Wilson finally come around to support the 
idea. Although the Continental Army was actually the brainchild of Garrison, there was a 
similar recommendation put forth by the Secretary of the Navy, Josephus Daniels, to 
increase America’s naval capabilities. This reorganization of America’s first line of naval 
defense also gave far more power to the federal government, although there were no 
state-controlled naval vessels. There were many opponents to the continental army idea, 
as well as the augmentation of the navy. These opponents argued that it took too much 
power away from the states, since the Continental Army would supersede the National 
Guards, which were state driven. The National Guard Association adopted a strong 
resolution against the formation of a Continental Army at its annual meeting in San 
Francisco in 1915. The National Guard Association did eventually come around to 
support the plan but only begrudgingly and with the knowledge that it did not have 
enough popularity nationwide to be implemented.57 
The navy, like the army, remained similarly small through most of the nineteenth 
century. There were, however, certain incidents in which the navy projected a huge 
amount of power. Commodore Stephen Decatur’s destruction of the Barbary pirates and 
Commodore Matthew Perry’s “opening of Japan” were a few such incidents. By the early 
twentieth century, Roosevelt’s Great White Fleet circumnavigated the world. It consisted 
of sixteen battleships and many escort vessels. With some additions and subtractions to 
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this number, these were the ships that participated in the American troubles with Mexico, 
and later, represented American naval capacity at the entry to the Great War. While the 
American navy grew larger, it still trailed behind Britain, in terms of naval capacity for 
war.58 
Ex-President Roosevelt and General Leonard Wood, who both cut their military 
teeth during the war with Spain, along with preparedness organizations such as the 
National Security League (NSL) and the Military Training Camps Association (or 
Plattsburgers) advocated for a complete reorganization of the traditional military format. 
Many of them rejected the old formula of organizing the American military by filling it 
with volunteers and militias as “anachronistic remnants of a parochialism obstructive to 
national efficiency.” The twentieth century demanded a professional army from 
industrialized nations and these Americans wanted to comply with that demand. In other 
words, they wanted to prepare the United States for war, whether or not war would 
become necessary.59 
War preparedness meant different things to different Americans in the early 
twentieth century. On the one hand, many claimed that preparedness simply meant 
America’s ability to defend itself. On the other hand, people argued that preparation led 
to jingoism. The ability to go to war remained the most common method of measurement, 
and it was most often measured by the amount of overall military spending by the 
government. Another test of preparedness came from comparisons made between the 
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United States’ military and the militaries of other major world powers, especially Great 
Britain and Germany. The amount of able-bodied American men available to serve in the 
military was counted towards the nation’s level of preparedness. Simply put, whatever 
America needed in order to be able to go to war was what measured its preparedness. 
“Preparedness is militarism” suggested Oswald Villard, the outspoken anti-militarist. 
Two sides of the United States emerged as the Great War became larger and 
encompassed more of the world. Pro- and anti- preparedness organizations appeared 
around the country to argue in favor or against the movement.60 
No event in 1914 proved to be a serious motivator to get the United States ready 
for war. The first impact of the war on the American people was economic. Trade 
between the United States and those European nations at war decreased but was not 
nearly significant enough to cause a declaration of war. By mid-1915 the pressure on 
President Wilson to begin preparation ramped up. The German policy of unrestricted 
submarine warfare caused him to reevaluate American’s policy of neutrality, and despite 
his famous campaign slogan, “He Kept Us Out of War,” the president had been working 
toward preparing the nation through 1915. That year, the president sent letters to the 
Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy to discuss the possibilities of a military 
preparedness movement that would lead to greater national defense. This news reached 
America’s most outspoken opponent of the preparedness movement a few days later, and 
Claude Kitchin readied his response.  
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In an interview with the New York World, a Democratic-leaning paper, Kitchin 
reinforced his belief several times that the United States did need an adequate military for 
defense, but not for offense. He favored submarines, destroyers, and other small coastal 
defense ships rather than gigantic battleships, which could be seen as aggressive or 
offensive weapons. Kitchin believed that aggressive preparedness, such as the call for 
building battleships in the president’s program, whether reasonable or not, amounted to 
nothing more than preparation for an offensive war. The Majority Leader confided in his 
close allies, men such as Senator James Vardaman, that he was enthusiastic that seven-
eighths of House Democrats opposed the American preparedness campaigns, but Kitchin 
expected that they would eventually vote in favor of war when the time came.61 
The president did not share Kitchin’s view on the number of Democrats who 
opposed preparedness. Indeed, practically all major House Democrats had pledged their 
support to the Wilson administration’s preparedness policy by late 1915, proving Kitchin 
wrong. But Wilson did want Kitchin’s support, and to that end, the president invited the 
Majority Leader to meet with him. Wilson appealed to Kitchin’s patriotism and party 
loyalty in an effort to have him lead the administration’s policy. Other party leaders were 
willing to compromise on several issues and the president hoped that Kitchin might also 
do the same. When the meeting finally came on November 8, Kitchin made his 
opposition to those plans clear to President Wilson. He spent more than an hour with the 
President, who outlined the army and naval proposals for the next Congress and for his 
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five-year plan. The newspapers described this meeting as “amicable throughout,” but 
Kitchin maintained his opposition, conceding that most of his fellow Democratic 
representatives were on the same side as the President.62 
One Democrat who did not agree with the president was William Jennings Bryan. 
He sided with Kitchin on many matters, and the notion that America was already 
prepared for defense was particularly evident to both. “We have a potential power of 
defense such as no other nation has today – such as no other nation has ever had, and 
other nations know it,” wrote Bryan. One of the original ideas of preparedness set forth 
by Colonel House reckoned that the United States could only avoid a war from the stance 
of power, in the form of a well-prepared army and navy. Bryan and Kitchin were 
frustrated that they had to keep reminding the country that it was already prepared to 
defend itself, so these increased expenses and military build-ups were unnecessary.63 
To meet the president’s increasing support of preparedness, and to respond openly 
and in public to Wilson, in November 1915, Kitchin co-authored an anti-preparedness 
pamphlet, developed from separate speeches, with Bryan. The pamphlet was well 
received by much of the public, and many copies were requested from around the state of 
North Carolina in particular. Peace or War: What the Preparedness Program Means 
delivered Bryan and Kitchin’s thoughts on the preparedness program to the country. 
Bryan, in his part took his time to explain how destructive the war already had been for 
Europe, for both belligerent and neutral nations; how the war had no good cause, and 
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how it was an anti-Christian war. He pointed out how America had already tried to play 
the mediator, but the European combatants all played the blame game instead. They all 
pointed their fingers at the other major powers as the true culprits behind the “great crime 
of the century.” When Bryan addressed preparedness, he explained that getting the 
country ready for a war would ultimately lead to one, rather than prevent it as had been 
suggested by Colonel House.64 
Kitchin’s portion of the pamphlet laid out the facts, as he recognized them, and 
reassured the nation that the United States was already prepared. “WE ARE 
PREPARED,” he consistently reiterated to the newspapers. A follow-up speech by the 
Majority Leader led to more requests for copies of his writings and speeches. “We are 
getting quite a lot of requests for your speech that you made the other day,” noted a 
secretary. Requests for additional information on his anti-preparedness activities, ideas, 
speeches, and writings arrived at his office regularly throughout his terms in Congress, 
and he was usually happy to respond. At least one time, Kitchin’s office had to request 
twenty-five thousand copies of one of his speeches to satisfy the demands of his 
constituents.65 
Kitchin certainly received a fair share of disagreeing correspondence in response 
to the speech and pamphlet. “The vast majority of our people are with the President in his 
determination to uphold the rights of our citizen[s], we call upon you to stand by him,” 
wrote one man. A community of North Carolinians “now residing in Baltimore” sent 
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telegrams to his D.C. office with their thoughts about preparedness. This community 
followed Kitchin’s past record in Congress “with pride and pleasure” but noted that 
Kitchin’s “present attitude of opposition to President Wilson” was deplorable. It seemed 
to be a question of honor to these “loyal Tarheels,” and they did not feel adequately 
represented from their state of origin. Another former North Carolinian living in 
Maryland begged Kitchin to “support the President in arm[ing] merchantmen and [in] 
other diplomatic controversies,” while imploring him to “remember [the] honorable 
traditions of [the] people you represent” and reminding him not to defame the Old North 
State.66 
The American people were obviously divided on the issue of war preparedness, 
but the North Carolinians who opposed American involvement in the war were quick to 
reassure the Majority Leader that he was on the proper course. He often replied to letters 
of support sent to his office with a similar response, “I am sure if the people knew the 
real facts, not one disinterested person in fifty would favor [preparedness], but would 
oppose it as earnestly as I shall. I shall fight it to the end.” The representative never 
minced his words. He was as interested in thanking those who supported his stance as he 
was interested in asking those who opposed him to explain their reasoning. He believed 
what he said and thought, and he believed if those who supported the preparedness 
programs saw the situation as he did, then they might change their opinion on the 
matter.67 
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Kitchin rarely expected anyone to just “take his word for it” and was usually 
willing to explain his position to anyone who questioned it. He would ask constituents 
that wrote to him why they supported more preparedness measures after he displayed the 
figures which supported his position: that the country was already prepared. Some 
constituents imagined grave danger, such as with the threat of a German invasion of 
America. Many people held a favorable position for preparedness because they lived in 
fear of that threat. The Majority Leader usually tried to reassure those fears. “We differ 
on the so-called preparedness question [and] I must say that I do not anticipate the 
dangers which you prophecy (sic),” Kitchin answered in response to a constituent’s 
prediction of a German invasion by 1918. He continued that he was for a “reasonable 
preparedness,” which the country already had.68  
Kitchin was rarely condescending and wanted to be sure that the American people 
were well-informed before they started making assumptions. He usually opened response 
letters with a request to make sure the recipient understood “the facts” as he knew them. 
Kitchin often began his letters of response with a request, “Please be kind enough to write 
to me by return mail what you understand is the President’s program of preparedness. . . 
Please write me also what you understand is my position. What I favor and what I 
oppose,” he asked one man. Kitchin honestly believed that if the people understood the 
facts as he knew them, they would agree with his stance. The end of these letters was also 
 
68 Kitchin to T. L. Moffett, February 19, 1916, Box 9, Kitchin Papers. 
119 
 
uniform, “I am inclined to believe that if we both knew the facts and understood the 
President’s program. . . there would be very little difference between us.”69 
Kitchin received letters and correspondence from across the country, not just from 
North Carolina, in support of his opposition to the President’s preparedness programs. “I 
just want to add my voice to the thousands of those who are offering you their heartfelt 
congratulations on the particularly brave stand you have taken relative to preparedness” 
one Marylander wrote. By late 1915, war was on the minds of everyone in and out of 
Europe, and this resident of the Old Line State echoed what many people from across the 
country thought. Importantly, modern Americans need to keep in mind that despite news 
of the war headlining every newspaper across the United States, there was still no 
inevitability of American entry. Today, we sometimes understand America’s role in the 
World War as though American involvement was a foregone conclusion, while in 1915, 
it was reasonable for Americans to question the merits of entering the European war.70  
Through most of 1915 and 1916, Kitchin received the occasional telegram or 
letter expressing disappointment or asking him to change his view on preparedness, and 
the days or week following a big speech or publication by Kitchin led to an influx of 
these letters and telegrams.  However, he received far more correspondence in the way of 
support. The community of Tar Heels who were living in Baltimore, for instance, 
produced more support than opposition. There were many meetings held by this tight-knit 
group. “The telegram sent you yesterday by several North Carolinians represents their 
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personal view, but not the views of all North Carolinians in [Baltimore],” wrote Richard 
White, one of those transplanted to Maryland. White continued, “On behalf of myself and 
several others, I wish to commend your course which has our fullest backing.” White 
ended by sharing his admiration of Kitchin’s “pluck.” Presumably, these two opposing 
factions of Tar Heels in the Old Line State knew each other and held meetings to discuss 
their planned response to Kitchin’s speech and pamphlet.71 
On the other side of the preparedness issue, a semi-famous American inventor and 
critic of America’s lack of preparedness, Hudson Maxim, penned a lengthy essay in 
response to Kitchin’s beliefs and public speeches. The reply began with a seemingly 
personal attack that accused Kitchin of being a buffoon: “I have not the least doubt but 
that Mr. Kitchin is possessed of sufficient unwisdom to believe what he says, for all the 
remarks that he has ever made upon preparedness are to my mind unimpeachable 
evidence that he is sufficiently ignorant of the subject.” For all of the bluster and 
hyperbole of Maxim’s essay, the inventor did make a few lucid points that most 
definitely resonated with many North Carolinians. In an analogy, Maxim compared 
Kitchin’s stance to an animal standing on a railroad track. Despite warnings from 
multiple sources, the bull on the railroad (and Kitchin in this analogy) decided to lock 
horns and opposed a force which they could not conquer.72  
Another, more reasonable, challenge to Kitchin’s essay from Maxim was that the 
United States should not be satisfied with Great Britain’s strong navy to protect against 
 
71 Richard J. White to Kitchin, March 7, 1916, Box 9, Kitchin Papers. 
72 Hudson Maxim, “Mr. Kitchin’s Colossal Folly,” Issues & Events 4, no. 3 (January 15, 1916): 35. 
121 
 
German aggression, and Americans should consider what would come once the war 
ended. One of Kitchin’s major points was that the British navy was considerably large 
enough to defend the Atlantic, and when America conducted an inventory of its own 
naval strength, only Britain’s was larger. “I do not believe that the United States of 
America would be safe under the towering preponderance of the British navy after the 
European War is over,” wrote Maxim.73  
Beyond the argument that the United States was already prepared to face an 
international crisis, Kitchin’s constituents steeled his opposition to preparedness. 
Especially when they warned against America surrendering its position of moral 
authority as one of the few great world powers that was not engaged in “the great crime 
of the century.” Entering the war, or simply advocating an aggressive preparedness 
movement, would cause the United States “to lose caste and position in the world of men 
and women,” wrote a supporter to Kitchin. America “would be throwing her great 
opportunity to the winds, and bringing herself unending promise of trouble if this action 
[preparedness] is taken,” the supporter concluded. Another constituent suggested to 
Kitchin that “it seems impossible to understand how men who know history as well as 
some of the advocates of preparedness do, can possibly see logic or common sense in this 
movement.” The writer seemed to be suggesting that President Wilson, as a man who 
knew history, was a historian earlier in his career, should have known better and chosen a 
different course of action to deal with the international crisis.74 
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One of the stories retold in elementary school classrooms around the United 
States today reinforces the idea of American moral authority. Teachers explain that one 
of the major reasons that British colonists came to the Americas was to escape the 
supposed immorality of Europe. And as one of Kitchin’s constituents, Edward Nelson, 
suggested to Kitchin in a 1915 letter, those stories carried weight well into the twentieth 
century, albeit in a marginally different context. It is as obvious today as it was over a 
century ago that the Great War was an abominable cataclysm for humanity, especially 
after the catastrophic Battle of the Somme River and the Battle of Verdun in 1916, which 
produced casualties nearing two million men. The Western world had not seen such 
destruction for over a century, since the end of the Napoleonic Wars. Except for the Civil 
War, the United States only had experience with limited wars that were expected to be 
brief and successful. In Europe, the same was mostly true, as limited wars ruled the 
continent after 1815.75 
With the World War in full swing and the casualty tolls in the millions, 
Americans may have been right to claim the moral high ground between 1914 and 1917. 
After all, American newspapers displayed images of the carnage that Europeans were 
suffering from and reported devastation-level casualty numbers from French, British, 
German, Russian, and other European nations, while America had yet to lose any lives on 
the battlefield. And while there were certainly Americans injured and killed because of 
the war, such as during the sinking of the Lusitania, there was no blame on the United 
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States for those casualties. Those Americans happened to be in the wrong place at the 
wrong time and died unfortunately, but America remained blameless, and therefore, 
morally superior to Europe.76 
Claude Kitchin’s opposition to the American preparedness campaigns cannot be 
dismissed by claiming that he was simply against the munitions makers and industries in 
the United States who stood to profit from American intervention in the war, although he 
did believe that the only Americans who would profit were the munitions industry and 
bankers. Rather, Kitchin concluded that preparedness indicated something more than just 
national defense, as the claim had been made in many circles. The buildup of a peacetime 
army and navy meant that the United States had offense on the mind, just like the nation 
did during its war with Spain two decades prior. And whatever the Great War’s final 
outcome was, this preparedness movement may have led to another arms race after its 
conclusion in Kitchin’s mind, which increased the likelihood of more and larger wars to 
come in the future. The United States, Kitchin felt, had a duty to lead by example for the 
rest of the world. He believed that “the militarists and war traffickers of every nation in 
the world will point to our conduct as an example” after the World War was over to 
continue an arms race in the name of preparedness and self-defense. If America joined 
the war, it would lose claim to the moral high ground it occupied in the early twentieth 
century.77 
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In the end, the preparedness campaigns which Claude Kitchin so ardently fought 
against were implemented to one degree or another but did not get the United States 
ready to go to war in April 1917. Indeed, it took nearly a year after the American 
declaration of war before the country entered the conflict in any tangible way. General 
Blackjack Pershing commented years later that Wilson did not even understand what 
would be necessary to prepare to go to war. Historian John Finnegan has suggested that 
the preparedness campaigns were never actually designed to get America ready for war 
but were almost purely defensive in strategy. The movement was billed as isolationist, 
rather than interventionist, despite the personal attitudes of its loudest proponents. “In a 
collapsing world, America was arming against nameless dangers which would follow the 
end of the European War,” Finnegan concluded. Despite the confusing goals, trajectory, 
and eventual outcome of the preparedness campaign, it gripped the American 
consciousness, political debates, and the conversations of North Carolinians.78
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Please write me by return mail what is your understanding of my position with 
respect to the so-called “preparedness program,” and what do you think I favor? 
Also write me specifically what is your understanding of the President’s Military 
program, of what it consists; and of what does his naval program consists. From 
your letter, you evidently do not understand my position 
--Claude Kitchin to W. H. Nash 
 
By late 1916 and into 1917 the United States was inching closer to war whether 
Americans wanted to or not. The debate over preparedness revealed to many Americans 
that there were potential areas of vulnerability. American preparedness was tested on two 
fronts. Neutrality was especially at risk in the North Atlantic and, closer to home, across 
the southern border with Mexico. The German submarine menace posed significant 
threats to American shipping, and in several high-stakes incidents, led the country closer 
to war. But many would argue that an even more threatening attack loomed just to the 
south. Mexico suffered through a period of high instability, and in 1916-1917, the United 
States’ sovereignty was violated along the southern border.  
From 1914 to 1917, American neutrality underwent its most severe threat from a 
European power since the Unites States signed the Treaty of Ghent one century previous. 
Through the course of the preparedness debate, President Wilson decided to agree with 
his advisor, Colonel House. The best way to maintain neutrality, the president believed, 
was through a well-prepared army and navy. The Navy League agreed and suggested that 
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“battleships are cheaper than battles,” later adding that “the weight of a powerful 
navy gives force to diplomacy.” In 1915, after a German submarine sank the Lusitania, 
Wilson sent word to Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels to get the “best minds in the 
Department to work on the subject” and develop a plan of action to respond to any threat 
to American neutrality.1 
Daniels has been described as the “most powerful man in North Carolina” by one 
of his recent biographers. Other historians note that he was “perhaps one of the most 
influential North Carolinians” during the Great War, next to Claude Kitchin. State 
governors came and went, but Daniels remained in a position of power from both his 
cabinet office and his printing press. Daniels was a native Tar Heel and ran the powerful, 
Raleigh-based News and Observer for most of his adult life. The paper would play an 
instrumental role in helping to shape public opinions on matters important to Daniels. 
While northern cities were satiated by William Randolph Hearst and Joseph Pulitzer, 
North Carolinians turned to Daniels for their news and helped turn him into a wealthy 
man.2 
In part, Daniels used his wealth to become more involved in politics. Through the 
late nineteenth century, he was involved with the local Democratic party. It was after his 
purchase of the News and Observer, and later involvement with the white supremacy 
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campaigns in 1898 and 1900, that he became heavily involved in politics. He supported 
Wilson in 1912, which led to his appointment as Secretary of the Navy. As the United 
States drew closer to war, Daniels became a close confidant of Wilson. He supported the 
president’s neutrality policy but recognized that after Germany and Britain escalated their 
naval war the United States would face great difficulty maintaining neutrality. No one 
ever held the cabinet position longer than Daniels did and when the United States finally 
entered the Great War, he became one of the most important men in the world. Claude 
Kitchin had been a longtime political ally to Daniels. Some friction developed between 
the two based on a feud that emerged after the 1908 North Carolina gubernatorial election 
in which Daniels supported William Walton Kitchin’s opponent.3  
Daniels may not have been the best choice to head such an important post on the 
eve of entering a war. He lacked any experience with the navy and was not very popular 
with long-time naval officers, but he did learn fast. One of his most memorable acts as 
secretary, and maybe the largest contribution to his unpopularity, was a ban on alcohol on 
all navy ships. More than alcohol, though, Daniels did not like war. He hated even talking 
about the notion of war. Years after the Great War ended, a naval admiral noted that 
Daniels rarely ever used the term “war” or “preparedness for war.” Nevertheless, after the 
president’s request to “put the best minds in the Department to work” Daniels did just 
that and quickly earned the trust of career officers. Men such as Thomas Edison were put 
to work after the formation of a consulting board that included some of the country’s 
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most influential and smartest scientists and engineers. The board researched and 
developed ideas on matters that involved submarine technology and ship construction.4  
Naval warfare underwent large changes in the years leading up to the Great War. 
In the three centuries preceding the twentieth, scores of rules developed among the 
European naval powers regarding the conduct of the capture or sinking of unarmed 
merchant ships. Warships were fair game for all of these nations. Belligerent powers 
retained the right to stop any ship flying an enemy flag and search it for materials that 
might support the enemy’s war effort, or “contraband.” If any contraband were found, the 
ship was to be escorted to the nearest port and a so called “prize court” would make the 
determination on whether the items or material were technically contraband and needed 
to be confiscated. If it was not possible to seize contraband, the vessel was allowed to be 
destroyed but only once the crew and passengers had the opportunity to reach a place of 
safety with lifeboats, transfer to the opposing ship, or otherwise.5 
The foundations of the American Republic rested on its ability to freely travel and 
trade across oceans, especially the North Atlantic, with the major economic powers in 
Europe. Control of America’s coastal waters played the most essential role for victory in 
the War for Independence (with French help), Mexican American, Civil, and Spanish 
American Wars. Lack of control on the Atlantic led to the War of 1812. And the German 
submarine menace in the North Atlantic between 1915 and 1917 became the single 
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biggest reason for American involvement in the Great War. This American desire for 
“freedom of the seas” would later be reflected in President Wilson’s Fourteen Points as 
second in importance only to the abolition of future secret alliances. From the American 
perspective of the war, “closed” seas were one of the major factors that led to the start of 
the war.6 
Between June 12 and June 15, 1775, the United States Navy was born. It was 
officially established in October of that year. The American Navy was not particularly 
noteworthy or even remarkable in its first century, apart from certain undertakings 
scattered throughout the nineteenth century. The Navy had participated in at least eight 
large-scale actions before the United States entered the Great War. Naval officers gained 
experience with blockades, patrols, and steam engines. But the Navy lacked in “fleet 
experience,” although some gains were made in the war against Spain. As far back as the 
American Civil War, the Navy experimented with submarine ships but never on a large 
scale. But there was a lack of tangible experience with the submerged ships.7 
A submarine is obviously much different than a surface ship. The very definition 
of a submarine establishes its location as below the water. The early days of submarine 
technology determined that the vessel would be a small one with barely enough room for 
the crew and equipment necessary to operate the boat. For this reason, German 
submarines could not possibly adhere to the longstanding rules of the high seas. They did 
not have the space to transfer a crew, nor did they have the luxury of surfacing to 
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challenge the surface ship without fear of be fired on. The Lusitania was not the first ship 
to be sunk under these new realities of war and it would not be the last, but it remains 
today as one of the most prominent in American minds because it was the first major loss 
of American lives associated with the war.8 
The British practice of arming merchant ships and the German announcement of 
sinking armed merchant ships would eventually be the leading reasons that drew the 
United States in the war. President Wilson and Secretary of State Robert Lansing 
recognized the absurdity that would have been required to follow the old rules of naval 
warfare, requiring a submarine to surface and warn the merchant ship, which was armed 
well enough to sink the submarine. The British government argued that her merchant 
ships had a right to defend themselves and it was not sure that disarming the merchants 
would prevent the Germans from sinking the ships anyway.9  
The German government could reasonably justify the sinking of the Lusitania due 
to the new realities of war. While he was still a counselor to the Department of State, 
Lansing wrote a memorandum, which was later shared with President Wilson, that 
preemptively addressed many possible justifications that the German government could 
use. First, Lansing explained that the Lusitania supposedly carried munitions of war 
(contraband) for Great Britain. Lansing suggested that unless that information was 
communicated to the German submarine, there was no way for them to even know it. 
Second, the Germans claimed that the ship had guns on board for self-defense against any 
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German ships, but Lansing noted that none were actually mounted on deck, or elsewhere 
visible to the Germans. Third, the German government continually took out newspaper 
advertisements in American papers announcing their intentions and therefore was 
prepared to sink any British ship. Lansing concluded that the German government and its 
embassy in Washington D.C. went over the heads of the American government, took 
advantage of America’s free press, and insulted the Wilson administration by warning the 
American people rather than the American government.10 
Of the nearly 1,200 lives lost in the sinking, 128 were Americans. At least one 
North Carolinian was on the ship, Dr. Owen Kenan of Wilmington. On the day prior to 
the ship’s destruction, only a few North Carolinians may have noticed the Lusitania 
mentioned in the papers. In general, fear of travelling on the open ocean probably did not 
concern many Tar Heels, as there were notes sprinkled in newspapers attesting to the 
general inefficacy of submarines as weapons of war. “Torpedoes cost over $5,000 each,” 
began one article in the Polk County News, due to the expense “they are not discharged 
unless there is a fair chance of hitting the object aimed at,” it continued. This article 
appeared the day that the Lusitania was destroyed and assured North Carolinians that 
submariners may get better at hitting ships in the future, but for the time being, they were 
just too expensive to be a major concern. There seemed to be no danger for merchant 
ships, as the old rules for the high seas governing a sinking were still in effect as far as 
any Americans knew.11  
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The ill-fated Lusitania had been mentioned in North Carolinian newspapers fewer 
than ten times across the state in the months leading up to the event of its sinking.12 The 
famous warnings taken out by Ambassador Count von Bernstorff were prominent in 
newspapers in Washington D.C. and New York City. For instance, the following was 
plastered on the front page of the Washington Times on May 1: “NOTICE! Travelers 
intending to embark on the Atlantic voyage are reminded that a state of war exists 
between Germany [and] Great Britain . . . In accordance with formal notice given by the 
Imperial German Government, vessels flying the flag of Great Britain . . . are liable to 
destruction.” Americans were reminded that “travelers sailing in the war zone on ships of 
Great Britain or her allies do so at their own risk.” This warning was posted in about fifty 
national newspapers throughout much of the eastern United States, especially in 
Washington D.C. and New York City.13  
The warning advertisements made their way to the Old North State too. Buried in 
the middle of the “General News” section in an Asheboro paper were two short blurbs. 
One noted that the German embassy had taken out advertisements in other papers 
advising Americans not to board the ship, and the other blurb stated that anonymously 
signed telegrams were sent to potential passengers advising them that the “liner was to be 
sunk.” At least one recipient tore up the telegram without comment. Presumably, the man 
disregarded the warning as just another instance of the German warnings which were 
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becoming commonplace and littered throughout newspapers nationwide. One well-
known North Carolina native and doctor did have a ticket for the ship. Presumably, no 
one would have noticed had the ship not sunk.14 
The well-known North Carolina native and doctor, Owen Hill Kenan, managed to 
survive the sinking and, in doing so, to remind Tar Heels of the realities of war. Kenan 
was born to James and Annie Kenan in a plantation house in Duplin County, North 
Carolina, in 1872. He was the grandson of a U.S. Senator and great-great grandson of 
General James Kenan of the American Revolution. Kenan attended the University of 
North Carolina at Chapel Hill and Horner’s Military Academy in Oxford, North Carolina. 
He became well-known as an Ambulance Corps volunteer in France during the war and 
received the title (not rank) of Colonel and a Croix de Guerre for his service. Later he 
volunteered for the American Expeditionary Forces Medical Corps. On board the 
Lusitania on May 7, Kenan stood with millionaire socialite Alfred Vanderbilt and 
Vanderbilt’s valet while the ship was going down. Vanderbilt died trying to save other 
passengers, while Kenan was able to survive the sinking. While Kenan’s experience 
aboard the ship was unique among Tar Heels, the incident hit close to the heart of many 
North Carolinians.15  
Soon after May 7, papers were filled with messages about the ship. “America is 
suddenly brought into the maelstrom of this gigantic war by the torpedoing and sinking of 
the Lusitania,” noted one local column. “What will our government do about it?” the 
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author demanded. He also asked if Americans should just stay at home while the war 
raged on? Many in the state echoed these questions. “We have a right to expect some 
quick action on this foul deed of enormous barbarity” the columnist closed. The Twice-A-
Week Dispatch identified itself as a Republican leaning paper and therefore a slightly 
more hawkish one. But this author’s feelings carried across the state. Many asked what 
the government planned to do about the event and felt it should not be left 
unchallenged.16 
In response to the sinking, the American and Imperial German governments 
entered into agonizing negotiations, which eventually led Wilson to reexamine his 
opposition to American preparedness efforts. It was not until the following year and the 
sinking of the French liner Sussex on March 24, 1916, that Wilson finally obtained a 
pledge from Germany to return to the traditional search and seizure rules of naval war. 
With the Sussex Pledge, Germany vowed to discontinue targeting passenger ships, to not 
sink merchants until the presence of weapons onboard was established, and to 
discontinue sinking ships without making adequate provisions for the safety of the crew 
and passengers. That pledge from the German government, ultimately, did not amount to 
much. Less than a year later, Germany renewed its policy of unrestricted naval warfare in 
early February of 1917.17 
The dramatic sinking of the Lusitania did not, in the end, immediately lead to 
America’s entry to the Great War, as many believe today. The end result did free the 
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United States to focus more on preparedness than it was able to do previously. However, 
President Wilson concluded that America’s military weakness hindered the diplomatic 
exchanges between herself and the German government. Thereafter, Wilson ordered the 
War and Navy Departments to begin preparations on an “adequate national defense” 
program due to be submitted to Congress by December, a move that historian Arthur 
Link described as “the most important decision on domestic policy that Wilson made 
during the year 1915.”18  
Despite the controversy concerning which flag the Lusitania may have displayed 
on the day of its watery demise, ships such as the Housatonic, City of Memphis, Illinois, 
and Vigilancia were without doubt American ships, flying the Stars and Stripes, and were 
sunk by German submarines in early 1917. In all, ten American merchants were sunk 
between February and early April, with the loss of many Americans lives. This third, and 
ultimately final, campaign of unrestricted submarine warfare that began in February that 
year proved too much to bear for the American Congress and President Wilson. Many of 
the congressmen and senators who spoke before the war vote cited these sinkings to 
accuse Germany of waging a ruthless war without mercy.19 
The Housatonic (distinct from the Civil War-era American vessel of the same 
name) was an American ship, but no American lives were lost when it was sunk. The 
German Captain in this sinking’s case followed traditional, or honorable, methods. 
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Warning shots were fired, and despite protests from the Housatonic’s captain, the crew 
were ordered onto lifeboats before the final torpedo struck. The crew were towed in their 
lifeboats for roughly an hour and a half by the German submarine after the sinking. The 
other three ships mentioned carried dozens of American citizens on them when they were 
sent to the depths. The sinking of these ships played a crucial role in Wilson’s, and the 
American public’s, decision to finally enter the war against Germany. In initial reports 
from the New York Times, however, the Housatonic incident alone was not enough to 
cause war. But the sinking of additional American ships did signal Germany’s 
renunciation of the Sussex Pledge, in which the German government agreed to restrict the 
sinking of merchant ships.20 
From Friday, March 16, to Sunday March 18, 1917, three American merchant 
ships were sunk and proved to be the so-called “tipping point” sinkings. The Vigilancia 
went down on the 16th, next it was the City of Memphis on the 17th, and finally, the 
Illinois on the 18th. These were not the first American ships to be sunk, and their 
downfalls did not result in the most losses of life either. About one hundred fewer sailors 
and merchants died from the incidents on this weekend than the sinking of the Lusitania. 
However, their individual stories were determined to be the tipping point. Oftentimes, 
ships would be constructed in one country and sold to another, possibly financed by 
investors in a third country, but this situation did not apply to Vigilancia. The Vigilancia 
was well marked with its name and large American flags painted on both sides and with 
an illuminated American flag flying over it. It had never been anything but an American 
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ship. The Vigilancia was the first American vessel to be fired upon with no prior warning 
by a German submarine.21 
From about February of 1915 until the Armistice was signed, Germany instituted 
three major submarine campaigns against the British and Allied shipping. Of course, 
American losses of life and shipping tonnage paled in comparison to what Great Britain 
lost on a monthly basis. From February through August of 1917, the British lost an 
average of 605,191 tons a month. A common guess, albeit probably inaccurate, posits 
that Britain was mere months away from being starved into surrender before the United 
States finally came to the rescue. We cannot know the exact amount of time that was 
required to literally starve Britain out of the war, but the possibility of that happening was 
very real. Research scholar John Abbatiello speculates that the final German submarine 
campaign that began in early 1917 came imminently close to “choking the British 
economy” and starving the island nation into surrender.22  
In response to the massive amounts of British shipping that was lost during the 
first years of the war, historian David Kennedy posed the question, “Would Wilson 
hesitate long enough for the U-boats mortally to cripple Britain” before the United States 
was willing to get involved? For a long time between 1914 and 1917, the answer seemed 
to be yes. It must be stated that the United States and Great Britain shared no natural 
alliance, but American interests rested much closer to an Allied victory than it did with a 
 
21 Carlisle, Sovereignty, 106-107. 
22 V.E. Tarrant, The U-boat Offensive, 1914-1945 (London: Cassell, 2000), 152-153; John Abbatiello, 
“Atlantic U-boat Campaign,” https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/atlantic_u-boat_campaign. 
A table under the heading, “The Final U-Boat Campaign” lists the monthly tonnage lost by both the 
Germans and the British from February through August 1917. I averaged the gross tonnage to determine 
the monthly average.  
138 
 
German victory. There were many economic ties between Britain and the United States 
that did not exist as heavily with Germany. Therefore, an Allied, or British, victory was 
more essential to American prosperity and led the United States to identify more closely 
with Britain than Germany. This calculation seemed especially true for President Wilson 
and especially obvious to Kitchin.23 
Inevitably, Claude Kitchin protested against Wilson’s handling of the so-called 
“submarine crisis” in 1916 and early 1917 during which the German policy of 
Unrestricted Submarine War led to the sinking of no fewer than three American merchant 
ships. Since the Lusitania was a British vessel the Germans could explain their way out 
of their share of the blame for the sinking to the United States. One interesting note to 
point out, however, is that the Lusitania had been known to fly the American flag on 
occasion. The tactic of displaying the flag of a neutral nation or no flag at all was 
common. On February 12, 1915, months before her sinking, the Polk County News 
reported that the “British steamer Lusitania of the Cunard line” sailed from New York to 
Liverpool while flying the American flag after passing “Queenstown until she entered 
Mersey. This is vouched for by American passengers who crossed on her.” She was 
warned by another British liner company that there were two German submarines in the 
area of travel. The ship’s captain reported that “he had a right to fly the flag of a neutral 
country for protection of [unneutral] passengers and mails which his ship was carrying.” 
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There is no evidence that the ship was flying any flag but the Union Jack on the day of its 
sinking.24 
Despite Kitchin’s neutral feelings about the world conflict, he did condemn 
Germany for its policy of unrestricted submarine warfare and Great Britain for its naval 
blockades, as he believed that the policies of both Great Britain and Imperial Germany 
violated American rights. When Germany sank the Lusitania, he favored a resolution 
warning Americans to stay off of the ships of belligerent nations. “Our citizens ought to 
be warned not to take passage on armed vessels of belligerents. This would keep us out of 
the war” he confided to a North Carolinian who wrote to his office about the incident. “It 
is common sense and real patriotism” to issue this kind of warning, he was reassured by 
another.25  
One of the more prominent women’s organizations in North Carolina sent a 
telegram to Kitchin’s office to inform him of their support of this resolution. “We 
American women beg you to use every influence to secure action preventing citizens 
traveling on belligerent ships thus jeopardizing safety and peace of our country,” wrote 
Mrs. Ethelina Bolton to Kitchin. Kitchin received enough support for this stance that it 
became clear to him that he was on the right path. The Majority Leader called the sinking 
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“inexcusable” and supported the recommendation that Americans stay off of the ships of 
any belligerent nation. He remarked in a letter to a constituent that “it is incredible to me 
how anyone can object to this country advising its own citizens not to take passage on 
armed belligerent ships.”26  
Well before the newspaper advertisements from the German government, or the 
sinking of the Lusitania itself, the American government considered issuing warnings 
about travelling on the ships of hostile nations, such as those of Great Britain. The United 
States was not the first nation to consider issuing warnings to its citizens. The Chamber 
of German American Commerce was quick to remind Kitchin of the precedent. Britain 
warned her own subjects to stay clear of ships belonging to both Russia and Japan during 
the Russo-Japanese War in the early part of the century, for example. Even the United 
States had done something similar in the recent past. Americans were warned that they 
took their own risk by staying in Mexico during the “Mexican disorders.” The idea of 
warning people to steer clear of hostile areas was not new and seemed a reasonable 
course to take. A constituent wrote to Kitchin to explain, “We think that the sooner 
Americans are made to understand that they must be reasonable and use only neutral 
ships the better it will be for American peace.”27 
While Imperial Germany’s unrestricted submarine warfare tactics nearly drew the 
United States to war before 1917, Kitchin was equally appalled by Great Britain’s 
blockade of Central Power ports. He explained that from 1915 onward, Britain violated 
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American neutrality rights by denying entrance to any nation’s port that Britain did not 
allow. According to Kitchin, Britain denied American access by declaring a war zone 
around German waters. So, the question was raised of how that action was any different 
than Germany’s declaration of a war zone around British waters. Neither policy 
benefitted the United States, and both caused hardship to the American economy, 
although the German policy did kill Americans while Britain’s did not. From a practical 
economic standpoint, however, both belligerents injured America.28 
Kitchin’s great hero and confederate, William Jennings Bryan, pleaded for an 
evenhanded policy. Before his resignation as secretary of state, Bryan suggested to 
Wilson that ships carrying war contraband be prohibited from carrying passengers. In this 
case, Bryan meant war contraband to be anything of military value that could be used by 
Britain, France, Russia, or another hostile nation. Bryan read an editorial with this 
suggestion and thought it was good enough to recommend to the president, or at least 
some form of that rule. The great orator argued that Germany had a right to prevent 
contraband from going to its enemy, and ships with contraband on board should not be 
allowed to rely on them as human shields. “It would be like putting women and children 
in front of an army,” Bryan remarked to the president.  Bryan went so far as to suggest to 
a presidential counselor, and future secretary of state, Robert Lansing, that Americans 
taking passage on a British vessel bound for a British port and passing through a war 
zone might be considered to have done so of their own free will and peril. Therefore, they 
were not necessarily entitled to the full protection of the American government. Bryan 
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tried to find a solution in this quagmire that would keep the United States on the 
moderate path, or at least the path least likely to lead to war for America. Kitchin 
employed the same tactic. Neither man necessarily blamed the passengers aboard sunken 
ships, but they did also suggest that the Germans had a right to prevent their enemies 
from moving materials of war.29 
Wilson increasingly moved away from Bryan’s approach. Secretary of 
Agriculture David Houston, a North Carolina native, recalled that the President discussed 
with his cabinet the possibility of arming merchant ships at the beginning of the third, and 
final, wave of German unrestricted submarine warfare in February 1917. At that time, 
Wilson still maintained that he desired neutrality over actual entry to the war. The 
President’s solution, which he discussed with his cabinet, was to try the policy of “armed 
neutrality” rather than asking for a declaration of war. He believed that the American 
people were getting fed up with Germany’s continued betrayal of American neutrality but 
not to the point yet where they would accept a war. Perhaps the middle course of arming 
merchant ships for their own defense would work.30   
The President waited for some kind of “overt act,” such as the destruction of an 
American merchant ship, which would give him a good reason to go to Congress and ask 
it for approval to arm merchant ships. The overt act on the Atlantic Ocean did not come 
in February though. Perhaps if Wilson waited an extra couple of weeks, the “tipping 
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point” of sinkings could have given him the firm excuse he was looking for, but another 
event took precedence. On February 20, American Ambassador to Britain, Walter Page, 
was given the infamous Zimmermann Telegram, which he relayed to Wilson the next 
day. The notorious request for Mexico to go to war with the United States did not change 
Wilson’s mind about anything. He had already decided on armed neutrality, but the 
telegram gave the president what he needed, and he went to Congress to officially request 
armed neutrality late in the month. Even as the president was addressing Congress about 
this request, someone came into the chamber and brought the news that a German 
submarine sank another British liner with Americans on board.31 
In a small concession to the President and preparedness, Kitchin voted in favor of 
arming American merchant ships to defend against German submarine aggression. This 
concession appears quite shocking on the surface, especially after Kitchin spent so much 
ink explaining to people that arming merchant ships would definitely lead to war with 
Germany. “If the President persists in his course with respect to armed merchantmen, we 
are bound to get into war with Germany” he wrote to one supporter the previous year. 
There are a few explanations for why Kitchin voted in favor of arming the merchant 
ships, given his opposition to the idea. First, Kitchin may have hoped to preserve 
American rights on the seas. Second, Kitchin recognized Wilson’s honest, if misguided, 
efforts to keep the United States out of war relied upon the protection of its shipping. And 
third, Kitchin may have seen the writing on the wall and realized any opposition to this 
 




bill would be futile, as four hundred of his colleagues were ready to vote in favor of it. 
But in the case of arming merchant ships, the action did come down to actual safety. By 
1917, Germany instituted its third, and final, campaign of unrestricted submarine warfare, 
which was the final straw for Wilson and led him to ask for the war declaration. As a 
practical man, Kitchin saw the need for armed defense in this case.32 
Kitchin consistently asserted that the American navy was already powerful 
enough to defend the United States, with only Great Britain possessing a larger one. 
Given that fact, there was no one for the United States to prepare against despite the 
propaganda from the “jingoes and war-traffickers.” Kitchin also reminded North Carolina 
in an opinion article that the three hundred million dollars necessary to finance any 
expansion would be raised by direct or excise taxes to be paid almost certainly by the 
common man. As he noted in 1915, “I have had enough experience with taxation to know 
that those who are howling most loudly now for the big Army and Navy program will 
protest and howl most wildly against any measures which may be attempted or proposed 
for increase of taxes.” Kitchin’s experience on the Ways and Means Committee made 
him the leading expert in the country to make this statement, and it would ultimately turn 
out to be true.33 
Even before any new army and navy building programs were proposed, Kitchin 
made a distinction between different types of military preparedness programs. He 
supported a limited defensive type of program. In the limited plan, the United States need 
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only prepare against the remote possibility of attack on America’s shores, and this 
preparation could be accomplished without bankrupting the American people. “I believe I 
favor building more submarines and torpedo destroyers and enlarging our capacity to lay 
mines,” he wrote to a colleague with similar views on preparedness. “I think [that] is wise 
and most probably necessary as a defensive measure.” Many North Carolinians agreed 
with Kitchin’s limited plan: “I hope you will continue to fight to the finish, not against all 
preparedness but in favor of only a reasonable preparedness, and prevent [if possible] the 
extravagant expenditure of money which is now contemplated,” wrote one constituent.34 
The other option was an offensive program, which Kitchin whole heartedly 
disagreed with and actively fought against. Kitchin argued that such a program would 
benefit big businesses and arms manufacturers at the expense of ordinary North 
Carolinians and had a much higher probability of bringing the United States into direct 
conflict with Germany. He noted to a colleague, “I feel it is big ammunition and war 
equipment interests that are trying to manufacture public sentiment into favoring [big 
preparedness] propaganda and with the attempt to intimidate Congress in entering upon 
it.” Kitchin kept returning to these concerns to explain his stance against preparedness. 
He tried time and time again to convince North Carolina and Americans everywhere that 
there would be no benefit for the United States by entering this war. Kitchin reexplained 
this point many times to numerous concerned constituents.35 
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The people of North Carolina made their support of Kitchin’s stance on the navy 
clear to him. “In regard to the preparedness question [I] would like to say for your 
information that I believe three-fourths of our people are solidly with you in your attitude 
on the matter,” telegrammed W.C. Dowd of Charlotte. Hundreds of letters from his 
constituents gave him the assurance that he was acting in accordance with their wishes. In 
fact, historians speculate that as late as April 1, 1917, a majority of Americans were 
opposed to entering the war.36 
Steadfast as Kitchin was, he never gave in by fully committing to preparedness 
activities, despite a promise to keep an open mind on the preparedness issue. Kitchin later 
took this same strong will to the House floor before the vote to declare war. He knew that 
he was on the losing side of the argument, but his conviction, and what he believed were 
the convictions of his constituents, would not allow him to vote in favor of a war with 
Germany. The preparedness programs put forth by President Wilson called for huge 
increases in army and naval expenditures in pursuit of preparing the country for the 
war.37  
In response to the President’s preparedness movement campaigns and the 
recommendations of increased naval spending and the proposed continental army, 
Kitchin wrote a lengthy opinion piece in a weekly periodical explaining his opposition to 
“senseless” preparedness. Kitchin penned the article in response to one in The Seven Seas 
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Magazine, the magazine of the Navy League, which tried to pressure Kitchin into 
keeping his feelings private. Undaunted, the Majority Leader rejected the arguments that 
so-called “patriotic societies,” such as the Navy League, peddled which suggested that 
the United States was in a helpless and defenseless state of dangerous unpreparedness. 
Instead, he declared that those arguments were “pure tommy-rot, BASED NOT ON A 
SINGLE FACT.”38  
A month later, Kitchin wrote a follow up piece to make sure his stance was clear. 
Even in the early twentieth century, writers could engage the “caps lock” to drive home a 
point, and the Majority Leader was not afraid to use it. He wrote that, “THE FACT IS 
[the United States has] THE STRONGEST AND MOST POWERFUL NAVY IN THE 
WORLD, except for that of Great Britain.” He explained in several more all-capital 
sentences that many war hawks were exaggerating America’s ill-prepared military 
strength. They focused on the number of ships and their tonnage. According to Kitchin, 
numbers and tonnage did not always indicate actual superiority, but he noted, as early as 
1915, that the American navy had more ships and over forty thousand more tons of 
shipping than Germany did.39  
According to Kitchin, the American navy was superior to every other navy in the 
world, except for the British navy. The United States had a far superior navy to that of 
Germany, even before any additional American naval build-up took place. A strong navy 
had never historically been a necessity for Germany because Germany boasted one of the 
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strongest armies in the world and was always a dominant force on land. However, as 
Kaiser Wilhelm II came to power and Germany sought to expand its influence on the 
world stage, he saw a large navy as a necessary instrument to compete with other nations, 
especially with Great Britain. Throughout the early 1900s, he saw every international 
incident as a lesson that proved the necessity of a strong navy. Kaiser Wilhelm supported 
a series of naval bills first proposed by German Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz in 1898, 
aimed at doubling the number of German warships. Over the next few years, more 
German naval bills were passed in Wilhelm’s quest to compete with the Royal Navy. The 
build-up helped Germany prepare a strong navy by the start of the Great War, but it was 
still less than half as good as Britain’s. Incidentally, the German navy proved to be rather 
ineffective throughout the war. The only major battle it participated in, the Battle of 
Jutland in 1915, was more or less a draw between Britain and Germany. After the 
encounter, the Germans retreated to port, where the navy remained for the rest of the war. 
And the Germany navy was not even as big as America’s navy.40 
“WE ARE PREPARED” Kitchin made sure to note after comparing America’s 
naval strength to Germany’s. But it was not just increasing naval expenses that Kitchin 
argued against, though he was sure to remind any readers that all extra appropriations for 
the military must come from an increase in taxes paid by the American people. There 
were also rumblings about dissolving the American National Guard and replacing it with 
a Continental Army, which would be basically the same kind of organization, although 
only the President, rather than state governors, would have the ability to call it to action. 
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As with the navy, Kitchin was sure to point out that the American army was already 
sufficient for defense.41 
Representative Kitchin opposed both the Continental Army and the proposed 
increase in naval spending. Privately, he boasted to a colleague that “we have already 
practically defeated. . . [Wilson’s] army program; that is, it seems that we will certainly 
knock out his Continental army.”42 In the end, the House and Senate ended up passing a 
National Defense Act between March and May of 1916, which did not establish a 
militaristic Continental Army. Therefore, this action appeared to be a victory for the anti-
preparedness group, led by Kitchin. Interestingly, despite their opposing viewpoints on 
the implementation of the Continental Army, Kitchin viewed Secretary of War Lindley 
Garrison, amicably. Upon learning of his resignation, Kitchin considered it “unfortunate 
that Mr. Garrison should resign,” as Kitchin “regarded him as one of the strongest men in 
the [President’s] cabinet” but ultimately recognized that Garrison would not have given 
up the fight for the plan.43 
Kitchin and his allies were not as successful in their opposition to the naval plan. 
Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels called for the construction of ten battleships, six 
battle cruisers, ten cruisers, fifty destroyers, one hundred submarines and various other 
vessels over a five-year period, a plan that President Wilson approved in October 1915. 
This decision, however, was not a total defeat for the anti-preparedness camp. The final 
allotment for the naval expenditure request was “too much appropriation by many 
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millions, but it is infinitely better than the program, first proposed” by Secretary Daniels. 
It seemed much easier for Congress and the President to approve naval monies based on 
the very much more tangible threat of war at sea than war on land.44 
The whole debate surrounding America’s army and naval preparedness may have 
passed on without being put to the test. However, an international crisis close to home 
began simultaneously to the events unfolding in Europe and in the Atlantic. Indeed, 
events nearly drew the United States into an international war with her neighbor to the 
south, Mexico. American relations with Mexico had been on shaky footing since before 
the Mexican American War many decades earlier. And in the years since that war ended, 
border raids and small skirmishes happened regularly on both sides of the Rio Grande. 
Through the early years of the twentieth century, tensions began to rise again. And in 
1911, the Mexican dictator, Porfirio Diaz, was ousted during a revolution. Diaz’s 
successor, Francisco Madero, was subsequently forced to resign and was later shot by a 
popular military officer that he appointed to quell rebellion, although it is unclear who 
ordered the assassination. In any event, Mexico was forcefully taken over by Victoriano 
de la Huerta. This action did not sit well with either President Wilson or with 
Representative Kitchin. The Mexican revolution led to an increase in Mexican bandito 
gangs and more frequent border raids, notably by Pancho Villa. The American response 
was to send twenty thousand troops to the border, with five thousand sent in direct 
response to Villa’s raid on New Mexico.45 
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There may have been some truth to the hawkish suggestion that America was 
vulnerable to invasion, but the oceanic barrier proved that American vulnerability was 
not necessarily from Germany. The more urgent vulnerability came from its southern 
neighbor. The United States almost did go to war with Mexico for a second time, and a 
lack of preparedness became evident. During the crisis with Mexico, American machine 
guns failed to work properly, reserve units of American troops were desperately needed 
to help but were lacking, and the cavalry proved to be ill-trained. Assistant Chief of Staff 
Tasker Bliss suggested that if Germany were able to breach the Atlantic barrier, it might 
well be through Mexico, in violation of the Monroe Doctrine no less. Still, while the idea 
of a German invasion of the United States via Mexico seemed, and was, unrealistic, the 
border crisis proved that the American army was not as prepared as would be expected in 
an industrialized nation while the world was at war. It was also clear from the raiding that 
in the event of a real emergency, many thousands, or perhaps millions, more soldiers 
would be needed to defend the United States.46 
The crew of an American ship sailing in Mexican waters near Tampico were 
arrested but quickly released, which was the single event that nearly turned the incident 
into a second Mexican American War. Wilson demanded full apologies and that the 
Mexican soldiers salute the American flag. The latter demand was refused, and Wilson 
used it as an excuse to secure a change of Mexican leadership. The president requested 
congressional authority to use force in Mexico, and surprisingly, Kitchin agreed with the 
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President, as did a congressional majority, leading to the seizure of Vera Cruz. The 
incident cost the lives of nineteen Americans, with seventy-one wounded, and proved 
Wilson’s determination, or stubbornness, to preserve his ideals. There was astonishment 
across America and the world that Wilson would spill blood over such a trivial matter.47 
In anticipation of a large crisis, the secretary of war notified Governor Locke 
Craig that he would need to mobilize the North Carolina National Guard in June. Their 
mission, the same as many other state Guards and militias, was to be ready to protect the 
“frontier,” or border. Three regiments of infantry, two of cavalry, a field hospital, and an 
ambulance company were requested for this assignment. Craig assured the president that 
the National Guard of North Carolina was ready to obey any orders from the White 
House and were enthusiastic to participate in this venture. The only concern Craig had 
was that he wanted to be sure that the North Carolina brigade would not be separated and 
sent to different areas. The North Carolina National Guard did not see much action 
during the border crisis, as General Pershing preferred to use regular army units.48 
Wilson had not been entirely honest with the American public as to what the real 
purpose of the intervention in Mexico was and that may have led, in part, to Kitchin’s 
support. Kitchin has often been described as a pacifist, though he was not, so his agreeing 
to a violent course of action, such as invading Mexico, may seem odd. When it came to 
the actual security of America’s borders (instead of the fantastical threat posed by 
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German submarines), he tended to agree with a military solution. After all, in the speech 
he made directly before the war resolution in 1917, he noted that Mexico posed a much 
greater threat to the United States than did Germany only a year prior. He voted for 
intervention against Mexican aggression because he believed that Mexico posed a real 
threat to American security in 1916. “I approved that course then [intervention in 
Mexico]; I approve it now,” he stated in 1917.49 
The threat from Mexico became far more frightening in the United States 
following the public release of the now-famous Zimmermann Telegram. Newspapers 
around the country reported in early March that Imperial Germany proposed an alliance 
with Mexico if the United States entered the World War on the Allied side. The overture 
promised generous financial support to Mexico from Germany and with the 
understanding that the Germans would support the Mexican reconquest of New Mexico, 
Texas, and Arizona. Germany also suggested that Mexico might also bring Japan into a 
new alliance in order to dominate and keep American influence out of the Pacific Ocean. 
The reality was far less real than the threat. Mexico’s instability, evident in the ongoing 
civil war, prevented this alliance and a potential foreign war. The instability of the 
Mexican government also prevented any war with the United States long before the 
telegram was sent to Ambassador Zimmermann. The Mexican military agreed that it was 
far too inadequate to launch a full-scale invasion of the United States, let alone control 
the reconquered American states. Few, if any, serious scholars and historians today 
consider the Zimmermann Telegram to be the major factor that pushed Wilson to ask for 
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the declaration of war, but it is one of the contributing factors that is necessarily included. 
The telegram did have an enormous effect on the American public’s attitude towards 
Germany, though, and pushed many who were still neutral in thought and action toward 
the Allies and away from the Central Powers. No other event had yet stirred such feelings 
in the American people.50 
Despite Mexico’s self-assessed inadequacies, it became clear to Kitchin that 
Mexico represented a more direct challenge to the United States than any of the Central 
Powers of Europe did. The extent of Mexico’s internal weaknesses did not become 
evident to most Americans until well after the World War ended. Kitchin was actually 
shocked that Wilson did not ask for a declaration of war against Mexico, given the 
provocation of the border raids on both sides that may well have warranted one. This lack 
of more significant action against Mexico reinforced Kitchin’s opposition to the 
President’s preparedness campaign. Preparedness was designed for a war, or according to 
Colonel Edward House, the prevention of a war, with Germany, after all. It should have 
been clear that if the United States was able to muster a force of twenty thousand to send 
to the Mexican American border, then the country was not as unprepared for a military 
conflict as many officials suggested.51 
Despite the fact that machine guns failed during the border crisis, reserve troops 
were unavailable to be sent where they were most needed, and the cavalry was under-
prepared for the incidents on the border with Mexico, the army and navy proved that they 
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could defend U.S. territory. Indeed, the North Carolina soldiers that were mustered to do 
their bit in Mexico were there, and even paid extra for their service. Eight Tar Heel 
soldiers died during the Mexican crisis. The United States proved its potential for 
preparedness. Not everyone in Congress was convinced, of course, and many surmised 
the opposite conclusion: that the Mexican incident revealed the work that America still 
had to do to prepare the army. There were two ways to view the crisis. Setbacks and 
failures for some represented opportunities for improvement to others.52  
By April of 1917, the merits of being pro or anti-preparedness had become moot. 
The renewed campaign of German submarine warfare began on February 1, 1917. 
Germany endeavored to keep the United States neutral, but in combination with the 
Zimmermann telegram scandal, it proved too much for the Wilson Administration and 
Congress to bear. The president called a joint session of Congress into an “extraordinary 
session” because there were “serious choices of policy to be made.” Wilson lamented that 
German submarines were sinking every ship, neutral or not, in British waters. He said 
that Germany was conducting “a war against all nations” with “no discrimination.” He 
believed neutrality had failed to keep the United States safe and maintained America’s 
moral superiority. Wilson claimed, “We act without animus. . . in armed opposition to an 
irresponsible government which has thrown aside all considerations of humanity and of 
right and is running amuck.”53  
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With that speech, the Congress acted. Senator Thomas Martin of Virginia 
introduced the war resolution to the Senate and Representative Henry Flood, also of 
Virginia, to the House. Over the next three days, both houses of congress debated the 
vote for war. There was clear support in both houses towards voting “yea” on the 
resolution. Of those who agreed that war was necessary, there was disagreement on the 
war aims. Many southern congressmen did not agree with Wilson’s stated purpose of 
“fighting for all mankind,” and reasoned instead that it was a fight for American rights 
and honor. In the Senate, the two most vocal senators who opposed the resolution during 
the debate were Democrats William Stone of Missouri and James Vardaman of 
Mississippi. Both referred to the conflict as a “European war.” However, with little 
substantial debate, the Senate voted 82-6 on April 4, 1917, in support of the measure to 
declare war on Germany.54 
The final step to complete the resolution came in the House. Democratic 
Representative Jeff McLemore of Texas spoke first in opposition. Many more speeches 
came but most were in favor of the declaration. Majority Leader Kitchin followed a 
speech from William Goodwin, a Democrat from Arkansas, in favor of the war 
resolution. Several of Kitchin’s colleagues urged him to remain silent or simply cast his 
vote as “nay” and not make a fuss about it, since it was clear that the resolution was 
going to pass regardless. Some Wilson Administration cabinet members pleaded with 
him to stand by the Democratic Party. Even Wilson himself supposedly sent a telephone 
message to remind him of his duty. But the strong-willed Kitchin could not bite his 
 
54 Congressional Record, 65th Congress, 1st Session, 1917, 104, 129, 205-251 
157 
 
tongue during such an important time. He believed that he must read his carefully 
prepared speech. A lifetime of oral preparation led him to this moment, the most 
important speech he had yet delivered.55 
“Mr. Chairman,” Kitchin said as he walked to the podium at the front of the 
House floor at about midnight on a rainy, dreary night to applause from his colleagues. 
He was recognized for his allotted ten minutes. “In view of the many assumptions of 
loyalty and patriotism on the part of some of those who favor the resolution . . . let me at 
once remind the House that it takes neither moral nor physical courage to declare war for 
others to fight,” and he was met with more applause. Kitchin made it clear that he knew 
his position was on the losing side of the argument and would continue alone if 
necessary: “I have come to the undoubting conclusion that I should vote against this 
resolution,” he told the chamber and more applause ensued. “Half of the civilized world 
is now a slaughterhouse for human beings. This Nation is the last hope of peace on 
earth.” For nine more minutes, Kitchin made his final, passionate plea to his colleagues to 
vote against the war resolution. He knew that he could not win the debate but refused to 
keep silent on it. He explained how both Germany and Great Britain were doing harm to 
the United States and could see no reason to take the side of one over the other. He 
described the much greater threat that Mexico posed to America and how inconceivable it 
was that, somehow, the United States was able to find a peaceful resolution with her 
southern neighbor but could not find the same peace with Germany. “Why can we not, 
why should we not, forego for the time being the violation of our rights by Germany and 
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do as we did with Great Britain, do as we did with Mexico?” A speech in favor of the war 
resolution followed Kitchin’s. The Majority Leader argued for what he believed was right 
and failed. The House voted only hours later, 373-50 in support of war. History will call 
them “the immortal fifty,” wrote one Baptist minister.56 
The day after the dramatic speech, Kitchin was called back to North Carolina 
because his eldest brother, Samuel Boaz Kitchin, suddenly died after a year of poor, but 
not generally life-threatening, health. One of Kitchin’s secretaries, Charles H. England, 
spent several days dealing with the arrival of hundreds of letters and telegrams from 
across North Carolina and around the country responding to the Majority Leader’s 
speech. Many of these enthusiastically expressed admiration for Kitchin’s courage and 
stand against the war. To satisfy public demand, Kitchin’s office had twenty-five 
thousand copies of his speech printed.57 
 “I read your speech with much satisfaction [and] knew you would have courage 
to do what you thought was right,” wrote one Tar Heel man in support of Kitchin. “Please 
accept my heartiest congratulations for the best speech ever delivered in the halls of 
Congress, every word you spoke are my sentiments and I believe [those of] a very large 
majority of the American people,” wrote another. Many more examples of these 
messages of congratulation flowed into Kitchin’s office over the next several days. Many 
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of those letters and messages of support may be attributed to Kitchin’s courage to stand 
by his convictions, rather than personal support of his stance. There were, of course, a 
handful of letters from citizens who detested Kitchin’s speech, with some even calling on 
Kitchin to resign. There was, however, roughly a ten-to-one split in favor of the 
Congressman’s position, which may indicate that supporters were more active in their 
correspondence than opponents. In any case, the number of supporters suggest that public 
opinion about the war through the whole preparedness period remained divided.58 
The speech was also remarkable and memorable to Kitchin’s colleagues. Jeanette 
Rankin, the first woman to serve in the House of Representatives, remembered it vividly 
almost fifty years later in an interview. Others called it a heroic act. As with the public, 
the speech was not universally applauded in Congress. Several representatives called on 
Kitchin to resign as majority leader since he would not stand with the president, but when 
one called on him to resign from the House, he was greeted with hisses. Despite their 
preference on the vote, nearly everyone agreed that the speech made an impact. Alabama 
Representative Thomas Heflin suspected that Kitchin may have increased the total “nays” 
from a dozen or fifteen to fifty. One reporter believed that even representatives who gave 
prowar speeches or interviews in their home districts had their minds changed.59 
It was no surprise that northern big city newspapers, such as New York City and 
Philadelphia, supported Heflin’s call for Kitchin to resign. Although he rarely let the 
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northern newspapermen get under his skin, at home, papers in North Carolina began to 
turn on him too. A writer in the Wilmington Dispatch called Kitchin’s vote, “the 
humiliation of North Carolina.” And a writer with the Charlotte Observer wondered if 
Kitchin’s conscience should disqualify him from his leadership role.60 
Nevertheless, once war was declared, and as he promised in his dramatic speech, 
Kitchin could not continue to oppose the will of the American people, so he ended up 
supporting the American war effort financially from his position as Ways and Means 
Chairman. He later disagreed with Wilson’s selective service conscription program, as 
did many in Congress. Rather, he supported a more “honorable” volunteer army. This 
sentiment of preferring a volunteer instead of a drafted army was prevalent throughout 
most of the South. However, despite the preparedness measures taken by the federal 
government through 1915 and 1916, the nation was still not adequately prepared for the 
coming war.
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NORTH CAROLINA FUNDS THE WAR, 1917-1918 
 
 
Two irreconcilable principles are contending for the mastery in the world today. 
We had believed until the Emperor of Germany plunged the world into war, that 
never again could the policy of Alexander and Napoleon jeopardize civilization. 
But the challenge has been made and the house of Hohenzollern by force seeks to 
impose its will upon every nation its military machine can overcome and chart the 
ocean highways for the great American Republic. If the policy of absolutism and 
force could succeed, free government would perish from the earth. 
--Josephus Daniels, “Our Country Accepts the Challenge” 
 
 
Claude Kitchin realized the predicament he was in while he delivered his 
passionate speech to the House on the dramatic night before the war vote. He stood 
starkly opposed Wilson’s war-preparedness campaign from the very beginning and long 
believed that if the United States was preparing for a war, that a war would find it. He 
consistently saw Wilson inching closer toward the Allies and Great Britain and further 
from neutrality. And the majority of the country and government wanted the war. His 
vote against the war resolution could have signaled his own political suicide, or “death 
knell” as he put it. However, the resolution passed, and the United States would soon be 
sending soldiers “over there.” Kitchin recognized the reality of the situation and agreed 
that the will of the majority should be followed. He helped to pass bills that would fund 
the American war effort and always took efforts to keep the greatest burden of the cost 
off of those who could least afford it. And while Kitchin worked to protect the average 
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American, the state of North Carolina stood to benefit from increased demands 
for goods and food needed for the war effort. 
Wars are obviously expensive in both money and material. The United States 
government, in 1917, lacked the money to fund a military expedition to Europe. Revenue 
had to be raised. A new and more reliable base of income would be required to pay for 
the military buildup necessary to fight in the war. The American people would be called 
on to provide these new revenues through several campaigns of Liberty Loan Drives, as 
well as through increased income taxes. A revenue bill battle began during the 
preparedness campaign as far back as early 1916. Most Democrats agreed that the whole 
burden of funding a war should not fall on ordinary Americans; rather, congressmen like 
Kitchin sought to increase taxes on big businesses, especially those in the North that he 
claimed stood to profit the most from war. Letters from anti-preparedness Democrats 
flooded Kitchin’s office in January and February 1917. They demanded a large increase 
of income taxes, inheritance taxes, and especially taxes on munitions manufacturers. For 
the most part, Kitchin’s role was as the financier of the American war effort. And the 
work was hard. The state of North Carolina stood to profit from the war as a heavily 
agricultural state, but there were also opportunities in manufacturing that could bring jobs 
and money into the state.1 
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Kitchin took center stage as a national financier for the first time in 1909 when 
the debate over the Payne-Aldrich Tariff gripped national politics. As a progressive 
reformer, he claimed that Republicans wanted the tariff only to protect the special 
interests of wealthy, mostly northern, elites. He concluded that high protective tariffs 
only served to create monopolies and trusts that would rob independent small farmers. 
These arguments were echoed by most southerners concerning tariffs at the time. Kitchin, 
and many of his southern colleagues maintained that only openly competitive markets 
and overseas trade would lead to prosperity for American farmers. It was ultimately 
Kitchin’s strong-willed stance on the Payne-Aldrich Tariff that led him to his leadership 
position.2 
Since the founding of the American republic, tariffs remained one of the biggest 
revenue sources for the United States government. Kitchin and his agrarian allies 
maintained that the tariff should exist mainly for that purpose. The modern world and 
coming war challenged the notion that tariffs, along with excise taxes, could produce 
enough money for the federal government. The first attempts at a national income tax 
took place in the nineteenth century as war-time measures, but as public opinion soured, 
these income taxes were repealed long before the first decade of the twentieth century. 
However, support for a federal income tax grew among progressives and agrarians at that 
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time, culminating in 1913 with the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution.3 
Despite the adoption of this constitutional amendment only a few years earlier, 
federal income taxes remained a modest source of income for the government. More 
revenue was necessary to fund increases to America’s armed forces. Kitchin introduced 
An Act to Increase the Revenue, and Other Purposes in 1916 to tackle the issue. A 
congressional report on the new revenue bill estimated an amount of money the United 
States would need to raise to fund the war effort. After accounting for all existing sources 
of federal revenue, the report projected that America would need to raise an additional 
$266,922,000 beyond its projected annual income, using 1916 as a guiding year. 
Although the reality was that no one knew just how much money would be needed in 
total. Various estimates ranged between three and fifteen billion dollars annually as the 
minimum amount of funds necessary. In any case, the total amount of necessary money 
would be an almost unprecedented sum for the United States. Kitchin’s proposed revenue 
bill included four means of increased taxation to fund the war: individual and corporate 
income taxes, estate and inheritance taxes, a tax on manufacturers of munitions and war 
supplies, and miscellaneous taxes.4   
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A graduated income tax on individuals and corporations promised to bring in the 
most revenue. As with any new tax, these revenues were not universally appreciated by 
the public. And corporate taxes posed a problem for policymakers who did not want to 
stifle production. The proposed estate taxes were also graduated and expected to bring in 
about seventeen billion dollars in 1917. The tax on munitions manufacturers included 
sales on any product considered an implement for war such as guns, cartridges, 
gunpowder, and explosives. That total would bring in over seventy-one billion dollars. 
The miscellaneous category placed a tax on services, special and luxury industries such 
as pawnbrokers, bowling alleys, tobacco, circuses, and similar establishments.5  
The new taxes alone would not fulfill the government’s total need for money. 
Other sources would be needed as well. Treasury Secretary William McAdoo initially 
wanted about 50 percent of the necessary war revenue to come from taxes, but after 
discussions with Kitchin and others, McAdoo insisted that overtaxing would stifle any 
expansion of industry. Instead, he asked the Ways and Means Committee to bring in one-
third of the total needed funds from taxes. The other two-thirds would need to come from 
other sources. The answer was the sale of “Liberty Bonds.” Liberty Loan drives were the 
biggest source of income designed to finance the war. Beginning in 1917, the federal 
government sought to raise funds from private American citizens to finance America’s 
involvement in the Great War. Kitchin tried to put the burden of payment on those who 
stood to benefit most from it, such as the munitions manufacturers, but Secretary 
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McAdoo convinced Wilson otherwise. The borrowing effort was called the “Liberty 
Loan” and made possible through the sale of Liberty Bonds. Most of the bonds were 
priced too high for average workers to be able to afford them, but the government soon 
issued “War Thrift Stamps” at much lower rates to include even poorer Americans in the 
sales.6 
There were incentives to buy bonds. The government paid interest on them bi-
annually (see figure 3). In total, the federal government instituted five loan drives 
between 1917 and 1919. In North Carolina, millions of dollars were raised for the war 
effort. The largest amount for the state through the whole war came in October 1917, 
with over five million dollars raised. The large sale of bonds throughout the country can, 
in part, be attributed to the Committee on Public Information, which ran a propaganda 
campaign to help sell the bonds, but also conducted efforts to “sell the war” to the public. 
Thousands of advertisements were plastered on billboards and streetcars nationwide to 
sell the American people on the war. In all, the federal government raised more than 
seventeen billion dollars through the bonds and stamps, which met its initial goal that 
two-thirds of the total amount raised to finance the war come from these bonds and the 
rest from taxes.7 
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Figure 3. Lend Your Money to Your Government. Posters, Military Collection, 
State Archives of North Carolina. 
 
 
Americans needed motivation to purchase bonds and to support the war in 
general. With that in mind, President Wilson established, via executive order, the 
Committee on Public Information (CPI). Formed on April 13, 1917, only about a week 
after the war resolution passed, the CPI was to control the news that Americans would 
receive concerning American and Allied efforts in the war. “Propaganda” is usually a 
dirty word in the American vernacular, and George Creel, the chairman of the committee, 
resisted use of the term to describe the committee’s work. He stressed instead that his 
panel would use “propaganda not as the Germans defined it,” but rather in the true sense 
of the word, as a “propagation of faith.” Creel wanted the agency to reach every nook and 
cranny of the country to carry out Wilson’s “verdict of mankind.” The CPI had to turn a 
traditionally isolationist and ambivalent country into a nation of ideologically motivated 
citizens.8  
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Creel set up channels for the committee to distribute patriotic information to every 
American. The committee was committed to reaching Americans as they staged events 
for different ethnic groups, in their own languages, throughout the country. The 
committee simultaneously worked with other government agencies and the post office to 
censor what it considered seditious counterpropaganda. The committee’s poster creations 
are probably the best remembered and were the most effective tools in Creel’s arsenal. 
The committee was ultimately successful in its goals to “sell the war” to the American 
public. Through its propaganda efforts, the Committee on Public Information helped to 
convince millions of Americans to do their bit to support the war effort.9 
Another federal organization, the Council of National Defense, originated from 
Wilson’s preparedness campaign. The passage of the National Defense Act of 1916 
established the committee with the purpose of investigating national needs and advising 
the president, along with certain department secretaries, on any strategic need concerning 
the war. Another role of the council was to create a unified, centralized, national 
organization to coordinate support for American involvement in the war effort. The 
council consisted of the secretaries from the departments of war, the navy, the interior, 
agriculture, commerce, and labor. The federal government held a conference on May 2, 
1917, to organize state councils of defense around the country, including in North 
Carolina. Although many states had already established their councils before America 
declared war, they only began to organize after the official declaration. According to 
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historian William Breen, southern state councils were particularly efficient. For example, 
in North Carolina, special committees helped drafted men put their business affairs in 
order before they were expected to leave for training camp. This service extended to both 
volunteers and drafted men. The Committee on Soldiers’ Business Aid performed this 
task in North Carolina. Government officials in Washington D.C. were so impressed with 
North Carolina’s handling of this matter that the Council of National Defense decided to 
publicize the state’s work on a nationwide basis.10 
The North Carolina Council of Defense met and organized on May 31, 1917. 
Daniel H. Hill Jr., the son of a relatively famous North Carolina Civil War general, 
emerged as the natural choice to lead the council. State councils were to cooperate with 
the federal government as well as with each other to organize and direct any resources of 
men and materials to defend the country. Like many state councils, North Carolina’s had 
many sub committees. Among them were finance, public information, legal issues, 
coordination work, sanitation, conservation, industrial survey, historical preservation, 
labor, military, home defense, transportation, research, woman’s work, and soldiers’ 
business aid. These mirrored their federal counterparts in many instances.11 
Many of these division’s purposes were self-evident. The finance division 
facilitated donations from “generous citizens,” because during the entire duration of 
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military involvement in the war, the North Carolina General Assembly was not in 
session, which also meant that council members were not paid for their efforts. The 
committee on public information was the propaganda wing. The coordination work 
division facilitated inter-council cooperation. Sanitation organized healthy living and 
medical practices generally to make sure potential soldiers, or young men, were able-
bodied. The conservation, labor, and industrial survey wings helped establish the best 
practices for both industry and farmers. Historical preservation recorded the names of all 
North Carolinians in service who were involved in the preparedness effort. Home defense 
was tasked with creating the last line of defense in the state, as most militia units were 
likely to be needed elsewhere when the war came.12 
As with many governmental functions, the bulk of the work done by the North 
Carolina state council happened on the local level. Each county in North Carolina had an 
appointed chairman who would organize county committees based on the statewide 
model. These local actions were most evident with the local Soldiers’ Business Aid 
Committees, which helped draftees and volunteers deal with legal matters, such as the 
writing of a will, and helped soldiers fill out absentee ballot voting cards so that they 
could maintain participation in politics. The county boards did most of the work to 
organize fund-raising drives and assist with draft boards. These county-based committees 
did their best to help North Carolinians on the home front.13 
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While the federal government sought the best methods to finance America’s 
involvement in the World War, North Carolinians were well-suited to benefit 
economically. Local businesses, farmers, industries in the state, and workers could see 
the possibilities in front of them. Before the United States became involved, the European 
war brought economic benefits to many Americans. Indeed, there was actually some 
initial excitement in North Carolina for a potential economic boon. The United States was 
in a position to profit not just from agricultural exports to Europe, but also, every “idle 
dollar” in the United States could go to work in the production of all types of materials 
that the Old-World belligerents would need. One North Carolina man expressed his 
hopes in an editorial written in 1914, in which he explained how easily North Carolina 
could benefit from tipping the trade balance in the favor of the United States.14 
Alas, these early hopes proved forlorn, as trade with Europe fell immediately after 
the war began. The initial result was a severe decline in southern cotton exports, 
especially to one of the leading buyers, Great Britain. Southern members of Congress 
were seriously concerned about the economic impact of the war on important cash crops 
such as tobacco and cotton. Democratic Senator Furnifold Simmons of North Carolina 
was quite pessimistic about the situation in the early years of the war. He foresaw a 
surplus that would glut the domestic market and drive down prices far enough to cause an 
economic disaster for southern growers. Those poor forecasts from southern 
congressional leaders only became grimmer as the war dragged on. Due to the state’s 
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economic links, the southern cash crop problem was really a national problem. In late 
1914, The Washington Post lamented that if foreign buyers could not buy American cash 
crops, the entire economy might collapse.15 
The first months of the war produced fear and confusion. Great Britain halted 
exports to Germany, which had bought Americans goods and southern cotton for 
decades. However, the British were more concerned with maintaining good relations with 
the United States than they were with preventing the Germans from obtaining cotton. 
Given this fact, at least for the first year of the war, American cotton was excluded from 
the blockade. When the British finally did enact the full blockade, Wilson saw it as a 
violation of American neutrality but could do little to fight it. In his defense of American 
neutrality, Kitchin would also point to the fact that Britain’s blockade hurt America’s 
economy as much as Germany ever did. 16 
Indeed, tobacco and cotton growers in North Carolina pleaded for government aid 
in late 1914, and while President Wilson was “deeply impressed by the plight of cotton 
growers,” very little was done for them. Elected representatives claimed to be on the side 
of the farmers, but there were no giant legislation or aid packages passed for them. 
Kitchin, along with many southern representatives, spent a lot of their political energy 
fighting tariffs for the benefit of farmers. The initial trade decline did not last very long 
though, and Louisiana’s Senator John Thornton noted only a year later that after an 
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unavoidable deficit in 1914, there was a splendid new outlook for business and people in 
the South.17 
After the shaky financial outlook in the early months of the European war, the 
United States and North Carolina stood to prosper from the conflict, especially in the 
agricultural sector. North Carolina, like many American states in the early twentieth 
century, was largely agricultural. In 1910 for example, 71.9 percent of the state was 
deemed farmland, with an average statewide value of $15.29 per acre. There was an 
increase of about twenty-nine thousand farms in North Carolina between 1900 and 1910, 
and that number increased even more by the time the war ended in 1920. The total value 
of farm property, including land, buildings, machines, and livestock was in excess of 
$530 million, an increase of 130 percent since 1900. Land value alone increased by about 
141 percent. It became evident that North Carolina farmers were well suited to contribute 
much produce to hungry Europeans, as well as provide the cigarettes that soldiers would 
rely on in the trenches.18  
As a predominantly agriculture state, produce was the biggest potential money 
maker for North Carolina. The Tar Heel state was actually on the verge of an agricultural 
revolution in the early decades of the twentieth century. A North Carolina newspaper 
editor and author, Bion H. Butler, declared that in the twentieth century cotton was still 
king in the South, as it had been for over 120 years since the invention of Eli Whitney’s 
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cotton gin. However, he continued, 1914 was no longer the time of kings. Butler 
suggested that corn and other grain crops might be the wave of the future for the southern 
states, although cotton was still the most lucrative cash crop in North Carolina, despite its 
falling price. Butler claimed that North Carolina was uniquely equipped to grow corn, as 
opposed to the “traditional” corn-growing states from the Mid-west, such as Ohio and 
Kansas. He reasoned that North Carolina had better and more frequent rainfalls that 
yielded more crop per harvest than midwestern states could produce. Butler also 
envisioned that with over ten million European men at war by October 1914, the world 
would look to the United States, and North Carolina, to feed it.19  
Butler was right about North Carolina’s potential as a “corn basket” for the world. 
The state’s corn and grain production increased by about 112 percent in the decade 
preceding the Great War, with a total value of thirty-one million dollars in 1909. Then, by 
1919, the last year of the war, North Carolina produced almost eighty million dollars’ 
worth of corn. Obviously, price increases accounted for some of the growth in value, 
given that there were very few farmers left to farm in most of Europe. The Old North 
State did not completely supersede those “traditional” corn-growing states of the 
American Midwest, but the increased demand and prices definitely benefitted Tar Heel 
farmers.20  
Aside from staple food crops, tobacco and cotton were among the most important 
cash crops in North Carolina. Tobacco production totaled roughly $14 million in 1910 
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but had exploded to a value of over $151 million by the close of the decade. Before the 
World War, tobacco agricultural techniques in North Carolina were archaic, which may 
help explain why the farmers were so concerned in the early months of the war. For most 
planters, farming tobacco was a path to poverty due to antiquated farming techniques and 
technologies. Despite initial fears, the war induced a small innovation boom that was 
needed to make tobacco production a more lucrative venture for southern farmers, 
although the true boom would not erupt until after the Second World War. Cotton 
production and manufacturing proved to be another great source of success in North 
Carolina during the war years. Tar Heel cotton mills produced a diverse assortment of 
finished goods for export including towels, socks, and denim, all of which were 
desperately needed in Europe. After textile manufacturers took a cautious initial 
approach, cotton prices improved enough that the industry began thriving. When Senator 
Thornton of Louisiana saw a “splendid outlook” for business, he may as well have 
specifically mentioned tobacco and cotton among the many American ventures that 
produced wealth for North Carolina.21 
In fact, it was the Great War that turned cigarette smoking from a dirty habit for 
seedy men and an activity reserved for the underclasses into a manly activity and a sign 
of masculine vigor. People smoked cigarettes before the war, but the war turned 
Americans into cigarette smokers according to historian Evan Bennett. It also made 
North Carolina’s tobacco production more vital than ever. With the changing nature of 
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the cigarette and increased demand, there was a true boom in the cigarette market, with 
many farmers switching their dominant crop from cotton to tobacco.22 
One of the earliest indicators in North Carolina of the coming World War was an 
idea that America might be able to create its own “army” of pint-sized farmers. The 
United States Bureau of Education had a peacetime goal in mind when it initially 
suggested training the country’s ten million school children to build and maintain their 
own small home gardens, but that idea quickly shifted to a wartime notion in 1914. The 
gardens tended by elementary schoolers would be “invaluable in supplying food to cities” 
in the event that millions of American farm boys would be called off to fight in Europe. 
Tar Heels foresaw the strife and hunger in Europe, and in some cases, odd suggestions, 
such as employing the nation’s children as substitute bread-makers, were created to 
alleviate any fears about this kind of creative solution. The suggestion of school-aged 
farming children was seen in the newspapers only about one month after the new 
governor Thomas Bickett issued a proclamation urging residents of North Carolina to 
plant war gardens in anticipation of the war’s effect on the state. This call was not that 
unusual since Governor Bickett was known as the agricultural governor of North 
Carolina. So, when he issued a proclamation in March 1917 that encouraged farmers to 
plant war gardens, even on a small scale at home, and coupled with the establishment of 
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the North Carolina Food Conservation Commission on April 17 1917, these suggestions 
fell in line with his overall goals.23   
Bickett’s tenure as governor coincided with America’s involvement in the war. 
Therefore, his advocacy of agricultural reforms stemmed from wartime need, even 
though the war hindered many of his other domestic reform programs. Bickett proved an 
able leader. He had previously served as the state’s attorney general for the prior two 
governors, including under William Walton Kitchin. Like many of the other prominent 
North Carolinians in politics, he spent his early career as a lawyer. He attended Wake 
Forest College, like the Kitchins, and later studied law at the University of North 
Carolina. As governor, his interest in agriculture grew out of his concern for rural North 
Carolinians and the low standard of life outside of the cities around the state. His 
administration enacted measures to promote agricultural instruction in those rural areas. 
Involvement in war tends to have a peculiar influence on domestic activity. In this case, 
the need for food to supply armies fighting in Europe provided the impetus needed to 
guide the governor’s wishes, although the results were short-lived.24 
Nearly three quarters of North Carolinians still lived in rural areas in 1914, and 
agriculture remained the state’s most prominent industry. However, the food situation 
was serious when the United States finally declared war. Governor Bickett’s plan to help 
 
23 “Move for Home Gardens,” Polk County News, May 7, 1915; Sellie Robert Winters, “Food Conservation 
in North Carolina,” Documenting the American South, http://docsouth.unc.edu/wwi/winters/menu.html; 
William J. Breen, Uncle Sam at Home: Civilian Mobilization, Wartime Federalism, and the Council of 
National Defense, 1917-1919 (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1984), 6. 
24 “Thomas Bickett,” Dictionary of North Carolina Biography: Volume 1 A-C, ed. Nathaniel F. Magruder 
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1979), 149-151; Papers of Bickett, v; Sandra Sue 
Horton, “The Political Career of Thomas Walter Bickett” (master’s thesis, University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill, 1965). 
178 
 
the state’s rural farmers coincided with a dire situation. There were food shortages in 
Europe, obviously due to millions of farmers putting on uniforms rather than tilling their 
fields. In North Carolina, bad weather caused a small but not insignificant food shortage 
during the first few years of the war. The worldwide demand for food was at an all-time 
high because of the war, but farming was not as personally lucrative as the potential of 
manufacturing work in the cities. Many young men from rural areas fled their family 
farms for higher-paying work in the cities. In light of these circumstances, the federal 
government, in conjunction with the states, made plans to turn farming into a patriotic 
duty. And to meet these plans, an annual gathering of North Carolina’s best and brightest 
agricultural minds shifted its focus.25 
In the 1910s North Carolina State College hosted the state’s Farmers’ and Farm 
Women’s Convention, gatherings that played some role in wartime food production. 
Before 1917, these conventions had promoted better farming practices and techniques. 
However, when it became clear that the United States would probably be drawn into the 
war, their purpose shifted from promoting cash crops toward encouraging the food 
production so vital to American and Allied soldiers. The convention also provided 
programs that focused on the best practices for food conservation. For example, some of 
the programs arranged demonstrations on extending the shelf life of milk by turning it 
into cottage cheese, which was considered a meat substitute. This goal fell in line with 
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the newly established U.S. Food Administration’s objective of conserving food, meat 
especially, for American soldiers (see Figure 4).26 
 
27 
Figure 4. Be Patriotic. 
 
 
The principal mechanism for food conservation was the United States Food 
Administration which Wilson established, via executive order, shortly after Congress 
declared war on Germany. It was a largely decentralized organization run by Herbert 
Hoover, who was already relatively famous around the country due to his efforts to help 
provide relief and aid in Belgium after 1914 as the Director of the Commission for the 
Relief of Belgium (CRB). North Carolina did its bit to help with Belgian relief efforts. 
Governor Locke Craig issued a proclamation imploring the state to donate extra clothing 
to the “destitute inhabitants in Belgium.” The Food Administration’s goals were to 
stimulate food production and conservation, control food prices, and even create 
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surpluses for America’s allies. The Administration was short lived, and it did not survive 
long after the war ended, but it was useful in securing its war aims.28 
North Carolina responded to the federal Food Administration by establishing the 
North Carolina Food Conservation Commission, headed by Henry Page as state food 
administrator and John Lucas as executive secretary. This commission emphasized a 
voluntary campaign around the state that encouraged Tar Heels to “feed yourself.” Even 
before the declaration of war, Governor Bickett called on North Carolinians to double the 
production of their home gardens in order to conserve food when the time came. The 
governor asked every woman in the state to sign a “food pledge card” to observe certain 
rules and regulations concerning food conservation. The campaign succeeded, and apart 
from typical food-producing farms, around fifty-six thousand gardeners cultivated their 
own plots around the state. Each county in the state had its own food administrator 
appointed to coordinate the effort. The notion of an American army of “pint-sized 
farmers” never truly took effect, but school children across North Carolina pulled their 
weight by organizing corn, pork, and poultry clubs.29 
North Carolina’s children were also called on to participate in conservation and 
other patriotic efforts. In December 1917, public schools across the state devoted the 
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annual North Carolina Day to teaching students about thrift, conservation, and patriotism. 
The state superintendent, James Y. Joyner, noted that it was the patriotic duty of every 
teacher in the state to make the day “a splendid patriotic rally for increasing the loyalty, 
zeal, and enthusiasm” of all students. He directed school rooms to be decorated in 
national colors, with many American flags, and “if possible,” the flags of Allied nations. 
If those flags and colored decorations could not be easily and cheaply obtained, young 
girls were encouraged to do their bit and make them by hand. And, of course, parents 
were encouraged to participate as much as possible in the day’s festivities.30 
The program issued in anticipation of the celebration included a copy of the Star-
Spangled Banner, numerous sing-along lyrics about American allies, and a detailed 
description of “the meaning of the flag” written by President Wilson to stir up patriotic 
feelings. It also offered suggestions for thrift and conservation. The school-aged audience 
was informed of the vital role that the United States would play, and was already playing, 
as the breadbasket, or corn basket, of her allies. They were also reminded that with 
twenty million able-bodied European men at arms, their respective countries were 
expected to go without, or with much less. There was an obligatory reminder that as 
troublesome as is might be to do with less in the United States, the situation would not be 
nearly as bad as that of the Allied nations in Europe. “Food will win the war,” the 
program reminded readers, “produce it” and “save it!” The only mandatory rationing that 
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ever took place in North Carolina, however, was with sugar, and this action did not 
happen until the final months of the war.31 
Holidays represented another opportunity to prepare North Carolinians for the 
approaching involvement in the European war. Independence Day was a natural fit to 
promote patriotism, nationalism, and many of the programs important to readying North 
Carolinians for war. Local government meetings were encouraged to develop ideas to 
make Tar Heels feel the national spirit of patriotism for the Independence Day holiday in 
1917. The state defense council urged those in charge of planning festivities to emphasize 
the “greatness” of the war. In Greensboro, and elsewhere around the state, battle 
reenactments were performed that featured patriotic celebrations in connection with the 
holiday. These celebrations also encouraged food and fuel conservation practices, which 
would be necessary for the war effort.32 
Food conservation was generally easy in North Carolina. No one was asked to 
give up too much, or for too long, compared to those in Europe and even the northeastern 
United States. Fuel conservation followed the same track, partly due to the state’s 
climate. Obviously, less fuel is necessary in a place where winter snows are generally 
mild. “Cut wood, cut wood, and cut more wood. This is my appeal to the people of North 
Carolina,” wrote Governor Bickett in a proclamation to the state to encourage Tar Heels 
to conserve oil and coal for the war effort. Alexander McAlister headed the state Fuel 
Administration, and he was later succeeded by R. M. Norfleet. The winter of 1917-18 
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was particularly cold in the northern part of the country, and in combination with a few 
other factors, weather led to the closure of non-war industries, including many factories 
in North Carolina. Ordinary citizens were encouraged to burn wood instead of coal to do 
their bit for conservation. The state fuel administration also issued a short pamphlet to 
explain the best practices for conserving coal and gas.33 
One unintended, but probably expected, consequence of American entry into the 
Great War was a farm labor shortage. Young North Carolinians were being drafted into 
the army, which caused some of the problem. However, if not drafted, many left rural 
farming areas anyway for higher-paying industrial jobs in large cities. The labor shortage 
did not quell higher production needs, however. The answer for more food with fewer 
farmworkers was technology. Tractors were not yet a fixture of North Carolina farms 
before the Great War, and it took education to make them such. The benefits of moving 
from literal horsepower to mechanical power were numerous. Fewer farmworkers were 
needed to move a tractor than a horse, which helped the labor issue. No fodder was 
needed to feed a tractor, and the savings could be turned into human food. The ratio of 
food saved versus fuel consumed by machinery created a small problem, but the benefits 
of a tractor were clear.34 
To overcome labor shortages during the war some business owners began hiring 
people who were traditionally excluded from textile mills and other operations, such as 
African Americans. Some historians have called this development a missed opportunity, 
 
33 “On Conserving Fuel,” Papers of Bickett, 91; Fuel Conservation. Twelve Questions and Answers, issued 
from the Office of the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, North Carolina Collection, 1-7, 
https://docsouth.unc.edu/wwi/fuel/menu.html. 
34 Kosmerick, “World War I and Agriculture.” 
184 
 
as these changes did not last longer than the war itself did. William Link, for example, 
concluded that white supremacist ideology prevented any long-lasting changes from 
taking place. But it did seem that the state took a small step forward in the long civil 
rights movement during the Great War. While race relations failed to move in a positive 
direction, the state’s manufacturing capabilities improved, partially due to the integration 
of minority workers in the factories.35 
Even before the United States entered the Great War, manufacturing related to 
wartime activities was on the rise across North Carolina. In addition to some of the larger 
shipbuilders in the United States, North Carolinians pulled their weight in new shipyards 
established in Wilmington, Beaufort, and Morehead City. Shipyards were another 
destination for the exodus of young farm boys seeking a place to earn higher wages. 
Although North Carolina’s shipbuilding industry is more often associated with the 
Second World War, there was a surge in this sector of manufacturing associated with the 
First World War. The Tar Heel state also excelled at producing projectiles and airplane 
propellers.36 
While these wartime industries thrived, individual businesses in North Carolina 
also benefitted. War has an unusual way of helping certain businesses, though which ones 
is never predictable, with some failing and others succeeding. For example, one 
quintessentially North Carolinian soft drink, and business, owes its success to the Great 
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War. The Carolina Beverage Company ran up against high sugar prices due to war 
preparation conservation efforts, even before the United States entered the war, and 
needed to find a more cost-effective product to stay in business. Company owner Lewis 
Peeler and his partners experimented with many different types of sugar substitute 
sweeteners before settling on a wild cherry flavor, and Cheerwine was born. Tar Heels 
were desperate for a sweet-tasting drink without having to pay excess prices for high-
sugared drinks, and the company was very successful.37 
With men needed elsewhere for the war effort, women’s roles in North Carolina 
began to change. The main job of women in the early twentieth century was first and 
foremost as wives and mothers. The United States always had a strong affection for the 
idea of “republican motherhood,” but times of war expanded the woman’s sphere more 
than ever. “For girls must work that men may fight,” read a poster published by the 
Young Women’s Christian Association. As much as ever, class distinguished where 
women exerted their influence on society. Working-class women had long toiled side-by-
side with their husbands on the farms and in factories while middle and upper-class 
women managed homes and familial finances, but the war helped to change these 
patterns, as all Tar Heel women “did their bit.”38 
Millions of women from around the country supported the war effort when they 
were called. Most female volunteers became nurses, sewed bandages, or simply drove 
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food conservation efforts. The United States did not seem prepared to use the full force of 
its womanpower even after entering the war, with the exception of the American navy, 
which was the first to harness their full potential. However, the several thousand women 
who ended up serving in the navy and army had no rank or benefits typically associated 
with military service. The army never accepted female doctors despite the obvious need. 
Nevertheless, hundreds made their own way to France to serve.39 
Most American women did not go to Europe or join the military, but their 
contribution to the war effort was still felt. In addition to any duties they had with work 
or in the home, they put together care packages for soldiers, grew their own food, and 
especially raised funds through Liberty Bond drives. One of the more common ways for 
women to serve the effort was to join a group or club. Both men and women in the 
Progressive period had a fondness for clubs. Before achieving suffrage, the most visible 
way for women to participate in a democratic society was through a group or club. Many 
women volunteered to help through their churches or through local and national women’s 
clubs. Even before the United States entered the World War, women had begun 
participating in the war effort through these kinds of organization, by raising relief money 
for Belgians or refugees around Europe.40  
The Red Cross was the most common organization that women joined, as it was 
one of the largest groups that utilized female labor, and it also crossed international 
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boundaries. Five chapters sprung up across North Carolina, some before and some after 
America officially entered the war. The first chapter in the state opened in Wilmington in 
1908, but its purpose at that point was limited, and women who joined only received 
basic first aid training. When the war broke out in 1914, the organization began to grow, 
and when it became clearer that the United States might actually be drawn in, the Red 
Cross began growing substantially. The State Normal and Industrial College (now known 
as the University of North Carolina Greensboro) boasted the largest chapter membership 
in the state, with 263 members at its zenith. “Have you answered the Red Cross 
Christmas Roll Call?” asked a Red Cross recruiting poster seen around the campus.41 
Women’s groups in nearly every county around the state also supported the war 
effort by creating care packages, organizing events for military camps in the state, and 
attempting to raise morale in general. One of these groups created a poem book that 
expressed their feelings concerning their fathers, sons, husbands, and brothers serving 
overseas, but the book also tried to explain their own roles as contributors to the effort. 
One poem explained that women were sacrificing at home in roles just as important as 
their menfolk would soon be undertaking. That particular poem was met with some 
resistance, but women were clearly demanding recognition.42 
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Women’s colleges in particular served as recruiting centers where North 
Carolina’s girls could join in the war effort. The Red Cross recruited at many women’s 
colleges, but a young woman did not need to join that group to participate. Colleges 
became training grounds for food conservation practices, as well as industrial training 
centers. To ease the labor shortage caused by so many men going off to serve, college-
aged women volunteered to take on “men’s work.” They became “farmerettes” and 
“carpenterettes” after being trained by the Young Christian Women’s Association 
(YWCA) or Women’s Land Army of America (WLAA). For the whole duration of the 
war, women’s colleges in North Carolina served as the vanguard of home front efforts in 
North Carolina.43 
Majority Leader Kitchin recognized the seriousness of the moment after America 
officially entered the war. He agreed that the will of the majority should be followed. He 
helped to pass bills that would fund the American war effort and always took efforts to 
keep the greatest burden of the cost off of those who could least afford it. And although 
Kitchin worked to protect the average American, the state of North Carolina stood to 
benefit from increased demands for goods and food needed for the war effort. The 
question left to answer was how best the United States and North Carolina could muster 
an efficient and effective army and navy to fight in the war.
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NORTH CAROLINA FIGHTS THE WAR, 1917-1918 
 
 
I have done everything in my power to keep our country out of war, but we are in 
it – and it now becomes our duty to give our country and the Government our 
loyal support and efforts in every way, in order to hasten the day of peace. 
--Claude Kitchin to W. R. Johnson, April 17, 1917 
 
 
In the early twentieth century, new ideas about modern war challenged America’s 
longstanding notions of military organization. The federal government created policies 
based on these new ideas to get the country ready for war. Conscription, it would seem, 
became the only efficient way to create a modern army in the industrialized world, and it 
was largely up to the individual American states to implement the federal government’s 
draft policies. Historian John Chambers detailed the federal efforts “to raise an army” and 
explained how it was organized. Of course, there was resistance to the draft from several 
sectors of the country. North Carolina responded to America’s entry to the war similarly 
to the rest of the forty-seven states. The Tar Heel state showed very little support for 
joining the war before the official declaration in April 1917 and only a little more 
immediately after. Governor Thomas Bickett and other state officials supported the 
Wilson Administration and tried to get the state “on board” as best as they could. Claude 
Kitchin acceded and reluctantly supported the war effort. Gradually, North Carolinians 
did what was asked of them and the state went to war. 
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A pamphlet issued to North Carolina’s school children shortly after the United 
States entered the war in 1917 explained, as best as it could, why the war started and why 
America was drawn in. “Many things, some of which it would take a long time to 
explain, helped bring on this war,” noted Robert D. W. Connor, North Carolina’s state 
archivist. He was correct to note that it would take a long time to explain those reasons. 
Connor wrote a question-and-answer template for teachers to help their students 
understand the causes of the war. The questions were accusatory of Germany and full of 
finger-pointing at the German Kaiser, no doubt to elicit patriotic feelings in the young 
American audience. The prepared questions noted that militarism, alliances, “ruthless” 
submarine warfare, and imperialism all contributed to the war. But chiefly, the murder of 
“an Austrian prince, heir to the Austrian throne” gave the “German Emperor his excuse 
for declaring war.”1 
The standard lecture on the origins of the Great War includes nationalism as one 
of the main underlying causes of the war. A relatively new term at the turn of the 
twentieth century, it had been gaining traction in Western nations for only about a 
century, since the time of the Napoleonic Wars in Europe and America. In the early 
thirteenth century, Robert the Bruce pontificated to his father in Braveheart that “men 
fight for me because if they do not, I throw them off my lands and starve their wives and 
children.” As an anecdote, that type of sentiment held true for thousands of years as the 
major reason that men were willing to fight and potentially die: they had to! There have 
 
1 Program for North Carolina Day, December 14, 1917, 10-15, Office of the State Superintendent of 
Public Instruction, North Carolina Collection, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Documenting the 
American South (project) https://docsouth.unc.edu/wwi/ncday1917/menu.html. 
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been professional armies at various times in different places throughout world history 
but, on the whole, peasants usually fought for their lord or sovereign but rarely for their 
country.  
That notion began to change with the foundations of very modern nation-states in 
the West. Nationalism and patriotism burst onto the social scene as an obligation of the 
people. To be good citizens of a Western nation, women had to be willing to sacrifice the 
lives of their husbands and beaus, while those men had to be willing to offer themselves 
willingly to the state. This idea spread throughout the United States and Europe during 
the late nineteenth century. In North Carolina, images that invoked American patriotism, 
such as the Liberty Bell, a bald eagle, and the year 1776, were plastered on the front 
pages of newspapers. But, of course, the United States was a little different in the way 
that Americans expressed their nationalism. There were still many hard feelings against 
the federal government in the South in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
Many southerners remembered, or heard from parents and grandparents, as was the case 
with Kitchin, about the “evil” federal government during the Civil War and 
Reconstruction. Cap’n Buck of the Confederate Army would have been one of the North 
Carolinians to tell his children about the “War of Southern Independence,” rather than the 
Civil War. Claude Kitchin routinely referred to “the War between the States” later in life. 
Thus, nationalism was not a universal truth in the United States, as it may have been in 
Germany after their Wars of Unification or France after the Franco-Prussian War.2  
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For that reason, many historians have argued that it was the Great War that 
installed a new national purpose into Americans. The Great War created modern 
Americans through patriotism and nationalism. Historian Christopher Capozzola argued 
that the “Selective Service Act of 1917 was the centerpiece of wartime citizenship and its 
defining obligation.” In other words, to be a good citizen of the United States in 1917, 
every able-bodied male not engaged in a wartime-essential industry, the clergy, divinity 
students, and members of “established” religious denominations holding “well-
recognized” objections to war, needed to volunteer his lot in order to be a full citizen. 
This departure from centuries of precedent was influenced by the early model of what it 
meant to be a man or be manly around the turn of the twentieth century, ideals 
popularized by Theodore Roosevelt and the heroic idealism of the Rough Riders. 
President Wilson argued that the selective service draft was not really conscription 
because the United States volunteered as a whole after the declaration of war.3 
  Claude Kitchin was no stranger to military service himself. His father, Cap’n 
Buck, served the South during the Civil War, and Kitchin grew up on stories regarding 
that war. In 1898, when the United States was on the verge of entering a war with Spain, 
the younger Kitchin held the position of commander of Company B in the First Regiment 
of the North Carolina State Guard, the successor to the state militia. This organization 
was established on March 12, 1897, and was made up of volunteers supervised by the 
 
National Memory, 1871-1918 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 61-72; 
Congressional Record, 65th Congress, 2nd Session, 1918, 661. 
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state’s Adjutant General. Kitchin corresponded often with his commanding officer, 
Colonel William B. Rodman. Most of Kitchin’s comrades complained and were 
unwilling to be sent to Cuba to fight against the Spanish. North Carolinians, however, 
saw plenty of action during the Spanish American War. The first American casualty was 
in fact a Tar Heel, a man named Worth Bagley. However, Kitchin’s company never did 
go to Cuba, and his time in the State Guard was more administrative than active. Kitchin 
saw no cause for this war other than plain imperialist dreams. As he learned from his 
father’s war stories, so too did Kitchin learn in 1898 that he did not like wars.4 
Back during the Civil War, fewer than 8 percent of all Union Army soldiers were 
drafted. Through the wars against western American Indian tribes and the Spanish 
American War, the American army was made up completely of volunteers. In contrast, 
during the Great War, about 72 percent of the total of three and a half million servicemen 
were drafted. On December 15, 1917, the Selective Service Agency prohibited voluntary 
enlistments by draft-aged men to the army. On August 8, 1918, voluntary enlistment in 
any service was prohibited. The powers in charge deemed volunteers by that point as 
inefficient and disruptive. Some prominent Americans saw the prohibition of voluntary 
enlistments as an inevitable consequence of a modern war. Henry Watterson, editor of a 
prominent Kentucky newspaper, noted, “The volunteer system, like the stagecoach, 
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served its purpose in primitive times, but like that stagecoach, it proved unequal to the 
expanding needs of modern time.” In those “primitive times” before the selective service 
draft was established in 1917, the American preparedness campaigns did not get the 
United States army ready for a large-scale war, let alone the modern war that featured 
tanks, machine guns, and airplanes, which America was about to enter.5 
Prior to the Doughboys showing up in Europe, North Carolinians offered their 
services to Britain and France chiefly through four organizations: the French Foreign 
Legion, the American Ambulance Field Service, the Lafayette Escadrille Flying Corps, 
and the Red Cross. The volunteer lists for all of these, except the Red Cross, remained 
relatively small, but it seemed that Americans had already chosen a side well before 
Wilson asked for the declaration. Between 1914 and April 1917, American citizens had 
to reckon with the government’s policy that it was illegal to serve in a foreign army. And 
the French military, where all American volunteers would ultimately go, had their own 
restrictions on foreigners. Ambulance drivers and medical personnel were technically 
noncombatants, so there was little problem with the American Ambulance Service or the 
Red Cross. Those who wished to fight and joined the French Foreign Legion 
circumvented that restriction because they took their oaths of loyalty to the Legion, not to 
France.6 
 
5 John W. Chambers, To Raise an Army: The Draft Comes to Modern America (New York: The Free Press, 
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Almost as soon as the Austrian government opened its bombardment on Belgrade, 
two Tar Heel brothers volunteered their services to the French Foreign Legion. Paul and 
Kiffin Rockwell were both severely wounded in the course of their service to 
“humanity,” not just to France. After their infantry service was over due to combat 
wounds, they found new fighting life in the Lafayette Escadrille. Named for the French 
general who helped Washington defeat the British, the Escadrille comprised Americans 
who wanted to participate in the war. As part of the squadron, Kiffin Rockwell was 
credited as the first American to shoot down a German plane in the war. Kiffin did not 
survive the war and upon his death in the war, his actions were met with praise and 
admiration. He was called “one of the most fearless aviators of the [Escadrille]” by one 
admirer. The Rockwell brothers represented a very small minority of the state. They 
came from a well-educated and privileged background, which allowed them to go off and 
seek this kind of adventure.7 
The majority of North Carolinians were unable to offer their service in one of 
those four organizations and waited until the United States was actually involved before 
they began to volunteer their service. Obviously, Claude Kitchin fell into this camp. On 
the passage of the war resolution, Kitchin offered his full, albeit reluctant, support to the 
war effort. The Majority Leader earnestly believed that in a democracy one was entitled 
to oppose a course of action until the majority declared its will, at which point one was 
obligated to adhere to that course. In the closing remarks during his last-gasp effort to 
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prevent a declaration he knew he could not stop, Kitchin made clear that he knew his side 
was the losing one and when the decision for war was made, he would join the majority. 
“When this Nation, as it doubtless will to-day, speaks the final word through the 
Congress, I trust I will be found in relation with my Government and my country 
emulating the example of that son,” he closed to applause from the chamber. To this end, 
Kitchin was true to his word and literally worked himself to death.8  
Despite lackluster support from many Tar Heels, North Carolina’s state 
government, much like every state government around the nation, fully supported the 
federal government’s war effort. Governor Bickett cooperated with the federal 
government throughout the war. He called for patriotic displays, called for volunteers to 
the navy and other branches of military service, defended America’s entry to the war, 
promoted Liberty Loan drives, and promoted the draft after conscription was passed. On 
at least one occasion, he travelled to the state’s mountain region to personally persuade 
deserters and draft dodgers to surrender themselves. The only question for federal 
government officials, in consultation with the states, was how best to build the military.9 
The issue of how best to create a national army was one of the great debates that 
emerged during the preparedness period after Secretary of War Lindley Garrison 
proposed the creation of a continental army. “America has no army, only a mob, and if 
war comes tomorrow the American people will be guilty of murder if they send their 
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army to foreign soil” said former president Howard Taft. The ongoing war in Europe, and 
especially the recent events in Great Britain surrounding conscription, convinced 
Garrison and other leading military men in the United States that some kind of 
preparation of the army would be necessary. The British army was made up exclusively 
of volunteers until the middle of 1916 but their government enacted conscription because 
the demands for manpower proved to be too much for volunteers alone. The British 
experience convinced many American officials that some kind of universal training in the 
United States might be necessary.10 
The question of how best to build a fighting force has always been particularly 
troublesome for Americans. The first British colonists relied on militia forces made up of 
volunteers, who one Virginian remarked were “soldiers when they chose to be.” That 
tradition carried much weight with Americans through almost its entire history. With 
only a brief, but dramatic, exception during the Civil War, America’s professional army 
was always made up of volunteers. Between 1863 and 1865, though, the federal and rebel 
government’s attempts to solicit volunteers and draftees proved difficult, especially in 
North Carolina. President Wilson respected the American tradition against a coerced 
military but reluctantly employed the draft at the urging of his advisers. One explanation 
to ease the selective draft onto the people was the very democratic nature of it. It would 
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bring all men together regardless of class, creed, religious denomination, or ethnicity, 
although black troops would still be segregated.11 
Secretary of War Garrison’s continental army plan was intended to create the 
adequate and professional army needed for the coming war. Garrison and other officials 
believed that volunteer armies were not enough for a modern war. Of all the belligerent 
countries involved in the Great War, only Great Britain long maintained a volunteer 
army. Indeed, when the British parliament proposed conscription for the first time, 
several British government officials resigned in protest and the country nearly broke out 
into a collective riot. Every other major European power conscripted millions of men 
from their own countries, as well as from all of their colonial territories. Some 
progressive and liberal Americans saw the draft as a European style system of state 
coercion. The reliance on volunteerism alone was inadequate in Europe, and American 
leaders were about to figure out that fact too.12 
Indeed, the American volunteer army that fought during the Mexican border crisis 
the previous year numbered about two hundred thousand men. Millions more than that 
would be required to fight in a war that already littered the battlefields of Europe, Asia, 
and Africa with millions of dead. More than ten million men were recorded as killed, 
wounded, captured, or missing in the first complete semi-official report from the various 
belligerent countries in early 1917. To properly enter and compete with those European 
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nations, the American government’s early estimates deemed over seven hundred 
thousand men to be the minimum necessary to enter the conflict. At least a few members 
of the House and Senate would have been old enough to remember the draft riots from 
the Civil War. Any vote for a conscription bill would make them fear for their political 
futures if they voted in favor of a draft. Instead, government officials were initially 
hopeful they could reach the required number of military men through volunteers alone. 
From North Carolina, this feat would mean augmenting its national guard with an 
additional five thousand men. Individual citizens, the state government, and the federal 
government all preferred this option initially. Volunteers could choose their command 
and branch of service, serve under officers that the volunteers knew, and serve with 
friends from home, not to mention have the honor of one’s name displayed in the local 
newspaper. Better chances for a promotion also titillated volunteer opportunities. 
Governor Bickett issued a proclamation acknowledging that “North Carolina will not 
fail” in this task.13 
However, early on during the government’s recruiting efforts, it became clear that 
volunteerism alone would not be enough to fill the armed forces. North Carolina did not 
fail to support Governor Bickett’s plea, but the initial enlistments proved inadequate. 
Federal officials began drafting a new idea to fix this problem, and the Selective Service 
Act of 1917 became the answer. For the second time in American history there would be 
a nationwide draft. Many in Congress contended that conscription was unconstitutional, 
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but the Supreme Court upheld the law in 1918. Kitchin saw conscription as a violation of 
American rights. He and several of his colleagues preferred a more “honorable” volunteer 
army that did not pluck young men from their homes to go fight in an unpopular war. At 
one point, he suggested to a colleague that those who had clamored for war should go to 
the front themselves. However, he recognized that a conscription draft would eventually 
win the day. Kitchin wrote to a concerned constituent, “I shall vote for the volunteer bill. 
However, conscription will doubtless pass by a big majority.” There was moderate debate 
in the Senate and House over the conscription bill, but sentiment in favor of the 
resolution was almost unanimous. Even the long-time champion of rural America, 
William Jennings Bryan, gave up his fight against conscription when the United States 
entered the war. The Selective Service Act eventually passed 397 to 24 in the House and 
81 to 8 in the Senate.14 
Despite conscription becoming the preferred method of building the military, it 
was not universally accepted. Kitchin even hypothesized that the majority of his 
colleagues in Congress disagreed with conscription but “could not get up the courage to 
go against the influences of the press and the demands of the war officials.” Non-leaders, 
especially many recent American immigrants became alarmed at the thought of 
conscription because they recently left countries where forced service was the norm. 
“Conscription is immoral, unAmerican, and unconstitutional,” one American asserted. He 
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wondered “why in the name of humanity drag us into a war which we disapprove? 
Conscription is the thin entering wedge of military despotism. Go to Europe and fight 
Germany if you want to, but do not try to drag us with you.” This sentiment was shared 
by many North Carolinians. Josephus Daniels wondered why the United States should 
“introduce Prussianism to fight Prussianism?” Harkening back to the draft riots from the 
Civil War, many Tar Heels took their displeasure to the streets, in Ashe County for 
example. Surprisingly, these protests were the aberration, as most of the ten million draft-
age American men filled out their draft cards without much grief.15 
Other North Carolinians feared that draft boards might institute favoritism in their 
selections. This policy was from the federal government, after all, and many southerners 
in general continued to distrust Uncle Sam. Many believed that draft board members 
could keep their own sons or close friends from eligibility in the draft. But the federal 
government was quick to reassure people that the Selective Service Act made it 
impossible to play favorites. The Provost Marshal General issued a statement to combat 
these fears. He said, “There is no ground for such a fear” because “the law is specific and 
allows no latitude to the [local] officials.” Every man was required to register, and the 
draft calls were randomized, so there was little possibility of fraud from the local 
boards.16 
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In their initial plans for the draft, the Wilson Administration sought to exempt 
married men, but this proved problematic with various discrepancies that were allowed. 
Then the debate over what age range should be included in the draft began. Especially in 
rural areas, many Americans believed nineteen- and twenty-year-old farm boys were too 
naïve for war. Eventually, the administration settled that wartime-essential industry 
employees, the clergy, divinity students, and members of “established” religious 
denominations holding “well recognized” objections to war would be exempt and all 
other men between twenty-one and thirty would be included. Kitchin took particular 
exception to the exemptions established by the Selective Service Act. Like many 
southerners and representatives of rural areas, Kitchin argued that farmers were just as 
essential as industrial workers and demanded that their service be exempted or deferred, 
but he failed to persuade the selective service draft board.17 
Despite the mandatory nature of conscription, the government still had to “sell” 
the army and navy to the country. The federal government tried to tie registration for the 
draft to civic duty as much as possible. For example, draft-aged men had to register at 
their voting poll places, rather than the post office, which is where the regular army did 
its recruiting. The selective service boards were made up of local officials but not regular 
military officers. Tactics like these made the mandatory nature of registration seem like a 
normal civic duty, the same way an American would register to vote. Young men from 
the Tar Heel state often felt compelled to cast their lot in the selective service draft, not 
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necessarily due to the legal obligation hoisted on them from the federal government, but 
because of a newly created social norm, voluntarism. Women might join one of the 
groups that supported the war effort or simply join a knitting organization to make socks 
for soldiers’ packages. Whether or not those socks ever made their way to a Doughboy is 
questionable, but the spirit of voluntarism was high, and women felt a sense of 
accomplishment that they could “knit their bit.” Men, on the other hand, had to volunteer 
themselves for military service, or at least volunteer their lot to the selective service when 
that came.18 
Newspapers across the country, as well as in North Carolina, reinforced the 
government’s call to voluntarism. One headline read, “Are You A Slacker?” The term 
“slacker” emerged to explain a person who failed in his or her duty to voluntarism. It is a 
word typically associated with deserters, but in 1917, it applied to all Americans who did 
not volunteer. Pressure for conforming to voluntarism, as well as outright repression, 
helped to suppress opposition nationwide. Except for the possible exceptions of a few 
politicians such as Eugene Debs or Robert La Follette, there was no national figure to 
galvanize an anti-volunteer effort, but even those two figures only influenced people 
already accustomed to them. After the declaration, nearly every major political 
personality got behind the war effort, including Kitchin, who still opposed the war but 
had to work with Wilson to help properly conduct it.19 
 
18 Capozzola, Uncle Sam, 83-90; Traxel, Crusader Nation, 281. 
19 “Are You A Slacker?” Wilmington Dispatch, September 30, 1917; Chambers, To Raise an Army, 205. 
204 
 
The notion of voluntarism denotes some sense of consent on the part of the 
volunteer, as if it was a simple duty, like a person might volunteer time to a local church 
function. Typically, volunteers are unpaid, and the task is performed out of an obligation. 
Posters created by the United States War Department made voluntarism seem to be this 
kind of task (see figure 3). Men and women alike were coerced into volunteering through 
the government’s propaganda efforts, along with what can only be described as shaming 
from other Americans. This kind of coercion was not needed in totalitarian Russia or 
Austria, where citizens were often forced into labor or military service. The reality there 
was, of course, different from the rhetoric used in the United States. While every 
American was expected to be a volunteer, many did not.20 
 
21 
Figure 5. America Calls Enlist in the Navy  
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Even though it was only a few months after the president was reelected for 
keeping “us out of war,” there seemed to be little blame for a broken campaign slogan 
among potential Tar Heel soldiers. Some were scared of the German imperial 
possibilities, while others wanted revenge for the sinking of merchant ships and the loss 
of American life on British liners. Wilson quickly made the Great War a war of ideals 
and a fight for democracy, and Governor Bickett agreed. The governor toured the state 
explaining that if Britain and France fell, America would stand alone against German 
militarism. He acknowledged that there would most likely not be a large-scale 
amphibious invasion. Most ordinary Tar Heels also recognized that the United States was 
in no immediate danger of such an invasion and saw the coastal defenses that were 
already available as among the best in the world to defend the country. Bickett argued 
though, that the German influence on Central and South America in Mexico, of course, 
and also in Brazil would be too much for the United States to bear alone. The president 
used this argument, among others, to turn the World War into a black-and-white struggle, 
the way Americans preferred their wars, with a clear good side and a clear bad side.22 
Indeed, Wilson remained quite popular around the country. In a newspaper 
editorial, one American acknowledged what a tremendous task Wilson had dealt with to 
keep the country out of war before his reelection. Wilson’s stern and uncompromising 
character spoke to this man who appreciated that very few presidents since James 
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Monroe had to deal with such an international crisis. The editorialist relished the idea of 
Wilson becoming the undisputed leader of democracy when the war ended due to what he 
believed would be the collapse of European world dominance. While this sentiment was 
not shared by all Americans, many remained hopeful that Wilson and the United States 
would take on a new role as the democratic world’s leader.23 
Nevertheless, many North Carolinians still chose to resist the draft when their 
number was called. The most common modes of resistance were draft evasion and 
desertion. These are two different terms. Draft evaders were those men who either did not 
register, failed to show up when they were called, or never appeared for training. 
Deserters literally deserted their posts after they arrived for training camps or skipped 
town and hid from draft enforcers, usually in mountainous areas. Some dramatic cases 
turned into deadly confrontations, but on the whole, passive evasion was the dominant 
method. Draftees in rural areas of North Carolina were able to avoid their call to service 
with systematic ease. Since this military draft was the first one since the Civil War, and 
the first truly “nationwide” draft, local officials struggled to enforce conscription. There 
were no federal identity papers or social security numbers to see who was eligible to be 
drafted. Nor was there a large enough federal bureaucracy to enforce a nation-wide draft. 
It was much easier to hide away from draft enforcement in the rural areas of North 
Carolina. Selective service officials reported that about 337,000 men avoided service 
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nationwide, but perhaps the true number was as high as 3,000,000. In the end, most of the 
evaders and deserters were never held accountable, except in a few specific cases.24 
North Carolinians had many different reasons for declining their requirement to 
serve. Fear or cowardice may have played a role in the minds of some. Suspected 
“cowards,” however, needed to be differentiated from legitimate conscientious objectors 
and pacifists such as Quakers or other religious pacifists. Political objections towards the 
war played a role in the objections of others. Many southerners disapproved of northern 
“militarism” in general and coupled that disapproval with a long-standing mistrust of the 
federal government. In many cases, the draftees were not criminal by nature and did not 
seek to break the law by avoiding military service. Rather, many of them had familial 
obligations, farm work, or some other honorable reason for evading Uncle Sam’s call. 
Many men also agreed with Representative Kitchin’s conclusions about the war and saw 
no reason to head off to Europe to fight and possibly die in a European conflict, despite 
President Wilson’s assertion that the fight was for worldwide democracy.25 
Luckily for federal officials, there was no repetition of the widespread rioting or 
antidraft resistance that was seen during the Civil War, but there were several dramatic 
cases nationwide and locally in North Carolina where Americans actively resisted being 
called for service. In the highest profile cases, the Secret Service was called in to 
investigate. Usually, state government officials tried to explain that these instances were 
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led by outlying radicals who, they suggested, may have even been financed by German 
money, although there is little evidence to support that claim. Newspapers reported one 
high-profile incident in very black-and-white terms where “loyal farmers” in Texas 
tipped off the government about conspirators who were ready to “shoot conscription 
officers” rather than face the draft. Draft resistance in North Carolina turned aggressive 
only a handful of times. Two instances in North Carolina mountain counties had the 
opportunity to turn into serious, or even deadly, events.26  
The first, in Mitchell County, North Carolina, occurred in May 1918 when over a 
dozen men who were at camp went home on furlough leave from their training but failed 
to return on time. Most of these thirteen men returned peacefully to their unit. Local 
police and the sheriff were called on to capture the remaining slackers, but the local law 
enforcement officers either could not, or probably would not, make any serious attempts 
to find them. One of the thirteen men who had already returned told the chairman of the 
draft board for Mitchell County that he had been “anxious to return to camp” in order to 
avoid punishment. The board official, Mr. McAbee, hatched a plan to convince this man 
to go out and let the other men know that if they returned voluntarily, McAbee would go 
with them back to their training camp and ask for lenient treatment, or even for no 
punishment at all.27 
Army Major John D. Langston unofficially charged the Mitchell County law 
enforcement officers with being either “grossly negligent or in sympathy with the 
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deserters” for failure to adequately and immediately apprehend the men. Major Langston 
indicated that he believed the situation was far worse than had been reported to the 
federal government. He sought out assistance from special operatives in the Department 
of Justice to bring the Mitchell County men back into line. The major’s worries turned 
out to be unfounded and the special operatives were not needed. The deserters from this 
county either returned or surrendered voluntarily and were brought in without major 
incident.28 
While the Mitchell County instance ended peacefully, the most notorious case in 
North Carolina took place a month later in Ashe County in June 1918. When forty drafted 
men refused to answer their conscription call, the local officials determined that a general 
round-up was the best option to collect the deserters in this county. The deserters armed 
themselves and gathered to resist their call to arms in a standoff that culminated on June 
24. When officials moved in to arrest the slackers, one deserter and one civilian ended up 
being killed. The state reserve militia out of Winston-Salem was ordered to hold itself 
ready for a week in case the Ashe County deserters continued to resist. The governor 
determined that any use of force against North Carolinian deserters should be a last 
resort, “after all other methods have failed.” Between fifteen and twenty men may have 
died resisting the draft around the United States during the war, including at least these 
two men in North Carolina.29  
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Governor Thomas Bickett made a special trip to Ashe County to address the 
crisis. As soon as those deserters in Mitchell County were advised of their duties, they 
returned voluntarily. Bickett believed the same would be true in Ashe County. He asked 
that news of his visit be sent to every “nook and corner” of the county and special efforts 
be made to ensure friends and relatives of all of the deserters be in attendance. After his 
arrival, Bickett announced to the people of Ashe County, “I come to you today to save 
and not destroy.” He delivered a thoughtful, compassionate, and uplifting speech to the 
“men of the mountains.” The governor told the crowd that he believed in his heart that 
the deserters were misinformed and that is why they left. He believed that their actions 
were based on “ignorance and false information.” Bickett spoke to the crowd about 
militarism in Germany as the major cause of the war in the first place and assured them 
that Wilson was no Kaiser. The president only wanted to keep the world from falling to a 
militarist government and make the world safe for democracy. Within two weeks of the 
governor’s arrival, the situation was quelled, and virtually all of the Ashe deserters 
returned to camp.30 
“Every deserter,” Governor Bickett noted in Ashe County, “is the son or grandson 
of a man who deserted the Confederate Army.” The South had a longstanding tradition of 
desertion. Common white southerners deserted from the Confederate army during the 
Civil War, and by the time the war was no longer in doubt, they did so by the thousands. 
Over one hundred thousand southerners officially deserted from the Confederate army. 
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This desertion is typically downplayed in popular and academic sources, but its impact 
was significant. Governor Bickett asserted that a lack of consequences for deserters from 
the Civil War had convinced many Tar Heels in 1918 that they only needed to wait out 
the draft in hiding, and afterwards, they could then go back to their lives as if nothing 
happened at all. Shifty North Carolina politicians also suggested that the draft, among 
other things, would make the Democratic Party unpopular enough for a new Republican 
administration to be elected, which would issue a general amnesty for all deserters.31 
The general amnesty argument from those politicians was seen by others as 
nothing but political bluster. Newspapers reported on the severe consequences that 
awaited any draft dodger. The president’s proclamation made clear that anyone who 
failed to register for the selective service draft would be subject to imprisonment of up to 
one year depending on the excuse offered. Even men too ill to present themselves for 
registration were required to make appropriate arrangements for an agent to register them 
on their behalf. And anyone who would be out of town on registration day was required 
to mail in their registration or otherwise make arrangements to complete the process. No 
message being put out by the federal government should have led ordinary people to 
believe a new administration would be lenient on them if they failed to sign up for the 
draft.32 
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Active resistance was, of course, an aberration, and not the norm. By mid-July, 
newspapers reported that there were as many as 138 deserters in Wake County, for 
example, compared to the 40 or fewer from Ashe County. Mitchell and Ashe only got so 
much attention because of the armed resistance. Most slackers passively resisted by 
hiding, running away, or some other method. Many others were just ignorant of their 
obligations according to several southern governors, especially in the cases of many 
African Americans. More than ninety-five thousand men across the South were officially 
labelled deserters. Southern governors and other leaders usually explained the desertion 
of most of these men as a series of misunderstandings. The governors said the men did 
not know they had to show up to the local draft boards because they were from rural 
areas with poor communication channels. Former Lieutenant Governor William C. 
Newland asserted that most North Carolinian slackers would make “the finest type of 
soldier once their duties were clearly explained to them.” African American draft evaders 
were usually described as too stupid to understand that they were drafted at all. By 
attributing desertion to ignorance or inexperience, rather than some kind of malice, 
southern authorities could maintain their reputations as patriots and also salvage the 
reputations of those deserters for later service in the army.33 
These arguments were applied specifically in North Carolina too, but not nearly 
as many Tar Heels deserted as in the rest of the southern United States. Most North 
Carolinians, however, were simply not accustomed to the military discipline necessary 
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for a modern army in 1917. Many did show up for training in “boot camp” but quickly 
found the lifestyle of the army disagreeable, so they simply wandered off and returned 
home, or they hid from draft enforcers near their homes. These tactics were especially 
easy for men from rural areas who could hide out in the mountains until they were 
forgotten, or the war ended, whichever came first, they believed. Whatever their personal 
reasons might be, these men became known in official and unofficial channels as 
“slackers.” More than 480,000 total Tar Heels registered for the selective service draft. 
Roughly 1,600 of these draftees refused to answer Uncle Sam’s call to service, although 
the true number may never be fully known. However, 62,557 of the drafted men did go to 
training, did swear in, and became soldiers, sailors, or Marines, or were otherwise 
discharged from their service requirement for medical or family reasons.34 
Most county draft boards around the country created “slacker lists” to note who 
these men were and where they were from. The slacker lists were in direct opposition to 
what President Wilson called the “lists of honor,” or the registration lists.  The “lists of 
honor” appeared in newspapers around North Carolina. They alphabetically prepared the 
names of all registrants in their readership districts so that their loved ones and neighbors 
could spot them instantly. Of course, the names were segregated. The slacker lists 
documented the names, ages, hometowns, registration, and actions taken against the 
offender, if any. Not every man who made it onto a slacker list automatically became a 
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criminal. In many cases, the potential draftee had his registration cancelled for some 
reason or another. Due to insufficient federal information, men would register in the 
wrong county or might register, but have the enrollment cancelled because they were 
underage or sick in some way. White and black men showed up about equally on these 
lists in North Carolina, although across the South, black men made up about sixty percent 
of the total number. Furthermore, in terms of percentages, black men had a higher rate of 
desertion than whites, due to the overall numbers of white and black men in North 
Carolina. However, “slacking” in general was the aberration. North Carolina’s desertion 
rate was well below the rates from the rest of the South and was even or lower than the 
rest of the nation’s percentage. Indeed, by percentage, white North Carolinians had the 
lowest rate of desertion in the entire South.35 
The American military that did go to war was an obsolete one. It was organized 
along pre-1914 lines and was severally underequipped, as demonstrated during the 
Mexican border crisis one year prior to America’s entry into the World War. For a war 
marked by the introduction of tanks (in 1916) and the large-scale use of poison gas in 
combat (in 1915), the United States was devoid of its own tanks or gas masks. There 
were roughly 742 field guns and 43 heavy guns in the country, and they all lacked 
sufficient ammunition to go to war. The army had fewer than 2,000 machine guns, and 
the ones it did possess were mostly out of date. The air force, if it can be called such, 
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consisted of a handful of “assorted flying machines,” ill-equipped for use on any 
battlefield. Most American recruits trained with broomsticks as replacement guns. The 
American navy faced similar shortcomings. Most ships were in need of repairs and only 
one in ten was fully manned with a sufficient amount of sailors. Just as the army was not 
ready to face the new realities of twentieth-century war, lacking tanks and gas masks, the 
navy had no experience with anti-submarine warfare, which would be its main task. 
Military leadership was also inadequately prepared for a modern war.36 
Despite the American military’s obvious inadequacies, the United States was at 
war after April 1917 and had to prepare appropriately. Training camps for new soldiers 
were set up throughout the country, including three in North Carolina: Camp Greene near 
Charlotte, Camp Bragg near Fayetteville, and Camp Polk near Raleigh. These training 
camps were not specifically established for North Carolinians, but there were certainly 
many Tar Heels who trained at them. In fact, many North Carolinian draftees and 
volunteers went to other states to train. For example, National Guard volunteers from 
North Carolina were sent to South Carolina’s Camp Sevier for their training.37 
No training camp was the same as another, despite the uniform nature that 
military discipline requires. Camp Bragg eventually evolved into the largest military 
training facility in the entire country. Camp Polk became one of the nation’s few training 
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centers during the Great War for tank crews, a very new weapon of war in 1917. The 
camps became small cities and developed their own personalities. Camp Greene, for 
example, hosted about forty thousand soldiers just outside of Charlotte. This camp, like 
many others, established its own newspaper, The Caduceus. But unlike other camp 
papers, this paper focused specifically on daily life at Camp Greene, as opposed to the 
national news and war updates found in others. The paper both informed and entertained 
the soldiers. It included cartoons and history lessons, as well as information on 
maintaining proper hygiene.38 
Black Tar Heels contributed to the military too, albeit in a segregated fashion. 
Newspapers reported that although government leaders initially feared that black men 
would try to evade the draft, they “crowded about the polls anxious to get their names on 
the list of honor.” Indeed, African Americans served at arms in every war fought by the 
United States in its history. Many black leaders in the early twentieth century, such as 
W.E.B. Du Bois, urged African Americans to “close ranks” during the Great War. 
Perhaps naively, Du Bois believed that if African Americans showed their “loyalty 
during this time of trial,” that they would be rewarded by the rest of America for their 
service once the war came to an end. President Wilson pledged to make the world safe 
for democracy, and America was part of the world, after all. Other black leaders were not 
 
38 The Caduceus, May 25, 1918; Bandel, North Carolina, 28-31; Herbert White, “Camp Greene,” Our 
State, July 29, 2014, https://www.ourstate.com/camp-greene/. 
217 
 
so optimistic. They believed that it was hypocritical for Wilson to make claims about 
promoting democracy while relegating black Americans to second-class status.39 
For most African Americans, though, the war meant very little at all, at least 
initially. Like their white neighbors in North Carolina, the war and the complexities of 
European politics were confusing but remained a world away. It was not until the 
Selective Service Act was passed that many black Americans began to pay attention. 
African Americans were not exempt from the draft despite the wishes of several southern 
politicians, including Claude Kitchin and James Vardaman. Many white southern leaders 
were terrified at the idea of a black man in uniform. For practical reasons, they feared that 
the South might lose its cheap black laborers to the army, where men like Kitchin 
dreaded that the new soldiers might even learn ideas above their second-class station in 
the South. Even more worrying to southern whites, upon joining the army, black men 
would be trained for war, and they might use that training to defend the new ideas they 
learned. Kitchin and his allies fought hard against including African Americans in the 
selective service draft for these reasons but ultimately lost. One of the compromises 
offered to southerners like Kitchin was that army and navy units would be segregated.40 
Upon American entry to the war, about ten thousand black men were regulars in 
the army, and with black inclusion in the draft, those numbers increased. Almost three 
hundred thousand African Americans registered for the selective service draft. Many who 
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joined or were drafted would ultimately be relegated to manual labor and mundane tasks 
far away from white eyes that were “allergic to the sight” of a black man in uniform. This 
situation was not remarkably different from the military roles reserved for black soldiers 
in previous American conflicts. The military in 1917 resembled the American public, 
where segregation was still the norm, whether de facto or de jure. There were black units 
that fought in France, such as the famous Harlem Hellfighters, and in fact, the first 
American units to see active combat were black units. However, most African American 
soldiers would be sent to guard duty in the Philippines, Hawaii, or on the Mexican 
border, far away from the battlefields of Europe.41 
More than twelve thousand Native Americans served in the American military 
during the Great War. Although their legal status as American citizens was in question 
for many years before the war, the arguments denying their citizenship conveniently 
disappeared after war was declared. Thousands of American Indians from many different 
tribes were drafted, but many more volunteered. In North Carolina, the superintendent to 
the Eastern Band of Cherokee expected every Cherokee to report for induction if their 
draft number was called. Unlike African American soldiers, these Cherokee were 
assigned to white units, with several even rising to the rank of non-commissioned officer. 
One of the most famous roles for American Indians in the First World War, although not 
nearly as famous as those from the Second World War, was in the role of code talking. 
The Eastern Band of Cherokee were called on during the Somme Offensive in 1918 to 
 
41 Chad L. Williams, Torchbearers of Democracy: African American Soldiers in the World War I Era 
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2008), 2, 53; Keith, Rich Man’s War, 121-122. 
219 
 
speak their own language to relay messages between American officers. American 
leadership figured that there were no Germans who knew the Cherokee language, so there 
would be no way to capture the message. That proved to work very well. After a German 
officer was captured, he reportedly begged his captors to reveal what language he had 
heard.42 
It took nearly a year of preparations and training after the preparedness campaign 
of 1915 to 1916 to get American Doughboys ready to fight on the Western Front. By the 
spring of 1918, the exhausted British and French welcomed fresh American soldiers with 
open arms. The United States participated in a number of battles across northern France 
including at Cantigny, Chateau-Thierry, and Belleau Wood, among many others. North 
Carolinians served in every major battle on the Western Front in 1918, most famously in 
the Meuse-Argonne campaign, which was the last major American offensive of the war. 
The American Doughboys proved to be an instrumental asset in turning back the final 
German offensive, known as the Spring Offensive, or Kaiserschlacht. However, 
American military officers committed many of the same tactical and strategic mistakes 
that the French, British, and German officers made many years prior, but by late 1918, 
the German army was too exhausted to continue fighting. The Allied nations achieved 
victory on November 11 of that year.43 
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Henry Gunther was the last American killed in the Great War. He was a native of 
Maryland. Perhaps his family knew the group of North Carolinians who lived in 
Baltimore and wrote letters and sent telegrams to Claude Kitchin in 1915 and 1916. 
Gunther charged toward a German roadblock with his bayonet fixed about a minute 
before the armistice took effect. The Germans manning the post knew of the impending 
armistice and tried to wave him off, but he fired one or two shots and they responded 
with a short burst of machine gun fire that killed Gunther instantly. At 11:00 am local 
time, guns fell silent across Europe for the first time in a little over four years. A 
staggering twenty-nine North Carolinians died before 10:59 am on November 11.44 
Though it was somewhat expected, the armistice caught most Americans off 
guard. By early November 1918, many newspapers were already publishing material that 
suggested the war was just about over. The general sentiment in North Carolina was a 
desire for a return to normalcy. Advertisements in the papers were trying to sell families 
goods based on the feeling that their sons would be home soon and needed to relax after 
their experience “over there.” There was some celebration, but mostly, it seemed that 
ordinary Tar Heels were just excited that the United States won. President Wilson’s 
black-and-white war ended with the good side as the victor.45 
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When soldiers on the battlefields of Europe heard about the armistice, many were 
shocked. Some doughboys stood in a stupor, careful not to get their hopes up. There were 
still battles being fought until 10:59 am. But the confusing trance soon turned to 
jubilation across the continent, and indeed, the world. At the end of a cataclysm that was 
seldom seen in the world, it would be difficult to find an adequate way to celebrate. Some 
men cried, some cheered, but for many, there was a relief that they made it through with 
their lives. Of course, it is impossible to accurately account for the total number of men 
and women who were dead, missing, or wounded during the Great War. North Carolina 
sent 86,457 soldiers to fight for the United States. Of those men, 828 were killed and 
3,655 were wounded. An additional 1,542 died from various diseases during their time in 
service, mostly from the influenza pandemic. Estimates of around twenty million dead 
and twenty-one million wounded worldwide are our best modern estimates. The 
American dead totaled 116,708. Those soldiers and sailors who came home would have 
to find a way to make the war make sense to them. For all of Wilson’s blustering 
speeches about making the world safe for democracy, it was up to the individual soldiers 
to reconcile the hardships they faced in Europe.46 
When the fighting drew to a close, Kitchin began to lose his influence and voice 
in Congress. Wilson was desperate to win the peace and called for the mid-term elections 
of 1918 to be a solid referendum of American confidence in his policies, which 
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ultimately backfired. The Democrats lost their majority, and by the turn of the decade, 
Kitchin delivered his final major political speech. He spent his time defending the Wilson 
Administration and berating his Republican colleagues. The fighting ended but the peace 
treaty took a long time to write. Wilson spent many months in Paris working on the 
details with David Lloyd George, Georges Clemenceau, Vittorio Orlando, and 
representatives from nearly every nation on Earth. Republicans grew impatient and 
demanded a quicker resolution. Kitchin, for a change, supported Wilson. While 
delivering a speech of support on April 9, 1920, Kitchin recognized something was 
wrong. He rushed back to his office to rest, but years of high blood pressure and stress 
finally accomplished what no Republican could: a stroke permanently disabled him.47
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CONCLUSION: KITCHIN AND POSTWAR NORTH CAROLINA, 1919-1923 
 
 
ARMISTICE SIGNED, END OF THE WAR! 
--New York Times headline, November 11, 1918 
  
In April 1920, Claude Kitchin suffered the first in a series of strokes and his 
health became worse. He suffered from influenza, vertigo, dizziness, and headaches all 
while trying to carry on his duties in the House of Representatives. He saw numerous 
doctors, at least one who was a quack and was later arrested for practicing medicine 
without a license. He even underwent a surgery to remedy his ailments, but nothing could 
fix the problems caused by the stroke other than temporary relief from the dizziness. In 
late May of 1923, he entered a hospital in Wilson, North Carolina. His condition 
fluctuated for several weeks with some improvement early on, but he deteriorated 
quickly. Then, on May 31, he passed away with Maria, a younger brother, and two of his 
children at his bedside. His funeral was held on June 1 in Scotland Neck, his hometown.1 
The subject of this dissertation is foremost America’s entry to the Great War from 
the viewpoint of North Carolina and the preparedness measures undertaken by the federal 
government between 1914 and 1917, but significantly, the specter of Claude Kitchin 
haunts every page. Kitchin is a largely forgotten figure today, and the fading of his 
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memory began almost as soon as the war ended. The Sixty-Sixth Congress was 
sworn into office many months before the final armistice was signed. The Republican 
Party regained the majority for the first time in almost a decade. Kitchin became the 
Democrat’s Minority Leader in the Sixty-Seventh Congress and served as head of the 
Democratic Caucus until 1923, albeit in a behind the scenes role due to his condition, but 
the Democrats had lost even more seats by that point. Kitchin faded into relative 
obscurity in his final years of service, largely due to his health concerns, and became 
almost as obscure as he had been in the years before the war. He had no more war to rage 
against, nor a major leadership position to give him the pulpit to do so.1 
Kitchin’s obscurity needs to be rectified. He played a crucial role as the loudest 
voice of opposition to American involvement in the European war. Other scholars have 
noted that Tom Watson should fill that role as the “loudest” opponent of the war but this 
perspective overlooks the fact that Watson had no influence over any political policy in 
the 1910s. He could persuade the public through the newspapers but that comes nowhere 
near the power that Kitchin held. The office of the Majority Leader has been 
characterized as second in power only to the presidency and that held true in 1917. 
Kitchin voted against entering the war, but the president persuaded enough of Congress 
to vote in favor of America’s entry. After Kitchin died, his memorial address was well 
received by his contemporaries. Kitchin’s colleagues in Congress remembered him as a 
fierce opponent and loyal ally. President Wilson referred to Kitchin as “that distinguished 
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stubborn North Carolinian who when he made up his mind would never open it.” Like the 
president he so often butted heads with, a stroke took him out of the public’s eye but did 
not stop him from fulfilling his role in office. Wilson’s final months were obviously 
much more controversial with Edith Wilson serving as a “presidential steward,” while 
Kate Kitchin served no such role. Kitchin seemed to slowly wither away after suffering 
from his stroke.2 
From a twenty-first century perspective, Claude Kitchin’s adherence to white 
supremacy might make him a controversial, even odious figure. He never would have had 
the opportunity to oppose American entry to the First World War, without the race-based 
electioneering that helped send him to Congress in the first place. Previous books, 
articles, and theses have left out too much of the “bad stuff” from Kitchin’s rise to 
national prominence. When I began working on this topic, I assumed he was a typical 
southern racist, but did not anticipate the severity of his actions. He directly and 
indirectly participated in the disfranchisement of African Americans, as well as violence 
taken to achieve this action. Kitchin, like many of his southern colleagues, would almost 
certainly never have been elected to public office if not for these methods.  
Alex Arnett said the following about studying Kitchin: 
 
 
A study of the career of Claude Kitchin impresses one with the historian’s 
obligation to rectify the distorted impressions of him created in his day by the 
press and other agencies of propaganda and adequately to recognize his 
importance and worth. He has been almost ignored by historians and all but 
forgotten by the public. Few histories of his period mention his name, and none 
 
2 Margaret B. Klapthor and Allida M. Black, The First Ladies (Washington D.C.: White House Historical 
Association, 2001), 65; William E. Hazelgrove, Madam President: The Secret Presidency of Edith Wilson 
(Washington D.C.: Regency Publishing, 2016), Chapter 21; Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson and a 
Revolutionary World, 1913-1921 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1982). 
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accords him adequate recognition. In so far as he is remembered at all by the 




Arnett was partially correct, although his choice of wording is poor. Part of this 
dissertation’s purpose is to set the record straight concerning Kitchin’s actions but not 
just against the press or propaganda wings. Arnett’s own biography of Kitchin 
completely ignored the driving force behind Kitchin’s election to Congress. Kitchin has 
been ignored by the historical community, though, and for far too long. He elicits only 
minor references in most works concerning America and the Great War. 
In the course of researching Claude Kitchin, I initially did not intend to conduct 
official family interviews, but the opportunity presented itself to exchange a few thoughts 
with some of his family members. I have had the privilege of connecting with several 
decedents of Cap’n Buck Kitchin. Of those who shared their time, several were rather 
annoyed that the only existing biography of Kitchin got key information wrong about the 
family’s story and seemed unhappy with Arnett’s treatment of Kitchin in general. A 
historian should remain evenhanded about his or her subject in any case. Claude 
Kitchin’s great-great granddaughter shared the following with me when asked if she had 
any comment or thought to share about her political ancestor:  
 
 
 Claude Kitchin and William Walton Kitchin should only be recuperated so as to 
remind ourselves of their fervent commitment not only to the ideology of white 
supremacy but also to utilizing every political means at their disposal to maintain 
a racial caste system, both in North Carolina and the nation at large. Through a 
 
3 Alex Mathews Arnett, “Claude Kitchin Versus the Patrioteers,” The North Carolina Historical Review 14, 
no. 1 (January 1937): 20. 
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detailed historical account of the how and why of their machinations, including 
voter fraud and disenfranchisement, we might begin to confront the inequitable 
truths of our past and the ways in which they structure our present. As 
a descendant of Claude and William, I use the knowledge I have uncovered about 
their shameful beliefs and actions as a catalyst to work on behalf of racial justice. 
For me, there is nothing positive about their political legacies but instead a series 
of lessons about the dehumanizing havoc wreaked by white patriarchal power.4 
 
This dissertation brings the Kitchins “back to life” by remembering the good and 
the bad deeds of Claude Kitchin. 
Public history continues to ignore Kitchin. A few examples are worth noting. On 
August 2, 2014, the North Carolina Department of Cultural Resources’ World War 
Centennial Committee launched the state’s four-year-long centennial commemoration 
with a wreath-laying ceremony at the North Carolina Veterans Monument. What began 
as an obscure assassination in an even more obscure part of the world one hundred years 
earlier launched the United States into the twentieth century, as it did for many nations 
around the world. America participated in Old World politics with its system of 
entangling alliances, blind nationalism, and encroaching militarism for the first time in 
1917. President Wilson assured Americans that they would be fighting to make the world 
safe for democracy, in the so called “war to end all wars.” That proved not to be true. 
Many historians argue that the long nineteenth century ended with the First World War. 
The war undermined the old European order and created new national borders in Europe, 
Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. The very nature of war changed with more efficient 
methods of killing people. The worldwide role for women also changed by allowing them 
 
4 Email exchange with Emily Ruth Rutter, December 7, 2019; Email exchange with Sue M. Travis, 
September 18-19, 2019; Telephone conversation with Musette Steck, September 29, 2019.  
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into the sphere that had for so long been reserved for men. North Carolina experienced 
many of these changes too. The state became less rural, more worldly, and a better 
industrial power in the country. However, the focus of the North Carolina Department of 
Cultural Resources commemoration activities does not truly give a loud enough voice to 
the opposition.5   
The North Carolina Museum of History displayed an exhibit in Raleigh for the 
better part of two years between 2017 and 2018. Over six hundred thousand students, 
history buffs, looky-loos, and others experienced what it was like to “step in the boots” of 
a Tar Heel doughboy during World War I. The exhibit won awards for its recreation of a 
trench warfare environment. Guests were able to walk through the simulated battlefield 
while reading and seeing images of life in the trenches, complete with examples of 
weapons, uniforms, machinery, vehicles, food, and sandbags. Even the information that 
was not directly related to life as a soldier revolved around supporting the war effort. And 
again, at this museum, there was a true lack of acknowledgement of those North 
Carolinians who did not support entry to the war. Claude Kitchin was not featured in this 
exhibit but that is not surprising. It is more difficult to get students interested in the anti-
preparedness forces of Congress rather than a simulated trench experience.6 
The earliest stages of this dissertation were constructed with the same thoughts in 
mind. When one ponders the turbulent decade from a century ago, the World War should 
 
5 “North Carolina in World War I Blog,” NCDCR Blog Post, https://www.ncdcr.gov/blogs/world-war-i; 
David Blackbourn, The Long Nineteenth Century: A History of Germany, 1780-1918 (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1998), xiii-xxii, 489-498. 
6Christa Gala, “For Him, Teaching Museum Visitors about World War I is Personal,” Raleigh News and 
Observer, October 19, 2017; Personal observations by author. 
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jump out as the watershed moment in the careers of so many politicians, and for ordinary 
people also. So much ink has been spilled over the causes, course, and outcomes of the 
war, but not enough yet has come from those voices of opposition. Unlike America’s 
involvement in the Second World War, its declaration of war in April 1917 was not the 
result of any single overt action. Rather, a series of incidents, together with various 
economic and political concerns, eventually led the country into the Great War. Most 
often, we cite unrestricted German submarine warfare, the Zimmermann Telegram’s 
provocation of Mexican American distrust, news of the Russian Revolution, and the 
realization that American involvement in the war would lead to a greater influence on the 
postwar settlement when it concluded. The truth is in all of these reasons, because there 
was no single factor. Pointing to the destruction of the Lusitania is an easy ploy to 
explain America’s entry into the war, but that simple explanation fails to recognize many 
additional factors, including the amount of time between the sinking and the declaration 
of war.7 
It is easy to wonder today, as it was over one hundred years ago, why any North 
Carolinian would, or even should, support a war that was an ocean away. Tar Heels 
across the state would have looked at their newspapers and scoffed at the wild goings-on 
in a small corner of the world where king, emperors, and archdukes were assassinated 
with seeming regularity. It must have seemed impossible to believe for many of them that 
such an odd event would lead to almost eighty-seven thousand of North Carolina’s young 
 
7 John P. Finnegan, Against the Specter of a Dragon: The Campaign for American Military Preparedness, 
1914-1917 (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1974), 189-195. 
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men being called to fight. President Wilson’s rhetoric about patriotism and democracy 
obviously spoke to many. We can see today many of the same arguments that were 
employed about supporting the president’s foreign affairs endeavors, despite our 
collective understanding of their origins. Americans have a history of equating military 
service, or supporting the military, with patriotism which seems a strange phenomenon 
for a democratic republic, although similar ideas date back to the ancient Greeks. But this 
idea, like many modern ideas of patriotism, was born during America’s preparations for 
entering the Great War. Coercive volunteerism, an idea born during the preparedness 
movement, is still with us today.  
It is often perilous to draw parallels between different eras. History never repeats 
itself as plainly as some fairy tale beginning, “Twice upon a time . . .” Events are unique; 
yet, meaningful patterns do exist and ought to be examined for the insights that they can 
offer. I have tried, not always successfully, to monitor the parallels I draw between 
different time frames in this dissertation. I compared Kitchin to those that came before 
him not necessarily to suggest, “this is how the South always was . . .” but rather to 
illuminate patterns that may have influenced Kitchin’s motives and worldview. While 
history does rhyme often, it never repeats itself; otherwise, historians are but entertainers 
rather than educators.8 
There is no “official list” of numbers or names for those North Carolinians killed 
in service during the Great War. Those records were kept at the federal level, but an 
 
8 Frank L. Holt, Into the Land of Bones: Alexander the Great in Afghanistan (California: University of 
California Press, 2006), xii. 
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unfortunate fire at the repository in St. Louis in 1973 has made determining the true 
number very difficult. The military collection archivist at the State Archives of North 
Carolina, Matthew Peek, notes that newspaper reports of deaths in most wars are 
notoriously inaccurate. But to answer the question, Peek and the North Carolina WWI 
Centennial Committee, along with a number of volunteers, compiled a list starting in 
2013, although admittedly it is not 100 percent accurate. However, it is the best available 
source for death records in the state. This project concluded that 2,188 North Carolinians 
is the tally, but there are possibly more names to be collected for this list. After the war 
ended, soldiers had to return to normalcy as best as they could. North Carolina attempted 
to gather as much information from its returning soldiers as possible. Fewer records than 
expected survive today, especially for servicemen of color. The veterans who came home 
did not talk too much about their experiences for many decades. Scholars like Jackson 
Marshall were able to glean much from interviews conducted in the 1980s, but in the 
immediate post-war years, few veterans talked much about their experiences during the 
war.9 
As much as things changed after the war ended, they also seemed to stay the 
same. The federal government’s power expanded, but for the average citizen it was a 
return to the status quo. White soldiers and sailors returned to their civilian pursuits. 
Black Americans returned to their status as second-class citizens. The United States did 
 
9 R. Jackson Marshall, Memories of World War I: North Carolina Doughboys on the Western Front 
(Raleigh: Division of Archives and History, North Carolina Department of Cultural Resources, 1998); 
Matthew Peek and LeRae Umfleet, “List of North Carolina’s Dead WWI Service Individuals,” NCDCR 
Blog, November 15, 2018. https://www.ncdcr.gov/blog/2018/11/15/list-north-carolinas-dead-wwi-service-
individuals. This list is a downloadable Microsoft Excel sheet. The number of total dead North Carolinians 
is conflicted in nearly every source. 
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not join the League of Nations, and the country returned to normalcy, that is, America 
returned to the isolationist policies that President Washington urged over a century earlier 
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